Shifting baselines of Europe: new perspectives beyond neoliberalism and nationalism by Büllesbach, Daphne et al.
www.ssoar.info
Shifting baselines of Europe: new perspectives
beyond neoliberalism and nationalism
Büllesbach, Daphne (Ed.); Cillero, Marta (Ed.); Stolz, Lukas (Ed.)
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Sammelwerk / collection
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
transcript Verlag
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Büllesbach, D., Cillero, M., & Stolz, L. (Eds.). (2017). Shifting baselines of Europe: new perspectives beyond
neoliberalism and nationalism (X-Texte zu Kultur und Gesellschaft). Bielefeld: transcript Verlag. https://
doi.org/10.14361/9783839439548
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC Lizenz (Namensnennung-
Nicht-kommerziell) zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu
den CC-Lizenzen finden Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC Licence
(Attribution-NonCommercial). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-70943-6

European Alternatives: Daphne Büllesbach, Marta Cillero, Lukas Stolz (eds.)
Shifting Baselines of Europe
               
X  T  E  X  T  S 
X  T  E  X  T  S 
The supposed “end of history” long ago revealed itself to be much more an
end to certainties. More than ever, we are not only faced with the question of
“Generation X”. Beyond this kind of popular figures, academia is also chal-
lenged to make a contribution to a sophisticated analysis of the time. The se-
ries X-TEXTS takes on this task, and provides a forum for thinking ‘for and
against time’. The essays gathered together here decipher our present mo-
ment, resisting simplifying formulas and oracles. They combine sensitive
observations with incisive analysis, presenting both in a conveniently, read-
able form.
 
               
 
European Alternatives:
Daphne Büllesbach, Marta Cillero, Lukas Stolz (eds.)
Shifting Baselines of Europe
               
New Perspectives beyond Neoliberalism and Nationalism
www.euroalter.com
European Alternatives works to promote democracy, equality and culture beyond
the nation state
 
               
This work is licensed under
the Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 3.0 (BY-NC) license, 
which means that the text may be may be remixed, build upon and be distribu-
ted, provided credit is given to the author, but may not be used for commercial
purposes. For details go to: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/.
Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek
The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Natio-
nalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at
http://dnb.d-nb.de
© 2017 transcript Verlag, Bielefeld
Cover layout: Kordula Röckenhaus, Bielefeld
Typeset by Mark-Sebastian Schneider, Bielefeld
Printed by Majuskel Medienproduktion GmbH, Wetzlar
Print-ISBN 978-3-8376-3954-4
PDF-ISBN 978-3-8394-3954-8
Contents
Note from the editors | 9
IntroductIon
Shifting the baselines 
Daphne Büllesbach | 15
Our European incapacity
Etienne Balibar  | 18
Our European capacity 
Which Europe do we want? Rediscovering Hannah Arendt’s  
concept of integral federalism
Ulrike Guérot | 26
ShIftIng cItIeS
Introduction | 35
The magnet and the container 
A transnational space of expression  
for “Cities of change” through Europe 
Giuseppe Caccia | 37
The cities want them in 
For a revised common European refugee policy  
to revive the European Union
Gesine Schwan | 42
Rebel cities are not utopia
Interview with Luigi de Magistris, Mayor of Naples | 45
Institutions mean inertia
Interview with Laia Forné, Barcelona en Comú | 49
Moment of confluence on the Atlantic coast
Interview with Claudia Delso, Marea Atlántica  | 57
This is how you win an election
Stacco Troncoso in conversation with Victoria Anderica, head of 
Transparency, and Miguel Arana, director of Citizen Participation,  
City of Madrid | 62
Forerunners of Italian municipalism
Interview with Renato Accorinti, Mayor of Messina | 70
Don’t let them d(r)own
Interview with Dobrica Veselnovic and Ksenija Radovanović,  
Ne da(vi)mo Beograd | 74
Cities rejecting sur veillance
Renata Avila | 78
ShIftIng MedIa
Introduction | 85
The populist Challenge 2.0  
How populism prof its from social media
Jan Rohgalf | 87
Contesting the shrinking media space in Slovakia
Alena Krempaska and Peter Weisenbacher | 97
Fluid media landscapes
Adam Ramsay | 101
Networked protest for a populist age
Jakub Dymek | 105
Journalism in spite of ever ything
Interview with Esther Alonso, eldiario.es | 109
We are the newcomers
Interview with Ramy Al-Asheq, Abwab  | 113
Our digitally mediated society
Robin Mansell | 119
ShIftIng allIanceS
Introduction | 131
A rigged economy in a rigged democracy
Lorenzo Marsili | 133
Breaking with the rules that ruin the Union
Lorenzo Marsili in conversation with Barbara Spinelli | 141
Social networks of influence in Europe – and beyond
Dieter Plehwe | 147
Learning from Syriza
Andreas Karitzis  | 158
The commons as unif ying political vision
Sophie Bloemen | 167
Instructions for building a pan-European movement
Interview with Pia Eberhardt, Corporate Europe Observatory | 174
Together means Razem
Interview with Marcelina Zawisza and Maciej Konieczny, Razem | 180
The birth of a new civic platform in Romania
Interview with Oana Băluță and Camil Pârvu, Demos | 185
The Rojava Revolution and the model of democracy without a state
Sheruan Hassan and Jonas Staal | 189
Works by Democratic Self-Administration of Rojava  
and Studio Jonas Staal 
New World Summit Rojava (2015-2017) | 193
A revolution of life
Jonas Staal in conversation with Salih Muslim | 200
annex
List of organisations in order of appearance | 207
List of contributors | 210
Note from the editors
Since we started work on this book, a political earthquake has shaken the 
world. Coming from the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, the shockwaves 
have reached Europe as well. However we judge these events, they make 
the title of this book seem even more up-to-date than in the late summer 
of 2016, when the idea to this publication first came up in the aftermath of 
European Alternatives’ Campus “Shifting Baselines” 1. Having gathered 
80 activists, researchers and artists from across the continent to develop 
strategies for an open and democratic Europe, we felt something essential 
to any political undertaking: optimism. By meeting other engaged citizens 
from within and outside Europe and getting to know projects from Poland 
to Portugal, we could see that there are alternatives already changing 
Europe. Struck by the remarkable and resourceful strength of the actors 
and thinkers of our network, we wanted to make these ideas accessible 
to a wider audience. We hope this book can amplify the optimism we felt 
when we met them.   
In our effort to shift Europe in a direction that we can define as 
forward, radically democratic, commons-based and catering to the needs 
1 | The concept of shif ting baselines has originally been developed in climate 
change research and later also adopted into social sciences analysis by the social 
psychologist Harald Welzer. The reference point is Daniel Pauly’s study: Anecdotes 
and the shifting baseline syndrome of fisheries in Trends in Ecology and Evolution 
10 (1995) about attitudes to climate change by fishermen. Pauly explains how 
humans tend to be unimpressed by environmental changes because they do not 
perceive long-term changes in their entirety but only in relation to conditions 
they themselves have witnessed. In his study some fishermen fail to identify the 
‘baseline’ population size of fish in the ocean and hence operate from a shif ted 
baseline. 
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of all, we gave this book the title and the structure of the Campus (Cities, 
Media, Alliances) because we see in these thematics a strong need and 
potential for political leverage. 
The phenomenon of shifting baselines means that the fundamental 
norms by which we judge what is acceptable are changing.2 They do so in a 
paradoxical way: on the one hand there is a lot of noise about the ‘populist 
age’, on the other hand, when it comes to the treatment of people fleeing 
war, to social security and solidarity, to what a good economic model is, 
what democracy and privacy mean, the shift is happening often gradually 
and going unnoticed. And in each of these areas there has been a shift, too 
often to the right, too often a race to the bottom. It would be fatal though, 
and also an incomplete analysis, to leave the picture like that. In the 
shadow of the big headlines, all over the continent, it is European citizens 
that every day keep the idea for a Europe for all alive through practicing it.
By taking already existing alternatives into consideration and combining 
them with contributions of distinguished and well-known authors, we try 
to present a positive and pragmatic transnational left position. The ideas 
here are largely born out of the practice and experience of activists from 
throughout the continent. We also think that policy recommendations 
can and should be drawn from the thoughts and projects presented here, 
against the general fatalism and political depression. This book shows that 
we do have alternatives and aims to reach not only researchers, activists 
and students already participating in politics, but also those that feel 
uncomfortable with the status quo but are not yet aware of the alternatives 
already under development. We want to open the often narrow discourse on 
the future of Europe and criticise the false dichotomy between nationalism 
on the one hand and a neoliberal version of Europe on the other. We still 
believe in a third option: A Europe made by and for its citizens. After all, 
“Shifting Baselines” leaves open in which direction the shift will happen.
2 | Also the concept of the ‘Overton Window’ could be evoked here as a helpful 
concept that refers to a framework of what ideas are seen as acceptable, in this 
case in a public policy context. See Nathan J. Russel (2006): An Introduction to 
the Overton Window of Political Possibilities, published at https://www.mackinac.
org/7504. 
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Introduction

Shifting the baselines 
Daphne Büllesbach
If you know European Alternatives, you will know what is important to us 
is to engage and inspire people to act. Having launched just over ten years 
ago, our aim has been, from the start, to contribute to the writing of the 
next chapter of European integration. A chapter that looks significantly 
different to the status quo and that can only be written by all those citizens 
who feel trapped in the neoliberal dogma of today’s European Union and 
whose voices too often go unheard. Our politics are based on the fact that 
it has become impossible to do progressive politics in only one country or 
only on a national basis, hence our motto of democracy, equality and culture 
beyond the nation state. We need a transnationally engaged civil society 
that understands itself as such and acts as such in itself and for itself. 
The wind is blowing ever stronger for those that do not want to give up 
the European project and retreat to nationalism, protectionism, walls and 
fences. But if we are unable to make a hegemonic shift in the direction of 
a progressive internationalism, we are not talking about the end of free 
movement, but the end of the European project itself.
We need to act now against the rise of authoritarianism in the guise of 
right wing populists. We need to act against the nationalism that threatens 
to destroy what we, the generations that have grown up with the fall of the 
Berlin wall, have taken for granted: freedom of movement for all people 
and, indeed, not only of us privileged European passport holders. And yet 
again, mere opposition is not enough, we cannot only engage in a politics 
of defense that is incapable of articulating something new, incapable of 
articulating the world we want to see.
For effective cooperation and transnational movement building, there 
is a need for better analysis and background on the context and realities 
in which actors operate. These are still very different across Europe and 
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across political fields, and often rooted in national or regional contexts. But 
while we also do have transnational spaces and many live transnational 
lives, little do we yet challenge power effectively on a transnational level 
(of those that do, we show examples in this book, including the anti-TTIP 
campaign). 
Electoral democracy is in a state of disrepair. Centre-left political parties 
have been hollowed out, social democracy has completed the shift towards 
market fundamentalism, leaving a potential vacuum. The banking crisis 
has brought no consequences and no government has stood up against the 
financial corporations. Movements for a fairer society and fairer economy 
flourish briefly, such as Occupy, Nuit Debout or the Refugees Welcome 
movement, that existed in the summer of 2015 across Europe. They shoot 
to international attention and capture people’s imagination, yet little 
seems left of them a few months after1. There is an increasing realisation 
that we need to shelve the pure horizontality of the movements of the 
squares as it fails to effectively challenge the centres of power. 
It is often the city, the space of social and cultural condensation, that 
provides the breeding ground for new ideas and formations, where many 
of these movements have started from. In Spain we have seen major cities 
being taken over by platforms emerging from the square occupations. 
Putting the citizen back into politics was the recipe to their success: what 
answers to the crisis of representation can we take from there? After 
just two years in power the civic platform government of Madrid has 
interesting perspectives to give on the question of whether their victory 
and the seizure of the institution has led to a politicisation of public life 
and whether they are able to go beyond the symbolism of that victory. This 
debate opens up the old question of whether the left should seize power 
or whether an institutionalised left is only busy negotiating the notorious 
contradictions between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ of government.
As the proclamation of the ‘post-factual era’ has made us aware again, 
the power of emotions and the need for inspiration are key to counteracting 
the rise of nationalism and the narrative of austerity and neoliberalism. 
1 | Meanwhile it is arguable that without Occupy, we might not have had Bernie 
Sanders or without the Refugees Welcome movement, we might not have had 
Merkel’s welcome policy.
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This book contributes to offering a vision and feeling of how alternatives 
could look like by creating visibility for such initiatives and narratives: 
from the municipal level to the level of transnational media, to how we 
work with technology and counter-surveillance, to a concrete proposal 
to revive the European refugee policy and the fundamental change of 
making society provided by the commons movement. Our motivation 
is to give people the desire to engage politically for an open, equal and 
democratic society.
The book is divided into three chapters that are each introduced in 
more depth separately. The following two texts are part of the introduction 
of this book as they set the tone, allowing us to understand the urgency in 
which we find ourselves in: a contribution by Etienne Balibar from 2011 
and an answer today by Ulrike Guérot. They tackle the fundamental crisis 
underlying the European integration process, the missed opportunity to 
become a Union of Citizens by giving up on national sovereignty. Guérot 
suggests the path shown by Hannah Arendt’s concept of integrated 
federalism could save the Union from disappearing into petty nationalisms. 
The mayor of Barcelona, Ada Colau, put it differently recently when she 
evoked the shifting baselines we are talking about here: “People call me a 
radical, but what is radical? We are living in strange times when defending 
democracy and human rights has become radical.” It is up to us to not let 
this be the narrative of our time and define ourselves what is radical today.
Our European incapacity
Etienne Balibar1 
To write about xenophobia in contemporary Europe – and especially to 
try and uncover the enigmatic path that would take us from the desolate 
shores of an ‘intolerant Europe’, whose tendencies appear increasingly 
self-destructive, to the more encouraging suggestions of a “new politics of 
hope” is not exactly an easy task in the current conjuncture.
This is not because we lack the necessary imagination or intellectual 
resolve, but because the more we think about it, the more we become 
aware that the path is intrinsically difficult to find: it could be effective 
only if we could bring together contradictory exigencies. This is more 
than utopian, since a ‘utopia’ is precisely what a ‘politics of hope’ is about 
and what it requires, in the sense of delineating the objectives and values, 
which “concerned citizens” are striving to promote. We may find this in 
the Open Letter to Europe of Ash Amin and his colleagues: “Living with 
Diversity” (which I completely endorse). This certainly does not prevent 
us from thinking about conditions, forces, material and cultural interests. 
The difficulty becomes infinitely greater, however, when we try and define 
a “politics of hope” in the very terms of the figures, tendencies, conflicts, 
movements of the situation that it should bring to an end. Because we 
are not even sure that we know or understand the realities that we want to 
transform, in spite of the fact that we are part of it. We rely on analogies, 
and these analogies are in fact highly problematic.
Let me take one example, which indeed I do not choose at random. 
Increasingly in Europe one hears it said (not only on the Left, or among 
intellectual militants) that the current situation is reminiscent of the 
great political and moral crisis of the 1930s. This is more than a way of 
adding pathos or dramatising the discourse: there must be an element 
1 | This ar ticle was first published in openDemocracy on 16th May 2011.
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of intelligibility, or at least a question impossible to ignore in the fact that 
a major disruption of the financial and economic system, precipitating 
masses into joblessness and insecurity (albeit not equally across nations, 
even in the European space), is accompanied by the increasing disrepute 
of political institutions throughout Europe, and a growing influence of 
xenophobic ideas, feelings, and parties. Respectable political analysts 
argue for the heuristic function of this analogy, and they also, obviously, 
mean it as a serious warning not to underestimate the tragic evolution 
that would become possible if the genuine causes and dimensions of these 
phenomena (and their conjunction) were not taken into account. I agree, 
especially because I am alarmed by the naiveté of such mantras as “history 
does not repeat itself” or “Europe has learnt the lessons of its tragic past” 
(witness the construction of the European Union …).
But I fear that the counterpart of this clarification is a blind spot 
covering the most enigmatic and embarrassing dimension of this political 
riddle, namely the contradictory reference both at the national and the 
transnational (or ‘global’) level, to democracy in a ‘Europe’ whose name 
now comprehends a totally different type of society.
Similar remarks apply to the use of the category ‘populism’, probably 
today the most widely invoked (both from inside and outside the nation) 
to name the xenophobic movements (most of the time strongly opposed 
to the “European supranational monster”, and also islamophobic or 
hostile to minorities) which – one country after another: East and West, 
South and North, gain visibility and credibility on the public stage, while 
encouraging violent attitudes towards ‘outsiders’. I hasten to add that I do 
not reject the term as such, especially because I am reminded of its long 
and ambivalent history as a political category inside and outside Europe, 
which it is especially worth studying in this moment.
Again, ‘serious’ political science seems at odds here with a contradiction 
impossible to resolve – possibly because it is itself part of the institutional 
system whose validity and durability is in fact challenged under the 
name ‘populism’. We are asked not to draw a simple line of equivalence 
between such ‘populism’ and ‘fascism’ or ‘neo-fascism’ (in spite of the 
traditions and the men or women who transmitted a language, a culture, 
even an agenda from one to the other in some European countries). But 
we are also alerted to the fact that ‘populism’ (especially when adopted 
as a self-definition by political parties) is clearly a euphemistic name for 
racism, especially that kind of racism (by no means entirely new) that 
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targets cultural difference and national origin as ‘inassimilable’ by the 
‘national community’: was not this discourse precisely the main defining 
characteristic of fascism, which provided its discourse, its culture, in the 
end its mode of government with the ‘interior enemy’ against which it 
claimed to defend the nation?
In a mirror image, there is a divergence between those theorists and 
analysts for whom a ‘populist’ movement is essentially ‘reactionary’, in 
the etymological sense, inasmuch as it expresses frustrations and anger 
against the transformations of contemporary societies and against the new 
‘elites’ who have appropriated positions of power; and those theorists for 
whom it brings back (even in a mystified, or destructive way) an element of 
popular contestation of power, and resistance to the ‘de-democratisation’ 
of neo-liberal ‘democracies’, a voice of the voiceless without which politics 
becomes reduced to the technocratic ‘governance’ of social tensions which 
are deemed both inevitable and inessential (since they do not involve 
historical alternatives).
But even the first theorists are led to explain that it would be self-
defeating for liberal democracies to ignore the element of truth and 
legitimacy involved in the ‘populist’ attacks against the corruption and the 
unlimited greed of the political-economic elites, or the mystification of the 
political life which resides in the fact that ‘left’ and ‘right’ governments 
basically implement the same policies. And the second are embarrassed 
to explain why a ‘popular’ reaction against the progressive neutralisation 
of every conflict with a meaningful social or cultural content, which 
has become the golden rule of ‘governmentality’ penetrating the (anti) 
political culture of the ruling elites in our countries, should coincide with 
an obsession with the decomposition of the national tissue, or the ‘loss’ of 
the cultural heritage of the nationals involved. Unless you implicitly admit 
a ‘Schmittian’ notion of political conflictuality as inextricable from the 
absolute primacy of the nation-State. Or also, even more problematically, 
you admit that the ‘popular classes’ are by their very nature, their social 
condition, etc., more inclined to enter into the conspiracy theories of the 
political, in which ‘elites’ and ‘rulers’ essentially aim to import outsiders, 
migrant workers, asylum seekers, and more generally foreigners, in order, 
first to provoke xenophobic and racist feelings in the masses, and second 
to exploit them as an instrument to undermine every revolutionary, or 
even progressive agenda …
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I do not believe that we can easily disentangle the political dilemmas 
involved in these oscillations (and I especially do not want to ‘resolve’ 
them by resorting to some pre-established ‘class analysis’). But I would 
like to offer some complementary hypotheses to start reflecting on the 
specific set of contradictions that seem to crystallise in the current crisis, 
even extending the complexity of its antitheses into the political projects 
through which we hope to overcome it. They are expressed both in terms 
which pointedly refer to Europe and at the same time to the obstacles to 
European construction. This is not meant to suggest that further steps in 
that construction – changing nothing in its dominant representation – 
would form a solution per se (on the contrary, I tend to believe that Europe, 
as it stands, has become ‘part of the problem’). It is also not a way to 
suggest that similar questions are not raised in other parts of the world (on 
the contrary I believe that these contradictions express global tendencies, 
but at the same time cannot be separated from specific historical and 
institutional conditions). So what I want to suggest is that we should 
do more to analyse ‘xenophobia in Europe’ as a European problem in the 
strongest sense: one that Europe creates, but also one that only Europe can 
resolve – perhaps at the cost (and the risk) of recreating itself on different 
bases. In this regard we already see a difference within the analogy with 
the situation of the 1930s (and the rise of fascism), and with other ‘populist 
moments’ in world-history.
My first hypothesis will be, simply, that there is again a ‘national question’ in 
Europe today, which has been completely underestimated, if not repressed, 
in the debates on the conditions, the modalities and effects of European 
construction; whereas in fact understanding it and joining together 
to address it should have been a primary concern for the ‘architects’ of 
Europe. Some of the main causes of this suppression clearly lie in the 
fact that the ruling classes of the European nations (and especially the 
‘leading’ nations) believed in the irresistible power of economic integration 
to ‘homogenise’ (on individualistic and consumerist bases) the societies 
which Europe was bringing into its common territory ‘without internal 
borders’, while at the same time fiercely resisting every idea to build 
channels of communication and processes of mutual recognition (through 
education, but also social struggles and political campaigns) which would 
allow the peoples to confront their histories and merge their interests. For 
this would also have challenged the monopoly of representation of these 
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ruling classes, both internally and at the supranational level (and thus 
their remaining the inevitable intercessors of ‘their’ peoples with regard to 
the European institutions).
In a sense this is exactly what ‘populism’ says: that Europe creates a 
problem for the nations (or even “destroys” them). Except that we must 
see the situation from an entirely opposite point of view: Europe reveals 
the incapacity of the nations, in the current historical moment, to resolve 
their problems (be they cultural or economic) in a ‘sovereign’ manner, 
while depriving them of every substantial possibility to resolve them at a 
different, common or interactive, level – thus becoming themselves ‘post-
nations’, or, better still, ‘post-sovereign nations’, which is not at all the same 
thing as no nations, or radically de-nationalised societies.  In other terms, 
Europe has not really conceived (in spite of many lengthy and beautiful 
discourses) and even less constructed its own pluralism or “diversity”, 
a failure, which has produced a completely ‘fetishised’ representation 
of collective identities, enclosing them in the stereotypes of ‘invented 
traditions’.
It would be necessary here, of course, to go into some details about the 
crucial moments of this history of missed encounters and opportunities, 
by insisting particularly on the dramas of decolonisation (which totally 
displaced the reality and the image of the “stranger” in Europe), and 
the fall of the Cold War division (which was perceived on one side as an 
opportunity to resurrect historic nations crushed by totalitarian socialism, 
and on the other side as either the opening of a new empire, or a threat 
of new competitors). But I want simply to jump to a possible conclusion: 
xenophobias in Europe are multiple, never reducible to a single pattern (and 
never acting anywhere in exactly the same manner), but they completely 
over determine each other (and perhaps with this “crisis” we have reached 
precisely the moment when this overdetermination generates cumulative 
effects). By which I mean in particular that feelings of hatred towards the 
‘common Other’ like islamophobia (and a fortiori the fear of “migrants”) 
do nothing to unite Europeans, contrary to the fantasies à la Huntington of 
the advocates of “Christian Europe” (or, conversely, “secular Europe”): but 
they add to the distrust between Europeans themselves, or sometimes they 
displace it and express it in the manner of a Freudian symptom. There is an 
element of “hope” here: it means that to work against this hostility among 
Europeans (rarely admitted, but running very deep) is also to create some 
of the conditions for hospitality with respect to the non-European stranger 
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(supposing that there is a fixed boundary between the “European” and the 
“non-European”, which is not the case, not even juridical). Different types 
of “multiculturalism” are mutually interdependent.
My second hypothesis is a continuation of the first, taking into account 
a crucial element concerning the function of the state (and the nation-
states) in the construction of the relationship of ‘affiliation’ between 
individuals and nations in the European framework, and the ‘material 
constitution’ which allows the ‘citizens’ of the same nation-state to mediate 
their conflicts of interest, particularly their economic interests – which is 
certainly not the same thing as reaching a consensus on the same values, 
sharing the same ideology, or thinking unanimously. In a sense it is just 
the opposite, which is the reason why, for several decades, politics has not 
been abolished by the development of social policies, but has remained active 
as its permanent condition of possibility.
Contrary to their own myth ‘nations’ are not eternal substances or 
entities, which subsist by inertia. They are fragile constructions, which 
must be permanently recreated through the achievement of institutional 
equilibria, therefore the setting of new relations of forces between their 
‘classes’, or ‘organic parties’. And they are also periodically threatened 
with losing this condition of possibility, either from inside or from 
outside, through wars and civil wars in the broadest sense. Now my 
hypothesis would be the following: inasmuch as European construction 
has essentially become an instrument of neo-liberal globalisation, in 
which financial imperatives of short-term profitability have the upper 
hand, and as a consequence, increasingly using its own framework as 
a field of competition among territories and populations – the State has 
shifted from a protective function to a function of destruction of its own civil 
society: not in the ‘totalitarian’ form, but in the ‘utilitarian’ form, which 
is hardly less violent. I am tempted to call this in Derridian terms a 
shift to “auto-immunity2”. Pushed to an extreme, this would mean that 
the State increasingly works within society not as a set of institutions 
representing and mediating (even in a coercive or inegalitarian manner) 
communications and processes of recognition among citizens, but as 
a ‘foreign body’ which destroys the social bonds that it is supposed to 
protect – something which at a fantastic level at least must not be without 
2 | “The Uses of Philosophy” July 8, 2003 (http://www.villagevoice.com/2003- 
07-08/books/the-uses-of-philosophy/)
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its relationship to the obsession with an invasion by ‘foreign bodies’ that 
riddles the current ideologies of the nation.
The state function of protection is indeed never an absolute guarantee. 
Furthermore it is never without its coercive, normative, and exclusionary 
aspects, since it is performed by what, in other places, I have called a 
national-social state, where ‘social citizenship’ and ‘social rights’ are 
collectively conquered, but also bureaucratically administered and riddled 
with all sorts of discrimination. But still, there is a dramatic contrast 
between such a bureaucratic administration of citizenship and a situation 
in which – while still pretending to be the protector of its citizens in 
the old sense that legitimised its sovereignty, but also claiming that 
this protection is transferred to the European Union itself, or to even 
more global and transnational instances of ‘governance’ – the nation 
state works to privatise public services, or subject them to the rules of 
management and accountability which hold for capitalist corporations, or 
actively contributes to dismantling the educational system by imposing 
market imperatives on learning and transferring the cultural missions of 
schools and colleges to massively commercialised television networks – a 
process which again cannot be entirely divorced from the development 
of populism and xenophobia, since the cultivation of ethnic stereotypes 
is a central orientation of these networks, together with the injection of 
standardised products of commercial entertainment.
I am aware that this description, if it is one, is in itself extremely brutal. 
The reality is one of conflicts between opposite tendencies unequally 
developed in different countries, but with an increasing disadvantage 
for the institutions of solidarity facing the forces of utilitarianism, which 
can count on the double support of the market and the state, or become 
pushed toward privatisation from within the public sphere itself.  There is 
an extremely perverse game at work here, for which Europe appears as a 
justification and an objective, which, for many Europeans, seems to leave 
them with only one choice: either call for the suppression or the exclusion 
of every foreigner, every ‘body’ that is ‘foreign’ or alien, or different, in 
order to compensate imaginarily for the cruelty of the protector, or idealise 
the protector’s function in the hope of exclusively benefiting from the 
inclusiveness of its restored services.
This “hope”, it seems to me, is indeed a despair. I would therefore agree 
that we need a politics of hope, in a more authentic, less self-destructive 
sense – based on a conjunction of forces within and across borders. But 
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such a politics must construct its forces, its goals, its language, entirely 
anew – taking as a negative criterion the reality of the contradictions which 
are revealed by the coexistence of an antidemocratic Europe, and an anti-
European exploitation of fears and frustrations, which are largely two sides 
of the same culture. It must therefore reconstruct Europe as a federation 
of original and diverse nations, leaving aside the myth of their State-
sovereignty, but mutually enhancing their power to create and collaborate. 
I say “it”, in an impersonal manner: but this is our responsibility, before it 
becomes “hopefully” our capacity. 
Our European capacity 
Which Europe do we want? Rediscovering Hannah Arendt’s 
concept of integral federalism
Ulrike Guérot1
In Our European incapacity, written already in 2011, Etienne Balibar 
lucidly describes why Europe did not become the democratic and social 
Europe aspired to in the Treaty of Maastricht – which envisioned a Union 
of Citizens based on coherence and economic convergence – but rather 
became technocratic and dominated by sovereign nation states that are 
not delivering good policies for many European citizens. A fact that is 
now triggering a wave of populist movements all across the Union, to the 
embarrassment of national elites.
Balibar offers as explanation that, as much as national elites were 
willing to Europeanise the market and currency, they were unwilling to 
do the same in the political arena, as it would have undermined their own 
power basis in the nation state. As such they administered their national 
democracies through largely neutralised grand coalition schemes lacking 
political contours, leading to a perfect erosion of state functions on the 
national level. It basically suited them to cling to fictive national power 
while accepting economic governance on the European level,
“Fiercely resisting every idea to build channels of communication and processes 
of mutual recognition (through education, but also social struggles and political 
campaigns) which would allow the peoples to confront their histories and merge 
their interests. For this would also have challenged the monopoly of representation 
of these ruling classes, both internally and at the supranational level and thus 
1 | Guérot’s response to Balibar’s text was written in November 2016.
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their remaining the inevitable intercessors of ‘their’ peoples with regard to the 
European institutions.” (Balibar 2011)
In other words: the famous, transnational ‘politicisation’ of European 
citizens, where the arbitrage of political decision-making could have been 
organised beyond national state sovereignty, never took place.
With the European Council becoming ever more important in 
decision-making in recent years, the primacy of the nation-state in 
a Schmittian notion of political conflictuality was kept within the EU’s 
institutional structures, to the detriment of European citizens who could 
have benefitted from transnational European policy solutions, for example 
a European unemployment scheme. As Pierre Rosanvallon puts it, the EU 
was built on a lie and the lie is that the EU is equally a union of states and 
a union of citizens, as promised in the Treaty of Maastricht. The union of 
citizens does not exist. Actually, quite the opposite; European citizens are 
often the hostages of European Council decisions, opposition to which is 
not possible.
Should there be astonishment or embarrassment about a popular 
reaction to this violence of democracy at the national level, while not 
reconstituting it on the European level? Rather not. In the absence of 
any meaningful political content, policies were said to be without an 
alternative – which is the opposite of the political itself. The problem is not 
anti-elitism, but the fact that European populism is framed as a national 
movement.
Today’s setting of anti-elitist movements across the union arguing 
against the national and European political class is the consequence of 
the fact that one market and one currency have never been turned into 
one democracy. Before digging further into today’s populist problem in 
Europe, it should be reminded that anti-elitism is a priori a good thing, 
and by no means ‘populist’ per se.
Being against the establishment was also the main feature of the 68ers, 
hardly a right wing movement. One of their most extravagant slogans was 
“Who sleeps twice with the same person, belongs to the establishment”. If 
any criticism of the system is called populism and shut down, democracies 
end up change resistant and lose the very capacity of a democratic system 
– in contra-point to authoritarian systems – which is precisely to integrate 
legitimate critics and to make things better. This is exactly what happened 
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to the EU, which, falling short of the capacity for reform ended up with a 
monolithic inertia, triggering popular protest.
The anti-establishment claim thus does not yet make the right-wingers 
‘populists’. The problem is the anti-pluralistic spin, with fragmented 
groups pretending to represent the people, for example the German Pegida 
militants who shout “We are the people.” Yet, who is the We? The German 
nation that they represent?
In fact, populism rather splits nations than uniting them. Brexit is 
the best example. If Theresa May has one problem today, it is to find 
the unity of the British nation. Whereas the very idea of Brexit was to 
defend the British identity against the European continent, the country is 
today deeply divided from Scotland to youth, to the City and the North of 
England, to Wales and Northern Ireland. The re-nationalisation discourse 
only distorts or hides a struggle about economic concepts, upon which 
the losers and winners of globalisation have different preferences – and 
needs. De facto, regional conflict about appropriate national economic 
policies is today’s substitute for the former class conflict. In other words: 
what suits the City of London economically is not necessarily good for the 
deindustrialised regions in Northern England. Austria and France will be 
next to experience the way populism splits the nations it pretends to unite – 
the discourse of national pride only hides a conflict between citizens. Even 
more: with populism breaking up nations, the long-expected politicisation 
of Europe, which the ‘United States of Europe’ could never produce, is 
finally happening.
What we are really experiencing is not the renationalisation of Europe 
as most of the national press tries to make us believe. What is really 
shaping at the horizon is the latency of a European civil war between the 
protagonists of an agenda of opening and those defending an agenda of 
closing and this civil war is transnational on both sides. It is a fight among 
European civil society – progressives and conservatives, if not reactionary 
forces – about the future European social and political contract and the 
values underpinning it. On the one hand, there is a liberal to progressive 
civil society across Europe standing in the tradition of European humanism 
and the heritage of the French revolution; liberty, equality and solidarity. 
On the other side, there is naturalism, if not proto-fascist communitarian 
thinking based on ethnic grouping, scarifying liberal society in favour of 
a closed community.
Our European capacity 29
The European identitarian movement recently organised a huge 
conference in Linz, Austria, under the title “Defending Europe”, gathering 
people from FIDES, UKIP, AfD, FPÖ and the Front National. In a way, 
we are experiencing the cosmopolitism of identitarian movements as 
contradictio in adjecto.  One could even argue that the populists are the 
real Europeans, as they, for the time being, do a better job of organising 
transnationally than the scattered left or liberal parties on the European 
continent. The irony of history might produce the first truly transnational 
party formation by today’s European right-wingers, realising what the 
socialist international failed to achieve a hundred years ago.
The expression of European civil war comes from the Austrian painter 
Franz Marc, who coined it in the midst of World War I to describe the 
struggle between the European spirit, as he called it, in defence of European 
humanisms and the cultural heritage of the French revolution on the one 
hand; and the Ungeist, leading to renationalisation, militarisation and 
finally fascism. Yet, the fight is not between countries, that is the point. 
Neither is it a fight between countries today.
“We must therefore reconstruct Europe as a federation of original and diverse 
nations, leaving aside the myth of their State-sovereignty, but mutually enhancing 
their power to create and collaborate.” (Balibar, 2011) 
This comes very close to what Hannah Arendt describes as ‘integral 
federalism’ in her political grammar of founding.  Putting aside the myth 
of state sovereignty could indeed pave the way for the next European 
project, a project beyond nation states – as the founding fathers of the EU 
also aspired. “Nous ne coalisons pas des Etats, mais nous unissons des 
hommes”, wrote Jean Monnet, as his vision of a radically de-nationalised 
European society. The shift from a Union of States to a Union of Citizens 
would go beyond the classical concepts of statehood-ness and sovereignty 
as brought to us by Hobbes or Rousseau. Hannah Arendt is in search 
of the hidden tradition of freedom, in favour of spontaneous forms of 
political organisation, among citizens, or towns or small entities, which 
form republican bodies.
Doing so, Arendt clearly distinguishes between sovereignty and 
freedom, because sovereignty contradicts the principle of plurality, if 
sovereignty is the absolute right of self-determination and the right of 
non-interference. Yet, nobody is sovereign, as (wo)man is not alone on 
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earth. Sovereignty is only a (weak) concept to deal with plurality, all too 
often through arbitrary rules placed over others. Freedom, however, is the 
existence of plurality and intersubjectivity. 
“The famous sovereignty of political bodies has always been an illusion, which, 
moreover, can be maintained only by the instrument of violence, that is, with 
essentially nonpolitical means … If men wish to be free, it is precisely sovereignty 
they must renounce.” (Arendt 2006: 163)
State sovereignty is a reductive concept; Hannah Arendt thinks about the 
organisation of political power without (state) sovereignty.
This is how she designs her concept of integral federalism, in line with 
the writing and thinking of Denis de Rougement, Franz Marc or even 
Albert Camus, who in the 50s, at the moment when the last European 
projects was taking shape in the form of the Rome treaty, advocated 
strongly against a state based, intergovernmental federalism, which ended 
up, as Hannah Arendt predicted, in the hollowing out of European 
democracy. What Jürgen Habermas has called “executive federalism”, 
leading to the usurpation of people’s freedom by nation states.
The notion of the nation state always mixes fatherland, state, nation 
and language. Yet, a federal structure, writes Denis de Rougement (de 
Rougement 1994: 223) cannot be based on one political feature  – the nation 
state – alone, as the nation state amalgamates at least four different layers: 
patriotism, ideology, administration and culture. History, geography, 
language, tradition or economy are not embedded in one nation state, but 
can only be federated though spaces of citizen participation, through small 
communities, which do not request absolute sovereignty.
The Europe that we want is thus more the one of Franz Marc, Hannah 
Arendt and Denis de Rougement, which is the concept of a social federalism 
of civil society, or integral federalism, rather than the one of De Gaulle, 
Adenauer, De Gasperi or Paul Henri Spaak, who finally did not dare to 
deconstruct the nation and ended up in a concept of intergovernmental 
federalism.
The Europe we want frees people from power structures embedded 
in a nation state; it brings together regions and towns in autonomous 
political decision-making procedures; it frees the notion of democracy 
from the notions of territory, state and people; and frees the concept of 
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Europe from the idea of integrating states so as to unite people; providing 
real freedom to European citizens.
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Shifting Cities

Introduction
What would happen if the international institutions opened spaces and 
mechanisms where cities could play an effective role in decision-making 
processes? What would happen if we could implement methods for 
sharing best practices to solve major local problems that have a global 
impact? What are the structures, resources and projects behind the 
“shelter cities”? In an era where the global can only exist with a connected 
local, cities are mobilising and proving to be the space where democratic 
renewal is happening. 
Europe is witnessing the evolution of innovative cities where the relation 
between active citizenship, social movements and local administration is 
leading to a new way of doing politics. Cities are showing that alternatives 
exist and can be implemented; cities are putting the commons in the centre 
of their policies, where activists are taking control of the administration 
and increasing political pressure on national governments and European 
institutions. 
This chapter depicts those parts of Europe, which are developing 
new relationships and methods between citizens and the institutions. 
Experiences, dynamics and programmes that are searching for creative 
paths and methods to face the struggles that directly connect the local 
with the global, that directly affect the welfare of the citizens. A new 
political agenda for the cities, projects for welcoming migrants, tools for 
engaging citizens in public participatory life or inclusion of the commons 
in the policy making process – these are some of the key challenges that 
this chapter presents. 
City-makers, commoners, urban social movements, mayors, coun-
cillors, and activists that are helping to create, promote and develop new 
urban experiences come together in this chapter. “Cities could be places of 
radical innovation in politics, spaces of actual reinvention of democracy”, 
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argues Giuseppe Caccia, scholar in History of Political thought, in his 
essay opening the chapter. Similarly, Gesine Schwan, Professor of Political 
Science, proposes to start from the cities, or more precisely those cities 
in Europe that are welcoming refugees as places for building bottom-up 
alternatives and presents a revised common European refugee policy. 
Following this, five interviews with the mayors of Messina and Naples and 
city councillors from Barcelona, Madrid and A Coruña, portray practical 
cases and experiences on municipalism, the commons, policies for 
refugees and citizen participation in the institutions at the local level. In 
contrast, the activist collective ‘Don’t let Belgrade d(r)own’, is not holding 
institutional power. They offer ideas and practices of urban resistance and 
mobilisation against the corrupt city officials. The chapter closes with 
Renata Avila, human rights lawyer and digital advocate, making the case 
against pan-optic surveillance in urban planning and why basic human 
rights in the digital era need to be defended also at the city level.
The magnet and the container 
A transnational space of expression for “Cities of change” 
through Europe 
Giuseppe Caccia
Permanence and nomadism, settlement and flows, have always charac-
terised the very nature of the city. With extraordinary effectiveness, to 
describe the role of urban areas in the Mediterranean of the 16th century, 
Fernand Braudel writes: “The cities, motionless points in the maps, are 
actually fed by movement.” And you can retrieve this long durée, this 
historical continuity, in the deep changes that have marked the European 
cities in recent decades. In fact, since late Middle Ages, cities in Europe 
have played a crucial role as places of recovery in production, craft, artistic 
and cultural creation, as nodes of extensive trade networks, as spaces of 
individual and collective liberation from previous constraints of servitude. 
Urban development has, since then, accompanied historical progresses in 
our continent. And the cities were, at the same time, the stage and the main 
actor in any process of economic, cultural and societal transformation.
In recent decades, the end of Fordistic production model, the new forms 
of work organisation – diffuse, immaterial and reticular –, the increasing 
financialisation of the economy, have again profoundly altered the nature, 
role and functions of European cities. They appear, simultaneously, as the 
context of a restructuring, on a metropolitan scale, of social production 
and reproduction, as hubs of global networks of communication and 
exchange, subject to financial investments on real estate, infrastructure 
and resulting speculative revenue.
The combination of these processes has generated new contradictions, 
dramatic imbalances and growing inequalities. Problems that have been 
exacerbated by the crisis management of the last eight years and by the 
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consequences of austerity policies, with cuts in money transfers to local 
budgets reducing the room for territorial self-government, and which have 
often run down the very fabric of urban social cohesion. But, at the same 
time, cities have been and are the scene of resistance and innovation, often 
in terms of spontaneous ruptures and eruptions: the place where social 
protests burst and mutual cooperation unfolds, where street mobilisations 
and processes of artistic and cultural creation and productive innovation 
emerge.
The European Commission itself has recently stressed the leading role 
of cities and metropolitan areas in the construction of Union’s choices and 
the need for a stronger coordination and exchange between them. A few 
pieces of data illustrate the importance of the issue: more than 70 per cent 
of Europeans live in urban areas, so there are focused mobility, production, 
trade, economic and social relations. In metropolitan areas 75 per cent of 
all energy consumption and 80 per cent of all emissions is concentrated, 
placing urban contexts to the core of the contemporary climate and 
environmental crisis. But urban areas are also the place where innovative 
policies could produce significant results in sustainable development and 
an even more radical social and ecological transformation. Consistent 
European policies can therefore set goals and promote strategies that are 
also the result of verification and dissemination of innovative experiences 
already achieved in some areas.
Such considerations make it even more worth facing the crisis of 
consensus and legitimacy of the EU’s supranational institutions, and the 
role crisis of nation-states, reduced to a mere executioner of decisions 
taken elsewhere, paradoxically just as we are seeing a “re-nationalisation” 
of political discourse (from the Eurozone crisis to the “refugee crisis” and 
the collapse of the Schengen space). Precisely in such a critical context, the 
cities – as it was in crucial moments of transition in European history – 
can play again a leading role. Not only for the reasons already mentioned, 
could they be places of radical innovation in politics, spaces of actual 
reinvention of democracy. And in this way they could provide answers to 
the major challenges of our contemporary world.
A long “municipalist” tradition of thought and practice, oriented in this 
direction, is waiting to be rediscovered, from medieval towns to its recovery 
in the 1990s. This tradition seems today to live again in the experiences of 
government “for change.” Everybody knows the “Plataformas ciudadanas” 
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– civic platforms born from the movements that filled the squares of the 
Iberian Peninsula from 15M in 2011 – who won elections in May 2015 in 
some of the most important cities in Spain, starting from the election 
of Ada Colau as mayor of Barcelona, Manuela Carmena in Madrid and 
others in Valencia, La Coruña, Zaragoza and many smaller towns. In this 
first year and half of government they have already introduced important 
innovations in local policies, in particular by investing in “citizens’ 
protagonism” – full transparency of the administration and direct 
participation of citizens in government decisions. 
They chose to assign more resources in new welfare policies, suitable 
to counter the advance of mass impoverishment generated by the crisis. 
They intervened in urban planning, initiating housing policies more 
favourable to low-income residents and starting to hit the speculative 
interests of banks and financial holding companies. They have set up 
programmes supporting a more fair and inclusive social economy, by 
changing the rules of local tenders and procurement and by developing 
cooperative platforms instead of extractivist ones. They are trying to “re-
municipalise” essential local public services, such as water and energy 
supplies, and even funeral services, which had been privatised in recent 
years. They decided, even in contrast to national and European policies, to 
devote themselves to the welcome of refugees and migrants, offering city 
spaces and resources and creating the possibility of direct “humanitarian 
channels”.
Certainly what is happening in the Iberian Peninsula is the spearhead, 
both from a symbolic and a material point of view, of a “new municipalism” 
trying to reinvent democratic practices from the local dimension. But 
it is equally true that the whole map of Europe is dotted with cases of 
already established or embryonic initiatives, which are testing new 
possible relationships between citizenship and local institutions, in 
search for creative answers to the challenges of urban development and 
coexistence. In this spirit, European Alternatives launched over the last 
year a first-mapping on a European scale of the “cities of change”, i.e. 
those cases where the initiative from the bottom of active citizenship (that 
is movements, associations, independent social and cultural projects) 
meets with original experiences of local governments, highly oriented 
to innovation. The first results of this work are amazing. In the North 
as well as in the South. In the East as well as in the West. Here we can 
mention only a few examples: the cities of Birmingham and Bristol in the 
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UK; the State of Thuringia in Germany; a Mediterranean metropolis like 
Naples and a city at the foot of the Alps like Grenoble; many municipal 
governments and two regional administrations, those of Attica and the 
Ionian Islands, in Greece; in Poland towns such as Wadowice and Slupsk. 
And these results were for the first time discussed and elaborated in the 
Campus of European Alternatives.
But we cannot stop at a simple, although necessary, photographic 
reconnaissance of existing initiatives. The experience of the last year 
has also highlighted the limits and contradictions of these alternative 
realities. The life of every country is crossed by economic and financial 
flows that are elusive to the communities’ control and removed from local 
democratic decision-making. On the city-level the same relations between 
active citizenship and local governments often prove to be problematic. As 
well, legal and institutional constraints by higher levels of government: 
the nation-state and the European, severely limit the range of concrete 
action of even the most innovative municipal or regional administration.
To prevent these problems from translating into the impossibility of 
any real change, it became clear that two parallel paths need to be crossed 
and intertwined. 
First of all, there is the need to organise a permanent exchange between 
these experiences as a mutual learning ground: the transfer of knowledge 
on single projects, or single civic participation models experienced by this 
or that city, can help to address and to resolve problems that emerge in 
another urban context and can help adapt and improve practices already 
in place. 
Second, it is urgent – particularly in the current situation, where there 
is the risk of the “disintegration” of Europe – to construct and develop a 
transnational space of political expression among “cities for change”. It 
could be a decisive actor in increasing the potential of intervention and 
pressure on national governments and European institutions to affirm a 
real protagonism of the communities and local governments in political 
decisions that affect them. And it could contribute – along with so many 
others initiatives for social equality, rights and democracy in Europe – 
to the reversal of the current dominant power relationships and to the 
identification of truly alternative solutions.
Sharing the thought of Lewis Mumford on the city: “the magnet 
comes before the container.” (Mumford 1968: p.9) The cities’ destinies 
are the same as that of Europe, of which they are original and constitutive 
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elements. And in these turbulent times we need, desperately and hopefully, 
the attractiveness and connectiveness of many different magnets, capable 
of being the propellers of change.
BIBlIogr aphy
Mumford, L. (1968), “The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformations, 
and Its Prospects”, Harcourt, Brace & World, New York, p.9
The cities want them in 
For a revised common European refugee policy to revive 
the European Union
Gesine Schwan
The European Union desperately needs a realistic, and human rights-
oriented, border and migration policy. The present situation puts the EU 
in a dangerous position of dependency on the Turkish President Erdogan, 
presumes African countries to be safe when they clearly are not, and 
considers North African countries as possible migration-policy partners, 
when they are neither coherent States, nor safe or observing minimal 
human rights standards.
The general political objectives of (1) overcoming the causes of 
migration; (2) supporting countries close to migration origins in hosting 
refugees; and (3) realising the Europeanisation of the border regime, are all 
necessary steps. But alone, they are insufficient. The idea of “outsourcing” 
migration control to countries outside the EU is not realistic in the long-
run. It also undermines the fundamental values of the EU. The EU’s 
current border and migration policy, which implicitly and inevitably leads 
to a “Fortress” Europe scenario, is already undermining the openness of 
our society and, indeed, will create new internal borders.
The urgent need for a sustainable, value-oriented approach to 
migration – which in the long-run needs to be combined with a European 
immigration policy – has been aggravated by the inability of the EU to find 
a concrete solution for the integration of refugees in Europe as a whole. For 
many reasons, a top-down distribution is condemned to fail. Therefore, we 
need a bottom-up alternative, led by municipalities and cities that have 
an interest in voluntarily integrating refugees, for both humanitarian 
reasons and for their own gains. 
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A number of cities and municipalities all over Europe have already 
declared their readiness to welcome refugees, including cities in Central 
Europe, be it for demographic or other reasons. What these cities need 
are financing options for the costs of integration and related issues. In 
order to stimulate as many hosts for refugees as possible, the financing 
should include a palpable “overhead” for the cities’ own needs, in order to 
encourage broad social support in undertaking the long-lasting process of 
integration within the cities.
In the meantime, national governments, which at present are not finding 
a shared solution within the European Council, hold the legal decision-
making power on immigration, and most of the political decision-making 
power on operationalising European financing. Cooperation between 
the State and the municipality level, therefore, needs to be strengthened 
and deepened. By demonstrating the possibilities for refugee integration, 
cities and municipalities can help their national governments fulfil their 
duties. This will have a positive impact on their mutual cooperation and 
communication.
Making available a European funding tool for integrating refugees, 
which cities and municipalities would be able to apply for, would realise 
three objectives at once: 1) Establish a humanitarian solution for the 
settlement of refugees in Europe; 2) Revive a European commitment 
by bottom-up citizen-led participation, and; 3) Instigate a decentralised 
sustainable growth initiative on a local level, to overcome unemployment.
There would, however, be certain obstacles to overcome, requiring the 
following steps:
Convincing national governments that this strategy is in their interest, 
allowing them to fulfil their legal and moral duties and to revive their 
economy; finding simple and uncomplicated ways for financing the 
integration costs for cities and municipalities. Their own contribution 
could be financed, for example, by a cheap European Investment Bank 
credit; and identifying ways to match the interests of refugees with 
welcoming municipalities in such a way that refugees are likely to stop 
and settle there.
The application of the municipalities should be as easy as possible, 
whilst of course including the following minimal standards:
• A multi-stakeholder governance model, in order to gain broad support 
within the cities. The application should be prepared by a range of 
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stakeholders, including from the worlds of politics, business and 
organised civil society;
• An integration strategy for the whole municipality must be included;
• An anti-corruption strategy, and;
• A macroeconomic vision for creating jobs and sustainable growth.
In the long-term, the European Council would need to permit the creation 
of a trust fund attached to the European Investment Bank, governed in 
such a way as to control, but also to make it easier for cities to apply for the 
financing of refugees and of necessary infrastructure.
In the short-term, a pilot project could be launched by a group of 
European cities that aim to facilitate refugee integration according to this 
model, and for this reason would be looking to find financial support. 
This could be managed within the framework of a “Union Action”, as an 
extraordinary measure. This would allow for the testing of the viability 
of this strategy, and mark the beginning of a visible European “revival”, 
which would empower citizens and strengthen their identification 
with the European Union, thanks to participation and the sharing of 
common projects. This could mark a turning point and the deepening 
decentralisation of the EU, avoiding a tendency towards centralisation, as 
well as renationalisation. 
Rebel cities are not utopia
Interview with Luigi de Magistris, Mayor of Naples1
Behind any rebel city there is an active structure  of social movements, 
civil organisations and active citizens claiming their rights to own their 
cities’ future. These are cities that become the space of radical innovation 
and democratic regeneration. At a moment where European and national 
institutions are losing support from their citizens, rebel cities put citizens 
at the centre of the decision-making process. Local governments defend 
citizen participation in political institutions and work to protect and 
strengthen the commons. 
These are cities like Barcelona, where the leader of the radical municipal 
anti-eviction platform won the city elections last year; or examples like 
Messina, the Sicilian city where for three years its mayor has been leading 
the city towards a more participatory and democratic political structure. 
Or Naples, in Southern Italy. 
A few years ago, the Mayor of Naples, Luigi de Magistris, was told to 
fire 300 teachers to comply with strict austerity regulations imposed by the 
central government of Matteo Renzi. De Magistris, a former prosecutor, 
refused to comply and appealed to the constitutionally protected right to 
a quality education for all. He was sued and brought to court, where he 
argued and won his case. The Italian constitution, the judges concluded, 
has precedence over regular legislation. The teachers – and the mayor – 
were reinstated to their places.
Today, after De Magistris was re-elected as mayor in 2016 with an 
overwhelming majority, Naples remains a city of great social participation 
and political innovation. Naples was the first Italian city to establish a 
“Department of the Commons” and the first to change the municipal 
1 | This interview took place in December 2016.
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statute by inserting the commons as one of the interests to be protected 
and recognised as the functional exercise of fundamental rights of the 
person. It has joined the network of shelter cities welcoming refugees. 
And it is experimenting new forms of co-decision between citizens and 
institutions.
***
You were recently re-elected as Mayor of Naples, supported by civil society lists 
and social movements, and without any of the main political parties backing 
you. Some of the activists who protested in the streets against austerity and 
corruption are now city councillors with you. What is the relationship now 
between civil society and the institutions?
This is an absolute novelty in the institutional and political panorama: that 
between civil society, social movements and local institutions there exists 
a relation under construction, where each has to preserve its autonomy 
while building new relations and forms of participation. There are 
traditional channels such as the participation of representatives of social 
movements or occupations in the Council. But then there is also a new 
way of working together. For instance, discussing the proposals for new 
municipal laws together, in a process of co-deliberation of the regulations 
that govern the city. How does this happen? Through direct contacts, open 
meetings, popular assemblies in the neighbourhoods, observatories, and 
by keeping a direct relation with social centres and spaces of activism 
and active citizenship. An important project to demolish and replace 
the infamous “Le Vele”, a social housing project dating back to the 
1960s, was co-designed by the City, the University and the autonomous 
neighbourhood committee. This is an open area of experimentation and 
more ideas and practices will come out in the coming months, including 
through the use of online technology. But beyond the social network 
revolution, we also want to be together in person. 
Back in 2011, in a landmark referendum, 27 million Italians voted for water to 
be considered a “common good” and be returned to public ownership. Naples is 
the only one among the large cities to have followed up on this request, bringing 
back water management under municipal control and beginning to develop a 
participatory management for the company. How is the process going? 
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We are very happy with this. Obviously, there are legal, technical and 
financial difficulties, but we have transformed a for-profit company into 
a public company that is now taking on board the full cycle of water 
management and has increased the number of employees. We have 
demonstrated that participatory management can also be an economically 
viable solution. Now we need to take more steps towards the participation 
of workers and citizens in the Board and management of the company. But 
we remain committed to the idea that water is a commons and we aim to 
continue remaining at the forefront for its participatory management at 
the European level. 
Speaking of commons, Naples has a number of buildings occupied by citizens 
and social movements utilised for cultural, social, or solidarity initiatives. 
You have recently passed an innovative law identifying such spaces as social 
commons. Or, in other words, legitimising and legalising social occupations of 
unused public and private properties. 
These are not occupied but liberated spaces. There are situations where, 
for whatever reason, public or private owners leave the buildings to decay, 
shutting them off from the population and creating empty zones in our 
cities. When groups of citizens take them over, clean them, repair them, 
open them up to the collective with social, sports, or cultural activities, 
these spaces are returned to the citizenry. They are a new commons and 
they should be treated as such. Not criminalised and evicted. 
Could the model of the commons, with participatory public management be 
expanded at a national level with public companies? 
Yes, the model needs to be extended to state-controlled companies. This is, 
after all, what the Article 41 of the Italian constitution demands, with the 
idea of civic uses. We have taken back this legal instrument. Our project 
is nothing more than the implementation of the republican constitution. 
And so the same needs to happen at the national level. 
The photos of Neapolitan citizens holding “refugees welcome” signs in Naples 
went viral in Italy, especially as during the same days in other parts of the 
country demonstrations against refugees were taking place. What’s different in 
Naples? What refugee policy are you putting in place? 
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Naples is a refuge city and a city of shelter. We believe solidarity and 
welcome policies are the best antidote against terrorism and the best way 
of building bridges between cultures and guaranteeing peace. In Naples, 
we are either all illegals or no-one is illegal. This is the history of our 
city, but it is also our political vision. Naples is at the vanguard of a new 
“diplomacy from below” working for a Mediterranean of peace and not of 
wars – for instance we are increasingly working with North African cities. 
Let me tell you a story that engaged the whole citizenry of Naples. There 
was recently a large scale arrival of migrants from Libya. Naples is a city 
with a lot of suffering and great economic difficulties: but we have had 
a rush for solidarity from all citizens. They were offering not just food 
and clothing but also opening up their houses to host the migrants. On 
Christmas evening all those who arrived were hosted by and celebrated 
with Neapolitan families. 
The question of migration is a good example of a possible new relationship 
between the municipal and the European dimensions. Ada Colau has given 
momentum to a network of European cities of shelter. Gesine Schwan, amongst 
others, is pushing for a direct connection between cities and the European 
refugee relocation scheme. Can we imagine a new European role for cities, also 
bypassing the nation state? 
This is already a reality. I worked towards this aim when I was a member 
of the European Parliament in Brussels. As president of the Budget 
Committee I worked for a considerable share of EU funds to be directly 
assigned to cities. We need a Europe of cities, a Europe of the people, a 
Europe of justice and of economic equality. We need to push for Brussels 
to give a greater role to cities and territories, which is a precondition for 
a more prosperous and democratic future. There are interesting signs 
emerging not only from Naples but also from Barcelona, Berlin, many 
cities in Eastern Europe and even London. This is the Europe that opposes 
the Europe of Hollande, Renzi and Juncker, to the Europe of austerity and 
budget constraints, of walls and borders. This is what we are working for, 
from below. And Naples is on the front line.
Institutions mean inertia
Interview with Laia Forné, Barcelona en Comú1
Barcelona en Comú has its origins in the social and political movements that 
emerged as a result of Spain’s economic crisis and the protest movement 
known in Spain as the 15M movement. A citizen platform, Barcelona en 
Comú has been governing the City of Barcelona for almost two years after 
winning municipal elections by proposing a “democratic rebellion” and 
the “appropriation of the institutions”. Laia Forné, Responsible for Active 
Democracy and Decentralisation in Barcelona, said in an article published 
by the Spanish journal Diagonal a few months after the elections that the 
municipality is formed not by the powers of a local government but by the 
social and communitarian powers that create a new institutionalism.
***
What challenges has the movement faced in becoming part of an institution? 
And in the specific case of Barcelona en Comú, what have you achieved, and 
what do you think the complex relationship between institutions and social 
movements should look like?
The main challenge Barcelona en Comú faces is to be a political organi-
sation with the capacity to mobilise society together with other groups 
in order to exercise urban counterpower. This first year has been a year 
of getting to know the tasks of the institution. Coming to understand 
them, dealing with the challenges of the moment and adapting to the 
institution’s times and structures. The challenge we face now is of an 
organisational nature: we need to strengthen the relations between the 
1 | This interview took place in November 2016.
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institution and the “suburbs” as much as possible. The institutions are 
designed in such a way that this kind of change is not easy to achieve. 
The institution means “inertia”, therefore this organisational challenge 
requires a critique of the institution and a review of the foundations on 
which it is based, for example what regulations have been formulated to 
determine the nature of its relationships with the external world?
If this inertia remains so powerful and the institution remains the 
same outwardly, it is difficult for those outside it to perceive the effort 
to rebuild its walls. Therefore asking for co-responsibility, asking for 
that task to be a shared responsibility sometimes seems like a poisoned 
proposal. That is normal. The only thing we can ask is that people trust 
in a long and difficult process that needs to give indications that it is on 
the right track, starting with concrete changes, progress and reforms. It 
is necessary to have a good understanding of the relevant institutional 
changes. In sum, what guarantees social rights is not the state, but the 
correlation of social forces. What guarantees the rights of the city is not 
the city council, but the urban counterpowers. Without organised social 
forces that demand and at the same time support measures, it is difficult 
to develop a new urban model.
To influence this dynamic reality we have institutional tools such as 
those we are creating at the Department of Participation. We have an 
idea, which we need to translate into concrete measures: participatory 
governance should not be based on ‘conflict management’ but rather 
on ‘conflict organisation’. The relationship between institutions and 
movements is conflictive, and this is how it is meant to be. Let us be clear: 
the institution wants to produce regulations and static norms, while social 
movements want to create leeway for a changing reality that is threatened 
by a financial logic that envelops everything. 
If we have learned something outside the institutions, it is to build 
federated networks with strategies based on solidarity and mutual 
recognition that are focussed on short and medium-term plans. This 
is our cultural capital: the knowledge we produce through our political 
practices. Although it does not fit in with the institutional structures, it is 
our main asset for changing them.
Ada Colau has already announced her willingness to participate in a network 
of “shelter cities” as a way to welcome people who are trying to reach Europe 
and to disobey unjust laws imposed by nation states that go against the basic 
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rights of migrants. How does Barcelona express its “shelter city” status? Is 
the city planning joint actions of disobedience against refugee policies at the 
European level?
Out of the 160,000 refugees that the member states of the European 
Union pledged to take in in 2015, only 3,065 have been relocated from 
Greece and Italy to other countries. This figure is from July 2016, but the 
situation does not seem to have improved in the meantime. In the case 
of Spain, only 500 of the 17,000 people it promised to take in have been 
relocated. Cities and municipalities are taking in and integrating refugees, 
but in Spain they are not involved in formulating asylum policies, and 
nor do they receive funding to develop better policies. The state does not 
fund local integration policies, even though it receives European funds for 
this very purpose. For example, in the period between 2014 and 2020 the 
Spanish state will receive more than 330 million Euros, most of which, 
however, is being invested in border control measures.
In view of these figures, and together with other European cities 
Barcelona is showing the will to take in refugees directly through 
Solidarity Cities, a network of European cities formed to help manage the 
refugee crisis. In addition to assisting with the relocation of refugees this 
network also aims to support the exchange of information and knowledge 
about the situation of refugees. It aims to share the practices, challenges 
and solutions adopted by the cities that form part of the network. This 
European cities initiative is now trying to increase its visibility in order 
to push for the reallocation of EU funds all of which currently go to the 
central state rather than to local governments. 
Barcelona is also promoting advocacy actions, putting pressure on 
administrations to fulfil their European commitments and to design 
policies that tackle the roots of the problem. In this context, the City 
Council is campaigning for the establishment of a humanitarian corridor 
to help refugees get to the European Union safely and prevent further 
deaths. Its cooperation with other municipalities is articulated in city 
to city relationships as well as within the framework of the various 
international networks of which the City Council forms part, such as 
Eurocities, MedCities, and United Cities and Local Governments.
The City of Barcelona has created a municipal project to care and 
provide social support for people who arrive here on their own via Greece 
and Turkey, northern Morocco, Ceuta and Melilla. This project, called the 
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Municipal Reception Programme, already offers around a hundred places 
for migrants. Its objective is to improve the processes of social inclusion 
and autonomy of these people and ensure that they are able to access the 
labour market and start a new life on their own once the programme ends.
It is also important to highlight the role that Barcelona’s civil society is 
playing in this process, because this inclusion work is not just the result 
of public policies but also of the hospitality displayed by many residents 
and collectives that have already been doing this kind of work for some 
time now. So the objective is to create pressure at the European level and 
to design comprehensive solutions at the local level. The goal is not just to 
redefine Europe’s relationship with its border policies, but also to rebuild 
the relationship between the cities – i.e. the main reception centres – and 
the EU. The cities need to be directly involved in finding political and 
social solutions.
As is the case in many other countries in Europe, one of the major problems in 
Spain has to do with the lack of transparency and corruption in the management 
of public buildings and urban spaces. Barcelona recognises the social value of 
the experiences occupied spaces provide, rather than simply the economic value 
of such properties. How does the government deal with occupied spaces? Do 
these spaces serve as a meeting point and strengthen the relationship between 
movements and institutions?
In the past the institutions conceived urban areas as a space in which 
they intervened in order to generate income without being subject to any 
democratic control mechanisms. If we drew up a map of the land ownership 
structures in Barcelona, it would probably show that a large number of 
financial institutions either own the land or decide how it is used. This 
limits the democratic instruments and sovereignty of those who live and 
work in Barcelona. Within this process of “commodification” – in which 
the state and the markets have acted together – processes of social self-
defence have evolved that sought to regain basic rights and public spaces. 
Seen from this perspective, occupied spaces take on a different political 
meaning to that indicated by labels like “uncivil” or “illegal”.
Barcelona has resources that are currently being used and managed by 
groups of citizens cooperating for non-commercial purposes. These social 
initiatives led by communities of active citizens aim to forge connections 
based not only on economic values, but on the values of communities that 
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continue to solve their problems collectively. The commons in the urban 
environment represent a challenge, as well as a change in the way public 
institutions operate.
During previous administrations Barcelona tried to find institutional 
answers to these social initiatives. Several citizens’ groups are managing 
public resources. “Casales de Barrio” is a project run by an association 
according to a civic management model. In the “Pla de Buits” programme 
the City Council allows citizens’ groups to use empty premises for diverse 
activities. And then there is the “Pla de Locales” programme in which 
municipal land that is not in use is given to citizens for them to develop 
their own initiatives. When we examined these programmes, we saw that 
the initiatives behind them always came directly from social movements 
and that, considering their origin, there are not that many of them. Both 
the regulations and the institutions’ way of relating to collectives were 
part of an institutional reality that was not flexible enough to understand 
the meaning of “community”, yet was tremendously innovative when it 
came to understanding what “private” means. However, we also realised 
that there is no global programme or common public policy that provides 
a framework for the community management of municipal resources.
What we understood is that we have not made the leap from the 
reality of the situation (i.e. the use of land and property by active and 
legitimate communities for social purposes on a district level) to the law 
(i.e. the creation of new rules and regulations that support or complement 
these community practices). Rather, the existing regulations have been 
used to manage, control and limit the power of these practices. This is 
why we supported a working group that aims to design a proposal for a 
conceptual and normative framework that defines how the institution 
should support these community practices, as well as defining the need 
for the integration of the institution into society and the criteria under 
which it should operate. This framework should lay the foundation for 
the creation of a new kind of relationship between the institution and 
the community through the recognition of community management and 
self-management practices that may in turn lead to the creation of a new 
policy of designating certain spaces as “Citizen Patrimony” in Barcelona. 
This explicit recognition requires that municipalities provide resources 
and public infrastructure for self-managed common use, according to the 
agenda of civil society.
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You are a Member of the Department of Participation’s Advisory Board. 
Collective management practices within the party itself, primary processes 
and open lists are measures that improve transparency both within the party 
and vis-à-vis the citizens. What mechanisms is Barcelona en Comú using to 
encourage citizens to participate in politics? And in what type of measures and 
policies do you encourage citizens to participate?
The challenge ahead is to develop participatory governments that can adapt 
to the forms of political interaction that already exist in a society. A new 
model of governance in Barcelona must respond to forms of participation 
other than those established within the institutional architecture. More 
and better democracy also means not falling into the trap of creating 
participation structures, which are devoid of content and have little real 
capacity for political action. The lesson learned in this political cycle is that 
not all of us need to participate in everything. It is more about creating 
means and mechanisms that enable us to have an impact on the problems 
and issues that interest us most, and on those with which we are most 
familiar.
We are immersed in a participatory process aimed at modifying the 
regulation of citizen participation. The objective is to give citizens more 
power and to create channels of democracy that foster the engagement 
of citizens. Right now, 80 percent of the time it is the City that promotes 
forums for participation, participatory processes, etc. We want that 
to change. We want the citizens to decide how and when they want to 
participate, we want them to feel sufficiently empowered to demand 
accountability or to participate in municipal policy-making when they 
want to. 
At the moment, carrying out public consultations that are citizens-
led is not easy. We are also thinking about creating autonomous bodies 
that validate the quality of the processes and evaluate the democratic 
mechanisms of the city and its participatory bodies. The city administration 
cannot be the only guarantor of democracy. Another priority is to reach 
the most invisible groups and those sections of the population that have 
no contact with the institutions (i.e. the majority of the population).
The fundamental question is how to reach out to young people and 
provide them with good-quality spaces, how to reach out to Latina women; 
how to reach citizens who work and have family responsibilities and no 
time to participate, and how to reach people who are simply unwilling to 
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engage. We want to encourage inclusive spaces that take inequality into 
account. A space of participation does not automatically become neutral 
merely by virtue of being participatory. The balance of power and the 
inequalities are translated into these spaces, and the City Council must 
develop measures of positive discrimination to give voice to those who do 
not have one.
There are collectives and economic elites with specific interests that 
have begun to realise that the spaces of participation are important for 
them, and that they need to be part of them if they want to influence public 
policy.
The election of Ada Colau brought hope to the discourse of governance based 
on the commons. Has Barcelona been able to inspire confidence among the 
citizens regarding the concept of “commons”?
I think there are two different dimensions in the interaction between the 
commons and the citizens as regards ongoing government actions. On the 
one hand there is a more communicative or rhetorical dimension, while 
on the other there is a more operational dimension, which is directly 
connected to specific programmes and policies.
With regard to the first dimension, I refer to how special emphasis 
is placed on the commons in speeches, in the way the message is 
constructed. I am not simply referring to the name of the political 
party, Barcelona en Comú, but to how the commons are introduced as 
a substantive part of the philosophy and model of the city for which we 
are campaigning. This is not a strategic approach but an integral part of 
the trajectory of those who have defined Barcelona en Comú’s sphere of 
action. We came together to solve collective problems through practices of 
reciprocity, interaction and decision-making generated in spaces of self-
government and direct democracy. This has been our “political school”, 
so to speak, and has included learning about institutional relations 
and making very detailed analyses of how the public administration 
functions at its various levels. 
As regards the second dimension, some of the programmes and policies 
are already making progress when it comes to talking about participation, 
but the goal is to translate the philosophy into concrete measures. 
Consider, for example, housing policies that seek to communalise the 
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public. There are many different ways of planning and implementing 
public programmes within that philosophy.
Our role is to see what kind of policies we can implement in each 
individual case, taking into account the redistributive role that a local 
government must play while at the same time transferring power to social 
initiatives that are organised and capable of ensuring that the commons 
are integrated into policies.
Moment of confluence on the Atlantic coast
Interview with Claudia Delso, Marea Atlántica1 
A Coruña is a city on the Atlantic coast of North-West Spain. It is the 
second largest city in Galicia and famous for having the world’s only 
Roman lighthouse still in use: the Tower of Hercules. Marea Atlántica 
(Atlantic Tide) is the grassroots movement that has been governing 
the city since May 2015. The movement uses the semantics of the sea 
to designate its decision-making phases. Marea Atlántica is one of the 
municipalist movements that are now sharing power in state institutions. 
Although each of these movements has its own specific characteristics, 
most have certain things in common: an ethical code, open primaries and 
programmes and infrastructural documents that were created through 
participatory processes. One of the main characteristics of the municipalist 
movements is that they are grassroots movements in which members of 
political parties participate individually, just like other participants. This 
is why these movements call themselves “confluency processes” (procesos 
de confluencia).
***
Marea Atlántica is an example of a grassroots movement that became a 
political party in order to run in municipal elections. It presented its candidacy 
for A Coruña’s municipal elections in May 2015 and emerged as the strongest 
party with 30.97 percent of the vote, securing 10 seats on the city council. A 
Coruña is a port city with around 250,000 inhabitants. Do you think that the 
difficulties citizens’ movements face in terms of maintaining their autonomy 
and identity once they become part of an institution are easier to handle in 
1 | This interview took place in November 2016.
58 Inter view with Claudia Delso
smaller cities? And in the case of Marea Atlántica, how is the relationship and 
communication between the original citizens’ movement and the institution?
The city’s size is a relevant factor and one should always bear in mind that 
it can have a negative or positive impact, depending on the situation. So 
even though A Coruña’s small size favours a better relationship between 
the public institutions and the movement, it also weakens the movement 
since many of its key political groups cannot afford to participate as much 
as they did before they became part of an institution. Nonetheless I think 
the fact that A Coruña is a small city makes it really interesting for a 
political experiment like Marea Atlántica, because it means that people 
both inside and outside the movement are close to each other, and this 
facilitates a flux across the boundaries of the two poles: institution and 
movement. To answer the second question, the relationship between Marea 
Atlántica and the local government is a strong one, although there are 
always aspects that could be improved. Government officials participate in 
Marea Atlántica both as members of its working group (called the “Grupo 
Municipal”) and as individual activists. That means that they participate 
in the dynamics of the movement just like any other person. In addition, 
the members of the Grupo Municipal share information and provide 
explanations on a regular basis at the general assembly, which takes place 
twice a month. Bearing this in mind, after a very intense period in which 
we went through four different elections at various administrative levels 
(local, regional and state elections) we need to focus on strengthening the 
movement. 
A Coruña was declared a “Cidade Refuxio” (Shelter City) for refugees and 
criticised the policy of closing European borders, while at the same time 
demanding that the European Union, the member states and the regional 
government provide more support for migrants. What political measures for 
the integration of refugees is A Coruña implementing and to what extent could 
these measures be jointly implemented with other cities in Europe that declare 
themselves Shelter Cities for refugees? Would A Coruña be willing to form a 
network of collaboration with these cities?
Civil society demanded solidarity and a dignified solution to the refugee 
situation with what is called the “Shelter City” network even before 
the institutions with responsibilities in this area took action. A call for 
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solidarity by the City of Barcelona prompted many other cities and towns 
across the country to join this network. One of those cities is A Coruña. 
The network is channelling this demand from civil society, which once 
again is ahead of the institutions in wanting to join forces and resources 
to actively collaborate on measures for welcoming migrants.
This network of cities is already working at the European level, with 
concrete examples such as the collaboration between the City Council of 
Barcelona and the city councils of Lesbos and Lampedusa.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states in Article 14: 
“Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum 
from persecution.” The city of A Coruña has provided a united response to 
the current refugee crisis, but making this a welcoming city goes beyond 
that. The City Council wants to design programmes and instruments that 
turn the city into a flagship welcoming city for immediate crisis situations 
and for the medium and long term. Our duty as an institution is to manage 
this wave of solidarity among the citizens so that the City Council agrees 
to accept an appropriate contingent of refugees, in coordination with 
the competent public authorities and with entities that have experience 
working in this area.
The City Council of A Coruña has designed medium and long-term 
initiatives to help these people and others who have applied for asylum 
and refugee status. And those who are already our neighbours, living in A 
Coruña, and have encountered barriers blocking their integration are also 
welcome to join in as full members of the city. These people must be made 
welcome and integrated because they have come here to escape poverty, 
war, femicide, sexual discrimination, and other forms of persecution.
Citizen participation transforms empty spaces in cities into places that create 
social capital for collective use. Last June the City Council of Naples, also a port 
city with 900,000 inhabitants, passed a resolution recognising seven public 
properties occupied by citizens and associations as “emerging and developing 
commons and civic environments”. All these buildings were public property that 
had been neglected for years. What happens with buildings that are used as 
squats in A Coruña? Have there been changes in the regulations governing 
public buildings and spaces since Marea Atlántica gained its political mandate?
At the moment there are no squats in the city, so there is no need to develop 
a specific policy on this issue. However, the squat movement has a long 
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tradition in A Coruña and buildings such as the “Casa das Atochas” and 
historical social centres like “C.S.A Atreu” and “Mil Luas” were occupied, 
and some of us were actively involved. So we see the steps taken in Naples 
as an example of an innovative policy on this issue. It is very interesting 
for us to observe Naples’ experiences with the official recognition of 
commons and the new experience of property that this has opened up. 
A few years ago a very exciting initiative called “Proxecto Cárcere” was 
launched in the city which aims to turn a prison owned by the State into 
a centre for cultural and social projects. We are trying to collaborate as 
much as possible with this project, and hopefully the building will be 
open to citizens before the end of the current legislative period.
In general terms, we are implementing several policies aimed at 
changing the way people use public buildings and spaces. For instance, 
we are trying to have all public buildings owned by the Council that are 
not currently in use opened up for projects to promote the participation of 
citizens in the decision-making process. 
As the Councillor for Participation and Democratic Innovation (Concejala 
de Participación e Innovación Democrática) in a city of less than 300,000 
inhabitants and coming back to the question mentioned above, is it easier 
to promote and manage processes of citizen participation in smaller cities? 
Despite all the theory, there is not much of a culture of processes of direct citizen 
participation, either online or on a face-to-face basis. What kind of citizen do 
you think it is easier to motivate to take part in participatory processes? And in 
what kind of political processes and decisions should the citizens be involved?
The size of this city allows us to design participation policies based on 
methodologies that are more direct and physical in comparison with those 
used in bigger cities. Our first initiative aimed at organising the city into 
districts is a good example. The characteristics of individuals who decide 
to get involved vary depending on the specific objective of a particular 
participatory process. For example, during this process of organising the 
city into districts, most of the participants were older citizens, whereas 
on the issue of the participatory budget most of the participants were 
aged between 30 and 40. In addition we have had several participation 
processes specifically aimed at the city’s youth. We regard participation 
as a basic civil right to which every citizen is entitled. For that reason we 
must create the conditions for those willing to exercise that right to do so 
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and at the same time we must raise local awareness of the importance of 
participating in public decision-making processes. Once such a context 
has been created, citizens will be able to determine for themselves those 
areas in which public participation is more relevant.
How do the citizens view the development of political measures that revolve 
around the concept of the commons? Do they demand comprehensive protection 
of these assets, even though it entails an increase in government spending? 
We truly believe that the policies that we are implementing are contributing 
to the redefinition of the concept of “common good”2, particularly at a 
practical level. Even though citizens tend to regard common good policies 
simply as an instrument for protecting and expanding the public sector, we 
should make an effort to introduce a less limited concept of the common 
good, together with more innovative proposals in this are
2 | The definition of the common good has been expanded in recent years thanks, 
among others, to Toni Negri. So far the definition of common good has been 
challenged mainly theoretically. In this respect the “new municipalism” (nuevo 
municipalismo) can help to ensure that the theoretical redefinition of the concept 
is put into practice.
This is how you win an election
Stacco Troncoso in conversation with Victoria Anderica, head of 
Transparency, and Miguel Arana, director of Citizen Participation, 
City of Madrid1
How did a group of 15M activists form an electoral coalition, which, 
after lagging in the polls, finally had a breakthrough victory? A win that 
shattered the chronic neoliberal narrative and forged an alternative path 
bearing little resemblance to the Brexits, the Trumps, to all that we have 
been conditioned to endure, if not expect. According to Ahora Madrid’s 
Miguel Arana and Victoria Anderica, the key is keeping it real – with real 
openness and participation. It will not work to pay lip service to those 
ideals and abandon them later. There is no faking it. Stacco Troncoso, from 
the P2P Foundation, visited the Madrid city council’s citizen participation, 
transparency and open government department and spoke to Victoria 
Anderica, head of Transparency, and Miguel Arana, director of Citizen 
Participation. 
***
There were some meetings two years ago, in a well-known Madrid squat/
social centre called Patio Maravillas, among other places, where people made a 
statement: “We are going to take power”. That was Ganemos. They were called 
crazy, yet one year later, you took power. I would like to hear your view of these 
1 | A longer version of this interview was previously published on the blog of 
the P2P Foundation on December 29, 2016. The P2P Foundation is a non-profit 
organisation and global network dedicated to advocacy and research of commons 
oriented peer-to-peer dynamics in society.
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last two years – first, the transition from Ganemos Madrid to Ahora Madrid, 
and then the second, the year since the election.
Miguel Arana: First, one important word is power. When social movements 
think about power, they think about institutions. That is where power 
resides: you just have to enter the building, become the one who gives 
the orders, and then things will change. One thing I love about Spain in 
this recent period is that from the very beginning of the movements on 
the streets, the idea was that we are not going to the institutions. That 
was wonderful – we were out there for three or four years in the streets, 
in the squares, the assemblies, the “citizen tides” (mareas) green, white, 
etc. – the Stop Evictions movement – and the idea then was, “We do not 
care about institutions! We will get together and think about how to 
change everything, press on and make all these crazy actions and ideas 
and everything we can imagine”. And then, just in this last phase, after 
we tried everything else we said, “… ok, maybe we could also try to enter 
the institutions. Some part of the power is there – we should get inside”. 
I think this is an important remark. When people are looking from the 
outside – from other countries – it is difficult to understand what has been 
happening all these years. We got to the institutions because we spent 
four years building something really strong, really powerful, and that 
is what allows us to enter them now. This is also important because the 
game in the institutions is a difficult and special one. To some degree, it 
is designed so you usually cannot win when you come from outside. We 
won because we were in the streets for all these years, thinking about 
the things we wanted to do and change, being really clear, building the 
movement without leaders, without faces, without laws – everything. Now, 
we can be in the institutions and face the attacks, which are really crazy. 
Outside, you are a lot more resilient against attacks because it is about the 
ideas, not the people. 
Can you clarify who you mean by the attacks?
Miguel Arana: Especially the media and the other parties, the traditional 
parties – the way they interact with you is by not focusing on problems or 
solutions; they only focus on you, personally. It is like, “you did this …” or, 
“you are coming from this world”, or – whatever. Previously, when we were 
not a party, when we were not the people inside, we never talked about 
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ourselves. We just talked about the problems, that was the important 
thing. We built something serious and now we can enter the institutions. 
This last phase, building the party, was really different. The values that the 
movement held as important before – horizontality, avoiding structures, 
no hierarchies – well, once you get inside, you are required to build some 
kind of hierarchy. Things are not as horizontal as you would like anymore. 
Of course this is problematic. You have to understand, and imagine, how 
you want to solve these things. I think we have been able to get through 
some of the main problems, for example, building the electoral list. That 
was done in Ahora Madrid in a very open way. Anyone could just join.
Let us talk about the citizen participation portal, Decide Madrid. Tell us how 
it works, how long it has been up, and what the general reaction has been.
Miguel Arana: Before coming into the institutions, one of the main 
problems we faced was that the moment you want to open the movement to 
everybody and have them make decisions, you start facing the complexity 
of the situation. If you want to have 20 people debate and decide something, 
it is easy. You make an assembly, like we had in the squares, you talk, and 
that is it. If you want to have 100 – or 1,000 – people, maybe you can still 
have an assembly or some kind of a more complex system, but if you want 
to scale up, it is impossible. We have 3.2 million people, something like 
that … You also want to build an effective system. You do not want just 
one decision in four years, you want to take all of the important decisions, 
every day. We believe that this can only be solved through the internet with 
a digital platform where all the physical barriers disappear, and where 
you can have thousands of people talking, deciding, proposing, etc. This 
whole year, we have been thinking about the tools we had available, trying 
and experimenting with everything that was on the internet. We learned 
a lot, tried a lot of platforms and got a lot of experience. But still there is no 
set, proper platform really capable of allowing all these direct democracy 
processes that we want. Nothing fits what we really need. We decided from 
the beginning to design a platform that collects our years of experiences 
and similar experiences we have heard about from all over the world, and 
build something that allows us to produce mechanisms and reproduce the 
democratisation we want to see. We started with this new platform. The 
software is called Consul and the platform is called Decide Madrid.
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We started from scratch in June 2015, it got built very fast. In September 
2015, we opened the first very basic process for the platform to start to 
work. It is a free software platform; we are sharing it with different cities. 
Barcelona, Oviedo and A Coruña are using it. We have already spoken 
with 40 or 50 cities who are interested in Spain but also in other countries. 
We are also studying different mechanisms to open the city council for 
the citizens. For example, we opened the citizen budget, a participatory 
budget. This year a small part of the budget, 60 million euros (which, 
anyway, is an important sum of money) is now decided by the people. Yes, 
people can always make proposals, but this is much more specific because 
now, they are proposing on how to spend a certain amount of money. You 
cannot propose just anything; it has to be focused on how to use money. 
It is close to specific issues. You can build a school, a social centre, maybe 
fix some streets, but you cannot spend the money however you like. There 
are legal limits.
You keep a focus on openness with other local parties in different cities, do you 
mutualise information and best practices with them?
Miguel Arana: All of us are working on the same things. We are just taking 
the common ideas developed in the last four years and putting them into 
practice. At the end of the day, all the programmes are quite similar but it 
is not like we wrote them together, it is just that we are coming from the 
same place. Common traits include being open to everybody, participatory 
decision-making, putting social justice at the core of everything we do. 
This is a very comfortable feeling; it is really great when working together. 
And we really are working together, in everything. In all the plans. This is 
significant. Normally, you find a sense of competition among the major 
cities. But here it is the opposite. We really love each other, we really want 
to work together and to help. Whenever something bad happens to the 
people in Barcelona, we are totally outraged and screaming our lungs out: 
“No, the same thing cannot be happening to them!” And it is the same 
with the other cities, it is amazing. We meet in lots of forums, conferences, 
working groups. We really are working together, which makes life much 
easier. Normally, most city councils work and develop their projects 
in isolation, and they want to come out on top of the other cities. So, if 
they want to build software for participation, you go to a big technology 
company and pay a million euros …
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… And you make it proprietary …
Miguel Arana: … and you get your proprietary software. At the same 
time, the next city is doing exactly the same. They have exactly the same 
software but they also paid a million, and it is the same for other cities. 
You end up with 50 cities using the same software while announcing it as 
this great new thing. We are doing absolutely the opposite. We started the 
software from scratch – this is Consul, from Decide Madrid. Some months 
later, Barcelona started using the same software. Now the developers from 
Barcelona have come to Madrid and they are working together. And now 
the people in A Coruña, working together, will adopt it. If we start solving 
all our problems by applying collective intelligence and debating how to 
scale everything, we will have something available for everybody in the 
world.
We talk about politics and counter politics; we talk about power and coun-
terpower. Now that you find yourself within power, how do you enable and 
make sure that there is a counterpower and respect that? I guess that, through 
your work, you are enabling the great majority of people outside institutions to 
still have a voice, to still matter.
Miguel Arana: For sure! Our specific role here could be quite short. This 
what we need to do: enable people to take decisions, to take control. Once 
that is done with, we do not need to do anything else. Ok, we have to take 
care and do the maintenance so it keeps working, and nothing more. We 
have started all these processes and think that they have the potential to 
change everything, but up until now, the bulk of the decisions taken by 
the city council are taken in the traditional way. We cannot forget that 
99% of the system still works that way. People are doing their best to open 
everything to everybody, but power remains focused on a small group of 
people.
In 15M I could identify the Commons as part of the discourse, both explicitly 
and implicitly. Now that you have come to power, do you think that the 
Commons is still part of the dialogue? Not just with the activists and the people 
working here but with the citizens that you interact with? Or, do you think it is 
a hard political concept to understand?
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Victoria Anderica: I think it is a hard political concept to understand. I 
think that in cities like Barcelona, they use it more naturally than we do 
here in Madrid, probably because of the people who are working in the city 
right now. But the fact that you do not use it as a concept does not mean that 
we are not actually putting it into place. The feeling that brought everyone 
in, which nowadays exists in the Madrid government is very similar to the 
one that struck the people of Barcelona, Zaragoza and other cities. That 
is something they had in common. I think it is being used, or verbalised, 
more by people in Barcelona. They have even done a congress about it, 
talking about it – but I think in Madrid it is also happening. It is probably 
something we do not say, but I would say it is definitely happening.
I definitely think it is part of the matrix, and I would like to see it become 
more part of the conversation because it is impossible to define. Because of that, 
it is actually an interesting conversation to have with people, to engage their 
creativity. It is not something you just explain with a little pamphlet and no 
further dialogue: “here is all you need to know about the commons, read it, 
goodbye.”
Victoria Anderica: Exactly. I think it is the philosophy behind the commons 
that is moving every single department here in the city of Madrid, because 
the idea is to give the city back to the citizens. That is essentially what we 
are talking about. That is what we are doing, actually doing, no? I would 
say there are a lot of concepts that are difficult for people to understand 
because they do not normally use them, but it does not mean they do not 
really understand them – they know what is going on. Even if they do 
not call it “the Commons”, they can feel what is really happening. In that 
sense, I think it is just a different approach in terms of communication, 
but I do not think it is different in terms of what is actually happening.
Miguel Arana: I think that the Commons, as a concept, is absolutely 
important because it offers us a new path to follow. It is quite a complex 
concept, which points to an absolute paradigm change, but we are still 
ensconced in the old paradigms and it may be difficult to understand 
the concept and its full potential. Still, it is a beacon to follow and one of 
the few, new possibilities allowing us to change things because it really 
questions the matrix of the whole system. It is huge and complex, as it 
has to do with economy, with knowledge, with power and its distribution. 
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However, at this moment I cannot say that it is playing a very visible or 
specific role.
How do you see this crystallising and scaling up, both nationally and 
transnationally? These experiences you are building here, do you think they 
are feasible at other levels? Or do you think that we need to go through a 
process of maturation of the urban commons before we can tackle national and 
transnational Commons?
Miguel Arana: All these ideas, including the commons but also focusing 
on things like collective intelligence or mechanisms for direct democracy 
– they are not really concerned with scale or the way power and society 
were previously organised. A true paradigm change will not be fixed to 
the old structures. For example, take this decision-making platform 
we are building: once you have built a viable platform that incites tens 
of thousands of people to work, think and take decisions together, the 
number of people or the scale does not matter anymore. It does not 
matter what type of decision you make, it does not matter if it is a local or 
national decision, none of that matters. The same thing happens with the 
Commons.  
Since one of the characteristics of these ideas is how fluid and open they 
are, I do not think they are fixed to pre-existing structures. Anything that 
we can make in Madrid and other cities will work at any scale, anywhere 
in the world. Actually, inside the department we have built a service, a 
kind of working group called “The Institutional Extension Service”. And 
that is precisely what they do: they are calling every city council in the 
world, every country, everybody to tell them: “Okay we are building this 
platform, it is free and we are going to give you the platform, we are going 
to give you all the rules and laws we had to write to make it work, and we 
will give you all the knowledge that we have built around this platform, 
for free. It is working for Madrid, so it can also work for you – so, why are 
you not using it?”
Anything else to close the discussion?
Victoria Anderica: We talked about the transparency policies, but I have 
not gone into much detail about what we have already done and what we 
can share. For example, in the transparency ordinance, which will include 
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what the government must do, we will include the publication of diaries 
or agendas. That means that every single public official needs to publish 
their meetings. We need to say who we are meeting, and what we are 
talking about. This is essential to decision-making transparency and is 
one of the goals we want to achieve within the three years we have left. We 
have built the software for that and it is being used very well. 
Then, the second thing I have not talked about is the transparency 
of the lobbies. This ordinance includes the obligation to create a lobby 
register, which is something that is not very common in Spain. The 
locations that have put a transparency register into place, like Catalonia, 
have not had it implemented in a very good way. There are many lobbies 
that are not registering, because no one is taking care of it. So, we will 
create a mandatory lobby registry, we are working on it. I think this will 
be a very good tool to share. I am talking about the software, because we 
will mix it with the agenda so it will be easy to register a new one, and 
then access the agendas and request meetings. It will flow – it will be very 
easy to use.
In terms of losing the fear that many people have about the transparency 
of decision-making, we are doing it and nothing is happening – in a good 
sense. I mean, we are publishing the agendas, we have published the CVs 
of everyone that is not a public official who works in City Hall. We thought 
it was going to be the end of the world – and nothing happened. We have 
had positive feedback. People are happy to know who they are working 
with because actually, we have really good professionals joining us in City 
Hall. That is great. I think that is something where Madrid can work as 
an example of how we should lose that fear of transparency, because it can 
be done. 
Forerunners of Italian municipalism
Interview with Renato Accorinti, Mayor of Messina1
Messina is a harbour city in north-east Sicily. It is the third largest city 
on the island and has a population of 238,000 inhabitants. Messina has 
become the first Italian city to be governed by a citizens’ movement: 
Cambiamo Messina dal Basso (Let’s change Messina from the bottom up). 
Cambiamo Messina dal Basso is a civil platform made up of hundreds 
of people with different backgrounds and a common goal: to put human 
rights, justice and social equality at the centre of the policy-making 
process. Renato Accorinti was the candidate supported by Cambiamo 
Messina dal Basso in Messina’s municipal elections of June 2013. He is a 
pacifist, activist and professor, and has now been the mayor of Messina for 
three and a half years. 
***
One of Cambiamo Messina dal Basso’s main objectives was to support, enhance 
and inspire a widespread participatory process of government. How has your 
relationship with the platform developed since you took office? What do you 
think the relationship between social movements and institutions should be like 
in order to successfully implement citizens’ demands?
I believe that the good governance of a city requires social movements, 
organisations and collectives of people that want to make a difference, 
to cooperate and to stimulate progress. Cities cannot be changed from 
the inside of a building. They can only be changed through continuous 
engagement in the city, on the streets and in the neighbourhoods. It is 
1 | This interview took place in November 2016.
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only natural that this has been one of the key elements of our approach: 
my door has always been open for those willing to help. And if before 
we used to have a queue of people waiting outside who wanted to ask for 
favours, now there is a queue of people who want to do something for their 
city. Obviously, in this context there is a unique link to Cambiamo Messina 
dal Basso, which is the political reality that emerged during the election 
campaign from the desire not to waste all the energy that had gathered 
around the large civic coalition that supported my candidacy. Within 
Cambiamo Messina dal Basso, while we respect each other’s autonomy 
(which in my opinion is indispensable) we constantly discuss issues and 
organise common actions, each of us according to our role (mayor, city 
councillor, activist). And by so doing we help each other and stay in close 
contact with the situation in the city and the demands coming from the 
grassroots. 
Cambiamo Messina dal Basso has an open and inclusive position towards 
migrants and refugees in the region. It opposes the dogma imposed by the 
economic crisis and the stigmatisation of those fleeing war and devastation. As 
a Mediterranean city, could Messina organise a joint action together with other 
European cities to develop a network of cities without borders?
This is one of the topics that is closest to my heart. When I think of 
the “least important” – whom I believe should be at the centre of the 
government actions of any administrator – I cannot help but think of 
them, of the migrants. We Sicilians are a migrant community ourselves: 
we have been all over the world and we know all too well what it means 
not to be welcome. This is why we must not make the same mistake. It 
is our duty, as human beings first of all, but also as administrators in 
this historical moment, to promote different welcoming policies that are 
humane and focus on human dignity. Over the last few years we have 
grown used to receiving boats – though one never really gets used to it – 
full of migrants (full of life, full of hope) in our city’s port. The solidarity 
shown by Messina’s community has been extraordinary and encompasses 
many different integration initiatives, the taking in of unaccompanied 
minors as well as a number of reports on the living conditions of migrants 
who are kept inside a “welcoming” system, which is sometimes inhumane 
(and which unfortunately does not depend on us). A network of welcoming 
cities without borders would be a very relevant message to send to our 
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governments, to show that things really can be done differently, provided 
there is the will to do so.
Squatters at the Teatro Fiera said in 2012 that their goal in occupying the 
theatre, which had been abandoned and left to decay for decades, was “to give 
the city a key asset for the civil and cultural growth of the community”. What 
is happening with the theatre today? What are the developments as regards 
legislation on occupied spaces in Messina?
Our experience with the Teatro Fiera was amazing. I myself participated 
and that was when the thousands of signatures demanding my nomination 
began to accumulate in 2013. Nowadays, unfortunately, the theatre has 
reverted to a state of neglect because the entity that manages the building 
– the Port Authority, which is directly subject to the national government – 
closed it down again to wait for it to be renovated. Faced with this situation 
we are taking action: in those cases we consider it appropriate, we claim 
ownership of a building or space for the municipality. The theatre belongs 
to the city and its citizens and therefore it should be managed by the 
municipality. This is not just a quarrel between entities: it is about putting 
politics at the service of the common good and giving back to the city what 
belongs to it. If we manage to achieve this, it will be the final proof of how 
a bottom-up initiative, the action of a social movement, can be brought to 
successful conclusion by an attentive and responsive public institution. 
This is how we try to work also as regards other commons, or community 
resources, in the city. We created an institution – the Commons 
Lab – in which citizens jointly wrote the rules for the management of 
commons, the management of urban gardens and for the execution of the 
participatory budget. Our administration recognises the social value of 
self-management experiences. And despite many obstacles we will soon 
start an experiment on commons in the city, as we have also created a self-
recovery and self-management project for families living in emergency 
housing. The municipality can do a lot in this respect.
Messina has been described as “the first example of municipalism in Italy”. 
What participation initiatives has the City Council implemented in recent 
years? What has been the reaction and level of engagement from the citizens? 
Has Messina’s City Council established contact with other Italian or European 
Forerunners of Italian municipalism 73
cities to exchange insights on practices for increasing the level of citizen 
participation in the institutions? 
There have been many initiatives, mainly because this was a sleeping city 
that was not used to participating. The Commons Lab, for one, comes to 
mind, but also the popular assemblies we organised on particular issues, 
and the Municipal Board meetings that were open to citizens in the city’s 
various neighbourhoods. We are also currently implementing a project 
for the participatory redevelopment of certain properties in the suburbs 
(through popular assemblies in which the citizens themselves decide how 
a particular area should be redeveloped). Yes, it would be nice if there 
were more opportunities and more citizens who want to get involved. But 
this is a start, and not just a little step. Clearly, exchange with other cities 
– from Italian ones like Naples to cities outside Italy like A Coruña or 
Barcelona – can help us greatly. Exchange, dialogue, and sharing skills 
and experiences on critical issues can only be good for all of us.
Don’t let them d(r)own
Interview with Dobrica Veselnovic and Ksenija Radovanović,  
Ne da(vi)mo Beograd1
The citizens’ initiative “Don’t Let Belgrade D(r)own” (“Ne da(vi)mo 
Beograd”) was formed in 2014 as a reaction to the imposition of the 
“Belgrade Waterfront” project (“Beograd na void”). According to Belgrade’s 
planning department, “Belgrade Waterfront is a project for which the city 
has waited for more than 50 years2”. The entire project is worth more than 
3 billion euros and could take 30 years to complete. By the time it ends, 
Belgrade should have a new opera house, shopping centre and luxury 
hotels and apartments. Critics say that the whole process of planning 
and decision-making lacked any transparency and democratic legitimacy. 
Since its beginning Ne da(vi)mo Beograd has organised a number of 
actions. It is collected and disseminated much needed information about 
the project of “national significance”, actively made use of all existing 
institutional ways of citizen participation and called people to the streets. 
These protests that started as a reaction to an urban development project 
have recently drawn up to 25,000 people, making them among the largest 
protests in recent Serbian history. 
“Ne da(vi)mo Beograd” is made up of people of different profiles, 
professions, and beliefs, who share the feeling of responsibility for their 
city, its processes and its problems, its present and its future. Their 
activities have one aim in common: to stop the degradation and the 
depletion of the city’s public spaces, done in the name of ostentatious 
urban and architectural mega-projects in Belgrade and other cities in 
1 | This interview took place in November 2016.
2 | “Controversy surrounds Belgrade Waterfront development” Guy Delauney, 
BBC News June 21 2016 (http://www.bbc.com/news/business-36576420)
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Serbia. They aim to reassess urban and cultural policies in view of the 
sustainable development of cities and argue for a more just distribution 
of common resources, while enabling the inclusion of citizens in the 
development of their environment.
***
How did the protests start and what have been the key moments and 
achievements?
From its initial launch, we have opposed the Belgrade Waterfront mega-
urban development project. We were trying to stop the city government 
of Belgrade from changing laws and procedures that regulate the 
development of the city, that they wanted to do to allow for the continuation 
of this project. For instance, when representatives of the city government 
proposed changes to the General Urban Plan, we organised professionals 
and interested citizens and proposed around 2,000 complaints. Needless 
to say that the Commission did not pay attention to them. Once they 
showed that they do not care about public debate and the opinions of 
professionals and citizens, as well as about legislation and law in general, 
we decided to stop participating in legislative processes regulating city 
development. We started protesting in various ways at the public hearing 
where the new Spatial Plan for this area was proposed. After that, we 
staged protests, entitled “Let’s show them duck!” on the occasion of the 
signing of the investment agreement. In Serbian slang ‘to duck’ means to 
trick or to commit fraud. Because of this, we established a yellow duck as 
a symbol for the protests, as it is the most common visualisation of this. 
The latest protests brought more than 25,000 citizens onto the streets 
to oppose the Belgrade Waterfront project and to denounce the criminal 
deeds that were committed in order to proceed with the envisaged plan. 
The occasion for this protest was the demolition of a whole street, including 
privately owned houses, and the severe violation of the citizens’ rights of 
freedom of movement, liberty and security. In detail: during the night of 
April 25th 2016, a group of masked people illegally demolished the whole 
street within the area designated for the project with three dredgers, 
including several privately owned houses. During the demolition they 
temporarily detained passers-by and security employees of private 
enterprises, restricting their freedom of movement and severely violating 
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their liberty, personal integrity and right to property. The police were 
advised not to react to citizens’ reports during the demolition, deliberately 
refusing to respond to citizens’ calls for help, while those on site were 
harassed.
What impact has the protest had on Belgrade’s politics? How do established 
politicians react to it?
Politicians that are “in power” have made a conscious effort to ignore what 
happened that night in Savamala and, for weeks, they tried to ignore the 
people on the streets asking for answers. Because this strategy failed they 
turned to plan B, which includes ongoing attempts to discredit the people 
who lost their homes and property that night and in the last two years, 
as well as attempts to discredit individuals and organisations helping the 
protests. It seems like their strategy is to distract the public from the main 
question:   what kind of society do we live in if the citizens’ well-being 
is considered less important than anything else? In addition, parties of 
the opposition tried to take over the protests, while constantly failing to 
make use of their institutional position, confirming that the path towards 
a people-oriented politics will be hard, but is necessary.
What do you hope to achieve in the end? And what would be a success today?
My hope is that we can show that a different politics is possible, and in 
that line, that also a different city is possible. With our actions we are 
trying to get back the hope that change “from the bottom” is possible. In 
that process we are also trying to empower the citizens to reclaim rights 
that are under attack. On a smaller scale, we believe that there is a strong 
and tangible chance to force the government to give up this problematic 
waterfront project, while also not to attempt anything similar in the 
future. That argument is called public pressure.  We are aware that this is 
a marathon, but as the number of people who are ready to say “no” to the 
disrespectful behaviour of the government is increasing, we are more and 
more confident that we will succeed.
Can the “Belgrade Waterfront” project and the protest against it be seen as 
a representative case for general developments in Post-Yugoslavian Eastern 
Europe? 
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Yes of course. This project is a paradigm of how cities are shaped upon 
entering the “transition” period. The main characteristic is that the 
processes happen without respect for the public interest. We see a 
constant shrinking of the public sphere, leading to violent changes in 
the environment, city neighbourhoods and natural surroundings. All of 
this for the profit of the narrow circle of people who are members of the 
economic elite associated with the political elite. But, to be optimistic, the 
resistance shown in Belgrade and other cities throughout Europe tells us 
that citizens are aware of this.
What can other cities learn from the protest?
We think that the citizens of other cities in Serbia and throughout Europe 
are starting to realise that they have lost the power to make decisions 
concerning the design of their everyday life. This is most evident in cities 
where we see more and more voices demanding the availability of public 
spaces for public use, increased participation in public affairs and generally 
more democracy. In the broadest sense we can see the emergence of calls 
for the appropriation of the right to our cities.
In Belgrade we are very carefully watching the experiences of other 
movements such as Podemos, Barcelona en Comú, the Democracy in 
Europe Movement (DiEM25), European Alternatives, the International 
Network for Urban Research and Action (INURA) etc. Because only with 
collective action and solidarity we can drive the waves of change. In that 
sense, every contact, every visit, every support and exchange that we 
make is crucial for our fight. Europe will not be changed by itself. We, the 
citizens of Europe, must do it together. 
Cities rejecting surveillance
Renata Avila
The city of the future I see in promotional videos1 for systems of mass 
surveillance and mass control seems to be subsumed in a permanent state 
of normalcy. It is a city with no traffic, no protests, no visible disasters, 
no spontaneous mobilisations, no surprises. Spontaneous events, as if 
they were system errors, are suppressed before they occur. Movement 
analysis and decision-making happens in a control room that looks like a 
spaceship, where technicians work in real-time, watching all of us, without 
us being able to see them. There is no citizen access. To the contrary, 
these are closed systems, difficult to monitor. Where actions are regulated 
by a system, designed elsewhere, that pretends it is not political.  But 
technology is political.
Cities where everything is controlled by invisible technology, almost 
imperceptible in daily life. Those surveillance cameras now visible on 
street corners are replaced by systems of constant monitoring integrated 
into the landscape.  Cities of sensors collecting our data all day long, 
where each movement is registered and stored, where decisions are 
automated and dehumanized, monetised to optimise consumption, to 
predict behavior, control people. And where the benefits of not knowing 
who decides and why, stand to be gained by the same conglomerate who 
bets on this vision. A few companies developing software, hardware and 
capacities in countries that can be counted on one hand. A market of 8 
billion US dollars, which is expected to grow tenfold by the year 2020. Fed 
with meagre public funds in a world where austerity is the default.
1 | For example SMART CIT Y – The interconnected city: improving the quality of life 
of citizens. September 2012 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qvGuw2zZ3qc)
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Although discourses keep feeding the imaginary, descriptions of 
cameras detecting pickpockets, this is something radically different. 
Matrices that combine lots of data in real-time. This vision for the city 
of the future, promoted by a small group of technology conglomerates 
(Environmental Leader 2013), is one where quality of life is directly 
proportional to the predictability and homogeneity of its inhabitants, 
clashing with the struggle for diversity and diverse behaviours. To achieve 
this vision, much more is sacrificed than privacy. We pawn off our security 
to those in the sealed-off control room. It is to sacrifice the purest form of 
democracy we have, our right to protest freely and anonymously in the 
town square.
Local surveillance systems are rapidly expanding everywhere, much 
earlier and faster than the regulatory frameworks for adequate protection 
of privacy and personal data, without democratic mechanisms, community 
or neighbourhood consultations to determine their necessity or ap-
propriateness. They are sophisticated and ephemeral systems that require 
updates and costly maintenance and show vague results. In Tegucigalpa, 
Honduras, for example, the city could not maintain the surveillance system 
due to a lack of budget to maintain the cameras (Pachico, 2013).
The contracts that are signed tie the hands of more than one public 
institution, borrowing from future municipal budgets, with a coordinated 
marketing and data machinery that does not offer solid evidence to 
prove effectiveness. Public authorities assure us that cameras, scenario 
modelling and mass surveillance will eliminate the problem of insecurity, 
advancing these over other public policies meant to attack extreme poverty 
and inequality of access to basic services, as well as the recovery of public 
space. The studies that vouch for the effectiveness of surveillance as a 
crime reduction measure are incomplete; they do not take local internal 
and external factors into account, and cannot be applied to different 
contexts (Murakami Wood, D. and Webster, C.W.R. 2009: pp. 259-273).
Cities of the future, promoted by the technology industry and real estate 
developers benefitting from them, allow for events to be pre-empted, for 
preventive decisions to be made to control the masses, block protests, 
predict civic mobilisations for more and better rights. To discriminate by 
algorithm. To exclude by patterns of behaviour.
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Do we want a future without surveillance? A future where diversity, 
and not uniformity of behaviour, is the rule? Let’s start by eradicating (the 
now invisible) vigilante culture of the neighbourhood and the city. Let’s 
start by participating in all public spaces and if they do not exist, let’s open 
them. Before the final bastion of democracy becomes a memory erased by 
someone behind a screen. Among the steps we can all take, here are three 
I will elaborate on:
Prevent the arrival of sur veillance
If mass surveillance is still at the exploratory stage as a security measure, 
it is important to organise neighbours against it, asking if municipal 
goods or services will be sacrificed in favour of surveillance, and question 
the impact that prioritising it will have on community and neighbourhood 
life. Moreover, it is important to ask about the long-term sustainability 
and viability of such projects, the conditions by which the municipality 
is acquiring them and the time frames. It is important to quantify what 
is being sacrificed to invest in surveillance. For example, indicating how 
many programmes for children and youth at risk could be started for the 
same price, offering more complete and long-term solutions. Once a mass 
surveillance system is installed, privacy and intimacy are only for those 
who can afford them (Alwin 2014).2
Question mass sur veillance already installed and the costs of 
maintenance and updates
Decisions to improve security and quality of life of neighbourhoods 
and cities should be participatory. The benefits of installing mass and 
continuous surveillance mechanisms in public space should be weighed 
against analogue, social alternatives. Technological surveillance is 
expensive because for every camera installed there are not just related 
fixed costs for maintenance and updates, there is also a sacrifice in 
terms of public spending on social programmes. Moreover, almost all 
2 | Pic Six Ltd. is based in Israel and provides authorised law enforcement 
forces and governmental agencies with a selection of interception products, 
standard off-the shelf or custom tailored solutions.(http://www.pic-six.
com/?module=catalog&item_id=3&c_id=12)
Cities rejecting sur veillance 81
the technology providers are not domestic companies. Mostly closed 
technology, running on proprietary software, makes effective citizen 
oversight impossible. Contracts with camera providers and services are 
generally in the millions of dollars, and are binding long beyond the 
term of the signing government, without considering the realities of a 
municipality.
Only making the cost of surveillance in the city visible, we could aim 
at its reduction: the cost of surveillance is paid by cuts in the budget of the 
neglected community hospital, sacrificing the youth and arts programme 
for marginal areas. 
Connect with other rebel cities and collectives
To free ourselves from surveillance and other repressive and authoritarian 
forms of power that this opens, we must immediately activate the 
mechanisms of law that allow us to oversee the functions of mass 
surveillance systems in our cities. And do this collectively, in coordination 
with other cities affected by the problem. Just as there are Smart Cities 
networks we should form our own Rebel Cities networks where surveillance 
is rejected and participatory democracy is affirmed, a democracy framed 
in respect for human rights and diversity, focused on collective solutions, 
which is the true path to safer cities. Not cameras.
We can then simultaneously activate collaborative mechanisms to 
prevent their expansion, and the actions could start regionally. 
Given the robust access to information institutions and laws and 
the current political moment, Europe is the perfect region to start with. 
As cities are aggressively securitising every corner to combat terrorism 
and manage crises, it is important to start a coordinated watch dog to be 
vigilant on the approval and deployment of surveillance technologies. 
An idea will be to use the current initiatives facilitating access to 
information, such as Frag den Staat3 or My Society ś What do they Know?4 
to simultaneously file standardised freedom of information requests in 
different cities across Europe, revealing the cost of surveillance, providers, 
vendors and who is benefiting from it. Data could also reveal in a given 
3 | Official website (https://fragdenstaat.de/)
4 | Official website (https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/)
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geographical area which social inclusion programmes were left out of 
budget, where cameras are now installed instead.  
Furthermore, a coalition of concerned citizens, supported by local 
parliamentarians or even the European Parliament could demand studies 
on the results of such technologies deployed. A coalition of European 
Rebel cities could also take serious legal action in face of possible illegal 
uses of surveillance for the adoption of discriminatory policies and 
practices. After a proactive series of actions in Europe, a second region 
could be added, ideally Asia or Latin America, where the expansion of 
Smart Cities is in its golden age. Only with facts and data on the harm of 
surveillance we could effectively demand from authorities’ protection of 
personal data where it exists, and where it does not, demand that human 
rights authorities undertake feasibility studies before surveillance is 
deployed, weighing the impact on individual guarantees before installing 
such systems. Democracy begins and ends there. In its exercise.
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Shifting Media

Introduction
Shifts in media technologies have been at the centre of the debates about 
the latest shifts in politics. While new media are now referred to as one 
of the main underlying factors for the era of post-truth and the rise of 
populists, some years ago they were celebrated for enabling horizontal 
communication which would pave the way for horizontal power structures. 
As Jan Rohgalf, one of the authors in this chapter, puts it: “Hitherto hailed 
as tools of democratisation and the weapon of choice against autocrats 
worldwide, social media recently became the target of a lot of finger-
pointing”. 
While there are many interpretations about the meanings and 
consequences of the shift happening in media, the shift itself remains 
without doubt: traditional media is losing its power to distribute news. For 
centuries, the dissemination of information was in the hands of those who 
created it, who then sent it to the masses for consumption through printed 
newspapers, radio and television broadcasts. Today, gathering almost 1.8 
billion users, Facebook is already the largest media company on the planet 
with advertising sales of billions of dollars a year. In a digital era where 
information loses its limits and boundaries and content flows between 
Instagram, Snapchat and videos on Facebook, the need to organise beyond 
the nation state becomes not necessary, but mandatory for media and 
communication experts and activists. 
As Robin Mansell reminds us, living in a “digitally mediated society” 
means that not only the visible streams of information are of importance 
but also the invisible streams of data and their management by algorithms. 
In a time of post-truth, how can we combat the rise of a false reality? 
Which media infrastructure is necessary for alternative narratives that 
finally bring transnational agenda to the citizens? What can be learned 
from existing alternative media platforms in this regard? Is social media 
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still offering resources for new ways of protest? And how do we deal with 
the new power of algorithms when for most of us they are blackboxes? 
While the first and the last article address some of these questions from 
a theoretical standpoint, the contributions in between come from voices 
that already are proposing and implementing new models of media, 
successfully shifting the mainstream narrative and responding to the rise 
of nationalism.
The chapter opens with Jan Rohgalf, researcher at the University of 
Rostock, pointing out the similarities between the structure of social 
media and communication strategies of populist actors. Alena Krempaska 
and Peter Weisenbacher from the Human Rights Institute in Bratislava, 
analyse the change in Slovakia’s media which is as vicious as it is 
representative for the situation in many Central and Eastern European 
countries. Adam Ramsay, editor at openDemocracy UK, presents his 
reflections on the possibilities of establishing a transnational media 
agenda that helps breaking boundaries in Europe and beyond. Jakub 
Dymek, journalist and analyst for Krytyka Polityczna in Poland, explains 
new forms of transnational cooperation and exchange of information 
between journalists. The chapter continues with two interviews presenting 
innovative examples of journalism in Europe: Esther Alonso, marketing 
director at eldiario.es, explains the working process and structure behind 
the online newspaper eldiario.es and Ramy Al-Asheq, founder of Abwab, 
explains the origins, objectives and challenges of launching Abwab, the 
first newspaper for newcomers in Germany. In the last article of the 
chapter Robin Mansell, Professor of New Media at the London School of 
Economics, thinks about the back-end of our “digitally mediated societies” 
and asks whether algorithms can be subjected to governance.
The Populist Challenge 2.0  
How populism profits from social media
Jan Rohgalf
The current momentum of nationalist populism, and especially Donald 
Trump’s election as president of the US, has provoked a heated debate 
about ‘post-truth politics’, or even the ‘post-fact society’ in academia and 
the media. Hitherto hailed as tools of democratisation and the weapon of 
choice against autocrats worldwide, social media has recently become the 
target of a lot of finger-pointing. It has been accused of having assisted 
political actors who mobilise voters through a crude blend of outlandish 
conspiracy theories and suggestive half-truths, barely concealed hate-
speech, as well as outright lies. Charges against social media have 
culminated in blaming Facebook, practically, for enabling the spread of 
fake news and hate-speech at an unprecedented scale, thus influencing 
the 2016 US elections in favour of the Republican candidate.
There is no doubt that neither lies, nor the blending of fact and fiction, 
are new phenomena in politics. They are part and parcel of politics, not 
only of populism, as are emotions, in contrast to rational arguments. And, 
of course, there was populism before social media and Facebook. 
Nonetheless, the advent of social media has had a tremendous impact 
on the structure and workings of the public sphere in modern democracies. 
This essay argues that the current populist challenge to liberal, pluralist 
democracy profits in a number of ways from the kind of public sphere 
embodied by Facebook. This discussion is preceded by a brief outline 
of the populist challenge and concludes with remarks concerning the 
defence of pluralist democracy.
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The populist challenge
There is no doubt that populism is a fighting word. Accusing a political 
opponent of populism usually has the aim of discrediting them. 
Notwithstanding this, populism is also a useful category for analysis. It 
can be characterised by a particular understanding of the political and of 
democracy (Müller, 2016; Urbinati, 2014; Rosanvallon, 2010; Mudde, 2004; 
Taggart, 2004). Let us take a brief look at how populism conceptualises 
the political, as well as democracy, and why this understanding challenges 
liberal, pluralist democracy.
First of all, populism revolves around the idea of the righteous people 
put under pressure from various sides. Populism always identifies the 
main threat as the invariably corrupt elites in politics, the economy and 
the media conspiring against the people. These enemies ‘from above’ are 
said to team up with other enemies ‘from outside’. Basically, anyone can 
be declared an enemy, immigrants of course, but also other groups such 
as progressives, the LGBT-community, feminists, environmentalists etc. 
The equation is very simple: those who do not fit, or indeed oppose the 
way of life and interests of the populists’ supporters, are excluded from the 
people. In short, populists idealise their own clientele as the true sovereign 
of democracy.
Populism entails the feeling that the people were deprived of their 
autonomy and self-realisation. Its enemies purportedly prevent the people 
from being who they truly are, and, thus, what is ultimately at stake here 
is identity and the recognition of identity. This identity is, however, not a 
matter of individual choice, but of descent and fate. Usually this identity 
is in one way or the other coded in terms of a distinct ethnicity or culture.
Secondly, the populist interpretation of the political is anti-pluralist 
and plebiscitary. Once the way of life and interests of the populists’ 
supporters count as the unadulterated popular will, no longer can there 
be political fault lines among the people. As a result, the exchange, 
bargain and compromise between conflicting interests – the bread-and-
butter business of democracy – is met with disdain. To the populists, it 
is just the business of the corrupt, selfish elites, always eager to increase 
their share. In contrast, populism assumes there is a common good, and 
a popular will oriented towards this common good, which precedes the 
The Populist Challenge 2.0 89
political process1 (cf. Fraenkel, 2007; Urbinati, 2006). Ultimately, it is 
nothing but the expression of the people’s identity. Hence, according to 
the populists, true democracy is about polling the authentic will of the 
people as directly as possible, in order to circumvent the bias caused by 
lobbying for particular interests.
Thirdly, and because of this, mood and affect are extremely important 
criteria in populist politics. Bleak scenarios of conspiracies, decline, and 
perdition – evoked over and over again – are defining features of populist 
affect management. Scenarios such as these suggest that the world is 
nothing more than a snake pit of lies and deceit. Hence, one is well advised 
to exclusively believe in what is in tune with the interests and values of 
one’s own group. In other words: truth is that which affirms the group’s 
outlook on the world and which promotes its cause. Populism thus tends 
to blur the distinctions between proven facts, half-truths, lies and fantasy 
in favour of sheer assertiveness and impact. It is pretty much the same 
phenomenon, which Harry Frankfurt in his classic essay, discussed as 
“bullshit” (Frankfurt, 2005). Hannah Arendt’s “emancipation from reality 
and experience” captures something very similar. (Arendt 1986: 965).
Facebook: No neutral network
Facebook was not designed to host meaningful public discourse. In 2004, 
it was launched as a service to stay in touch with friends, colleagues, 
former schoolmates and the like. In the beginning, it was a tool for 
networking, for sharing experiences and thoughts with other users or for 
work on one’s personal identity. The network of friends and acquaintances 
rapidly grew into something much bigger. The company still likes to think 
of its product just as a place where people personally connect, but in fact 
today this social network – with about 1.7 billion users worldwide – figures 
as a decisive factor in the strategies of businesses, journalism and political 
campaigns. It has become an important part of the public sphere. But 
what are its defining traits and to what extent does populism benefit from 
these features?
Firstly, Facebook is marked by personalisation and thus fragmentation. 
Introduced in 2006, the personalised news feed is now at the heart of 
1 | However, a common good and a popular will are actually the outcome of the 
political process.
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the social network experience. The news feed is a digest of content 
considered most relevant to the respective user. The exact workings of 
the complex filter algorithm are a business secret, undergoing constant 
adjustment (Constine, 2016). Very broadly put, from the content posted 
in the respective user’s extended personal network, it picks roughly 10 
per cent that will probably matter most2 (cf. Mosseri, 2016). Criteria for 
relevance are derived from past behaviour, and from how intensely other 
users interact with the content.
The recent concerns about the effect that echo-chambers and filter 
bubbles might have on public discourse originate from this feature (cf. 
Sunstein, 2001; Pariser, 2011). On Facebook, users decide who populates 
their ‘world’ and, consequently, also make a choice on the content that they 
wish to be exposed to. The news feed algorithm amplifies this deliberate 
filter further, delivering ever more of the same. As a result, critics argue, 
manual and automatic filtering work to create enclaves of like-minded 
people and, not bothered by alternate points of view, these enclaves run the 
risk of radicalisation and the fostering of hostility towards other groups.
Because of this, Facebook provides an ideal environment for all those 
who are convinced of the grand conspiracy of the elites and of manipulation 
by the ‘crooked’ mainstream media. The social network invites them to 
retreat into counter-publics tailored to their needs, complete with a diet 
of hyper-partisan ‘alternative media’ and fake news that flatter their own 
opinions, prejudices and feelings.
Secondly, while the social network fosters fragmentation through 
personalisation, at the same time, it overrides other distinctions. Namely, 
it calls into question the well-established distinction between the few who 
produce media content and the many, largely passive consumers, who 
consume such content (Poster, 1995). Now everybody can – or at least has 
the potential to – directly address a large public, without any cost or the 
need to gain access to established media outlets.
Social media has been praised for toppling the gate-keepers who, 
from the editorial departments of the old mass media, decided what was 
worthwhile to put into the public sphere (cf. Chadwick, 2013). It goes without 
2 | According to Adam Mosseri, Vice-President of Product Management at 
Facebook, on average users actually read 10 per cent of the posts from their 
network. 
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saying that this narrative of emancipation is also attractive to populists and 
their supporters, who feel hostility towards the ‘mainstream’ media3.
Furthermore, the common markers that help distinguish content with 
respect to quality, origin and intention, have also moved to the background 
or vanished altogether. Reliable news or cat-themed memes, birthday 
greetings or the latest celebrity scandals, life hacks or conspiracy theories 
– on the news feed they not only appear next to each other, there also 
appears to be no substantial difference between them4 (Remnick, 2016).
These are near ideal conditions for the blurring of fact, fiction and 
fantasy typical of populism. Consider, for example, on the one hand, a 
journalistic report on the integration of immigrants based on serious 
investigation and a hastily penned rant on the same subject on the other. 
Once you deny that there is a difference in quality and assume instead 
that they are merely two equally legitimate conflicting standpoints, you 
are free to pick whatever suits you best5 (cf. Lynch, 2016; Harsin, 2015).
Thirdly, as the number of senders and the amount of content produced 
keeps growing, while the attention of potential consumers remains by and 
large the same, the news feed turns into an attention economy (Franck, 
1999). Content of varying natures enters a cut-throat competition for the 
scarce resource that is the users’ attention. A recent study confirms the 
intuitive idea that the news feed algorithm decisively guides the users’ 
attention and their interaction with the content they are exposed to6 
(Tufekci, 2015: 1130-1132). If the goal is to maximise outreach, such as is 
typically the case in advertisements, journalism and politics, it is therefore 
imperative to secure one of the top positions in the news feed. The 
algorithm creates feedback loops: posts on popular, so-called trending 
topics, stand a higher chance of receiving a top position in a user’s news 
3 | However, the relationship between populists and old mass media is diverse 
and too complex to be summed up in a single sentence.
4 | As also Barack Obama aptly put it: ‘An explanation of climate change from a 
Nobel Prize-winning physicist looks exactly the same on your Facebook page as 
the denial of climate change by somebody on the Koch brothers’ payroll’. 
5 | They argue that the Internet and social media proliferate competing standards 
of what establishes facts. We are confronted with ever more ‘truth games’ (Harsin), 
which cannot be decided.
6 | Zeynep Tufekci has pointed to this aspect in the inhouse study conducted by 
Facebook employees, Bakshy, E./Messing, S./Adamic, L.
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feed and in turn are more likely to provoke user engagement and thus even 
increase their popularity. The social network’s metrics provide a simple, 
yet all too simple means to measure value and importance: the intensity of 
interaction that content provokes. Or in one word: impact.
As research suggests, content that induces emotions like awe, anger or 
anxiety, is more likely to provoke interaction, regardless of other qualities 
such as novelty or practical utility. Users are also motivated to engage 
with social media because they want their own identity and lifestyle to 
be visible and recognised (Bennett&Segerberg, 2013; Papacharissi, 2010; 
Papacharissi, 2015).
The flood of pro-Trump fake news during the 2016 US presidential 
election provides a good example. Journalists managed to track down 
a number of fake news producers. They tinkered fake news for Trump 
supporters for the simple reason that this group of voters was the most 
determined to engage with fake news and hence created the largest 
revenue in advertisements. Fake news producers also discovered 
something else: the messages that got the most interaction were those 
that affirmed the audience’s prejudices and anxieties, but also their hopes 
and wishes, regardless of how outlandish they were. Fake news consumers 
also click what they want to be real, not only what they believe to be true 
(cf. Silverman, C. et al, 2016; Horning, 2016).
In their study on political mobilisation in social media, W. Lance 
Bennett and Segerberg showed that users assess politics in a highly 
personalised manner; one’s own lifestyle and the presentation of one’s 
identity are crucial (Bennet&Segerberg, 2013). Ideologically thin messages, 
like memes and hashtags, which have a high potential to stir emotions 
whilst also being easily personalised and distributed, do a much better job 
in promoting a political cause these days than unattractive, cumbersome 
party organisations. They can initiate cascades of the sufficient thrust to 
be trending and, hence, garner even more attention.
This new form of political mobilisation does not only resonate with 
populist disdain for organisations and the fantasy of the spontaneously 
erupting popular will. With regards to the Tea Party Movement, and 
the Swedish Sverigedemokraterna, Bennett also points out that populists 
might pursue authoritarian politics, but they are successful in this 
new mode of mobilisation because they do not impose a strict party 
line Bennett&Segerberg, 2013). Rather, they aim at unleashing anger 
and indignation (on the German case of PEGIDA cf. Rohgalf, 2016; 
The Populist Challenge 2.0 93
Bizeul&Rohgalf, 2016: 49-67). For this purpose, they offer diverse, 
ambiguous materials and the vague narrative of omnipresent traitors 
and enemies, which can be individually adapted to fit one’s own anxieties 
and grievances. The populists, so to speak, offer an outlet for various, 
individually felt forms of discomfort – and social media provides the 
infrastructure for this.
Donald Trump was mocked for his inconsistency and eclecticism. 
However, eclecticism is not a deficit here. On the contrary, it is a 
promising way to mobilise crowds – not only online audiences. Yet the 
Trump campaign had a different take on personalised politics than the 
one identified by Bennett and Segerberg. Social media, combined with 
big data and cutting-edge psychometrics, enabled the micro-targeting of 
a huge range of groups of potential voters. It allowed for the addressing 
individual citizens, delivering content tailored to their personality, life 
situation, opinion, etc (cf. Krogerus&Grassegger, 2016).
In defence of pluralist democracy
With nationalist right-wing populism on the rise, liberal, pluralist 
democracy is under pressure. The open society and its emancipatory 
development since at least the 1960s is being jeopardised from within. 
The preceding remarks have set out to contribute to an adequate 
understanding of the present challenge. In this conclusion we shall ask 
what to do in defence of a pluralist, liberal democracy and argue that it is 
not social media that is at the centre of this answer.
First of all, do not settle for the diagnosis of the post-fact society. It is 
important to note and criticise a recently successful wave of politicians to 
whom facts do not seem to matter. However, announcing the era of post-
truth equals a declaration of surrender (cf. Pörksen, 2016). The proponents 
of a pluralist democracy should not consider themselves to be the relics of 
an era that has come to an end, but approach the future with a realistic, yet 
forward looking mindset.
Secondly, do not let the populists define the rules of the game. Populists 
attack politicians and journalists – and, at times, also scientists – as 
members of an allegedly corrupt elite. But the reaction to this depends on 
who is attacked. Far too often, those attacked do their challengers a favour 
and behave just like the elite they have been accused of representing. 
Instead of banding together against the populist newcomers, political 
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parties should sharpen their respective profile and engage in a serious 
competition for the best solutions to urgent problems, but also for the 
most promising vision of the future. Journalists should report critically 
on populists, but a near 24/7 coverage will, at the end of the day, not help 
the pluralist cause, but rather the populists. Facing the populist challenge, 
journalists need to also resist the temptation of discovering, again, ‘the 
man in the street who feels neglected’. This paternalistic attempt to win 
back trust will surely backfire (cf. Haemin, 2016).
Thirdly, fight hate-speech and misinformation on social media. Part of 
this struggle is a matter of criminal prosecution. But it is also the business 
of independent fact-checkers to debunk hoaxes and urban legends. All 
social media users are called upon to exercise counter-speech whenever 
hate-speech appears online. Last but not least, it is the duty of social media 
companies like Facebook to intervene – whilst there are also good reasons 
not to make Facebook the arbiter of truth. For the sake of a pluralist 
democracy, we cannot allow a single corporation to decide what is fact and 
what is fake. Nor should a government agency play this role. In a pluralist 
democracy, what is true remains subject to an ongoing process of trial 
and error and of the exchange of reasoned arguments. The willingness 
to listen and to consider your opponent’s arguments is a mandatory 
precondition. Here we touch on the aspect of a political and civil culture 
on which a pluralist democracy depends.
Fourthly, maintaining this political and civil culture is an everyday 
task. Let me conclude with just two thoughts on this complex endeavour. 
To start with, make sure you do not start seeing society through the 
populist lens. The Manichaean distinction between the people and the 
elite is ultimately a pre-modern, pre-democratic, anti-political one, 
echoing the insurmountable hiatus that separated the commoners from 
the nobility7 (De Saint-Victor, 2015). On the one hand, this is an inadequate 
paradigm for understanding politics in modern societies, including 
actually existing power asymmetries and inequality issues. On the other, 
it downplays the political opportunities the ‘ordinary citizen’ indeed has 
in modern democracies. Blaming nebulous elites for everything may be 
a convenient way to cope with reality, but it is an act of intellectual and 
political surrender.
7 | Jacques de Saint-Victor aptly pointed to this aspect of populism.
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What is more, a pluralist political and civil culture will be the ongoing 
task of political education in schools, in academia, in adult education and 
beyond. And last but not least, this culture is the result of lived experience.
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Contesting the shrinking media space   
in Slovakia
Alena Krempaska and Peter Weisenbacher
The March 2016 elections took Slovakia by surprise: the neo-Nazi Kotleba 
– LSNS (Kotleba – People’s Party Our Slovakia) won 8 per cent of the vote. 
It was an already dissolved party, which had renewed its activities, having 
hardly ever won more than 1.5 per cent in the polls. Now they are in the 
Parliamentary opposition, rather silently, but some NGOs have already 
received emails from one of the Kotleba members asking for them to 
disclose all their sources of income and the party has proposed a law to 
make a compulsory registry of foreign-financed NGOs in order to “protect 
the country from foreign ideologies”. Although politically marginal, the 
direction of the party’s activities does not make Slovak liberals feel at all 
comfortable. 
How did we get here? As the post-election analysis shows, the majority 
of voters did not vote for them because they are neo-Nazis, but in spite of 
this. For many, it was a protest vote, against mainstream parties that were 
either perceived as embroiled in corruption scandals or as no alternative at 
all. Part of the problem here is the absence of any progressive movement 
that would embody a different narrative. There is no established Leftist 
party or credible Leftist political institution. All that remained of the 
former Communist Party (renamed the Party of the Democratic Left in 
the 1990s), as well as the “original”, pre-war Social Democrats, have been 
consumed into SMER-SD, the ruling Social Democrats, who implement 
only very rudimentary Leftist policies, otherwise being a very mainstream 
party in the true sense of the word.
The disintegrated trade unions are of no help either. Over the years, 
they were only able to achieve very small victories and it is up to smaller 
associations and journalist platforms to represent any sort of counter-
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narrative. Increasingly, this gap is filled by far-right parties and the 
proliferation of conspiracy-prone, self-declared “alternative” media, active 
online.
Divisive media sphere
Since 2013, we have witnessed the exponential growth of so-called 
‘alternative media’, initially published online, but also increasingly in print. 
These media groups portray themselves as alternatives to the mainstream 
media, delivering ‘uncensored’ truth. They also often collaborate with 
traditional far-right websites and organisations, which have had a political 
presence since the 1990s. These media groups have turned seemingly 
harmless conspiracy theories into a platform for hate-speech, extremism 
and anti-Semitism. From the absurd ‘hollow-Earth theory’, suggesting 
that an alien race has its headquarters in the middle of the Earth and 
that the entrance is the very spot where the Slovak, Hungarian, and 
Austrian borders meet, to the more sinister ‘world Zionist conspiracy’ or 
blaming the Roma for Slovakia’s economic situation, and the demonising 
of LGBT people, it did not take long for human rights activists and NGOs 
themselves to be demonised as “American agents” or worse. By 2014, this 
so-called ‘alternative media’ began to enter mainstream public discourse 
in their own special way.
While still referred to as ‘controversial’, these media sources have 
also started to be quoted in the mainstream press, a fact that would have 
been unheard of just a year earlier. The most prominent example is that 
of the so-called Slobodný vysielač (Free Broadcaster), an internet radio 
station and website, notoriously extremist in its content, which slurred the 
name of the short-lived radio station of anti-fascist insurgents during the 
Slovak National Uprising (SNP), during what was arguably the Slovaks’ 
finest hour, in August 1944. It also promoted, and largely assisted, in the 
victory of the openly neo-Nazi candidate for regional governor, Marián 
Kotleba, the head of LSNS, presenting him as an alternative to the current 
“establishment and state”, thus legitimising neo-Nazi leaders. Neo-Nazis 
and fascists are often guests on the radio, where they are introduced as 
experts on “‘Roma issues”’, international affairs, human rights or even 
science.
Another example is the a monthly magazine Zem&Vek (Earth&Age), 
edited by the notorious conspiracy theorist and anti-Semite, Tibor Rostas, 
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which saw phenomenal success, with sales in its first three months 
rocketing by 500 percent. The biggest ‘success’, and a real cause for 
concern, is the extent to which these media sources present the extremist 
message in a more sophisticated way, making it harder to discern at first 
glance. By doing so, these publications reach larger parts of society. Public 
discourse has deteriorated considerably as a result. One could argue that 
it is in large part due to these forms of media that the anti-immigrant 
mood in Slovakia today is as high as in Hungary, although no refugee has 
sought to settle in the country.
It becomes increasingly acceptable, and easy to find online, discourses 
that are populist, xenophobic, homophobic, anti-Semitic, or other similar 
rubbish, and social media helps to spread such messages. These media 
forms buy their reach to farther audiences, and as Facebook algorithms 
work in creating bubbles of people interested in similar issues, the 
audiences of ‘alternative media’ are becoming less and less exposed to the 
more traditional media. All the less so, when the traditional media is more 
and more often locked for only registered users – why would someone pay 
for content he or she thinks can be reached for free on online websites?
The situation is getting worse. Virtually any significant alternative to 
the existing mainstream media promotes fascist ideas. It is unexceptional 
today for Leftist, or even environmental activists, to appear in the same 
studio, or give an interview to the same magazine, as neo-Nazi leaders. In 
addition, more and more establishment figures, such as right-wing MPs, 
are starting to accept the ‘alternative media’ as mainstream media outlets, 
and regard their output as true journalism, instead of unsupported, 
incendiary opinion with no regard for professional standards or ethics. 
The attitude of the publishers is thinly veiled self-righteousness. They 
often defend themselves by citing freedom of speech, claiming that they 
are open to everybody and everything, and even accusing all those who 
refuse to appear in one of their ‘talk-shows’ of censorship. The effect on 
their recipients is the perversion of the very idea of freedom of speech, 
by maintaining that our country’s biggest problem is the ‘censorship’ of 
fascism and other extremist ideologies, in the media and by law.
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Shrinking space for progressive voices
For those who want to build a tolerant, inclusive and just society, or for 
those who want to simply live, work and raise a family here, Slovakia’s 
current trajectory is troubling. On the one hand, we face a situation in 
which conspiracy-prone and fear-mongering online platforms are gaining 
ground, while the mainstream media does not shy away from lowering 
their journalistic standards further, in order not to lose their audience 
(and sources of income) to ‘alternative media’. The almost universally 
abhorrent mainstream media coverage of refugee issues during the events 
of last year is a case in point.
On the other hand, there is no political alternative formed on the Left, 
no party that could gather the protest vote. At the same time, since the 
2016 elections, the leading opposition Liberal party has had no shame in 
claiming that their economic programme is essentially the same as that 
of the neo-Nazi’s, and their leader has issued statements claiming that the 
neo-Nazi leader is “not really a neo-Nazi”, thus effectively normalising and 
legitimising their existence and political activity. The signs are all there 
that mainstream politicians may be tempted into seeking tacit alliances 
with the neo-Nazis in order to secure votes in the future and who knows 
on what kinds of deals, or policies, these alliances will be built.  
Neo-Nazis in Parliament, the failure of mainstream politics, no 
alternative on the Left, and a divisive media landscape with a proliferation 
of ‘alternative’ information, all culminate in creating a critical situation. 
While there is, objectively, a space and need for Leftist ideas that promote 
unconditional support for human rights, including economic and social 
policies, currently the Leftists have no vehicle, as any alternative to the 
existing system comes in a proto-fascist package. The Leftist voter is thus 
vanishing; either turning idle or towards radical groupings. The task for 
the progressives in Slovakia is therefore as glaring as it is pressing: to not 
let the public agenda be dominated by conservative forces attempting to, 
in various ways, curtail human rights, and to, by all means, reclaim public 
space for the diffusion of values for a more just society.
Fluid media landscapes
Adam Ramsay
Benedict Anderson argued that the invention of the printing press was key 
to the rise of the modern nation state. As written material could be mass 
produced, common languages formed, shared discourses developed. 
Communities started to imagine themselves into existence over large 
geographical areas, to see themselves as peoples, and to organise politically 
into administrative units based around these new-found identities.
Later on, broadcasting became key. The radio, it has been said, did 
more to unite Italy than Garibaldi. The BBC was launched three weeks 
after Ireland became independent from the UK, so that, as its founder 
Lord Reith put it, “the chimes of Big Ben could be heard in the remotest 
cottage in the country”. The powerful have long understood the role of the 
media in the construction of identity.
Similarly, it seems almost inevitable that future historians will look 
back at the rise of the telephone, texting, TV and the internet as key to 
shaping how those of us stumbling through the first half of the 21st 
century see ourselves. It is still less than 100 years since the first television 
broadcast, and less than thirty years since Tim Berners-Lee coded the first 
browser for the World Wide Web.
And, of course, it is not just geographical areas or historic nations, 
which are defined by these shifts. From magazines for airline pilots to 
websites for kayakers; journals for conspiracy theorists to forums for 
people with muscular dystrophy, our civilisation is a veritable forest of 
media platforms. And through debate and news and in-jokes and jargon, 
these often begin to form a particular function. Consciously or not, they 
start to build up imagined communities with shared identities.
It is in this context, and with debates around Britain’s European 
referendum still forming eddies from the Carpathians to the Balearics and 
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Sápmi to Crete, it is worth surveying the landscape of European media. 
Because, of course, there are plenty of significant European institutions. 
Every football team in the continent yearns to win the Champions League. 
The Council of Europe facilitates collaboration to protect human rights 
and the rule of law. The various European courts are key corners of our 
trans-continental justice system. Much of Europe shares a currency 
and free movement area. And all countries in the EU, of course, have a 
common parliament, commission, and council of ministers; and agree to 
pool policy on everything from international trade to hedgehogs.
Never before in all of human history has a collection of independent 
nation states been so intertwined. Never have different, self-governing 
peoples chosen to collaborate in so many ways, share so much in each-
other’s cultures and institutions, travel so much to each-other’s countries, 
learn each-other’s languages, or study at each other’s universities. Never 
have different peoples so frequently fallen in love.
And yet, despite all of this, there is no common European mass media. 
Beyond the annual Eurovision bonanza, there is no shared broadcasting 
on Europe’s airwaves. Beyond a few, rare projects, like Euronews or 
openDemocracy’s Can Europe Make It?, there is no major European 
common media outlet.
Some of this, of course, is a linguistic question. While 51 per cent of 
EU citizens had conversational or fluent English even a decade ago1, this 
means almost half do not. But real news journalism is expensive, and it is 
cheaper to translate than to start again from scratch.
The lack of a European media clearly causes a problem: not so much 
in its impact on our identities. After all, why should those of us on the left 
particularly care whether we identify more with Europe, Eurasia, Spain 
or the Basque Country? So long as we are open and inclusive and treat 
people from everywhere as equal, questions of identity as such are not 
worth falling out about. But they do matter, because European institutions 
need to be held to account and, more importantly, because without some 
kind of shared political narrative, it is hard to mobilise people across a 
continent against the powerful forces, which shape our world for the 
worse. Some kind of shared media ecosystem is not sufficient to build 
1 | ‘Europeans and their languages’ Special Eurobarometer Summary European 
Commission (2006) (http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_24 
3_sum_en.pdf)
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among the peoples of Europe the sense of being a public, but it is probably 
necessary. And at the moment, our media is not so much a continent as 
an archipelago.
This, though, is not an insurmountable problem. The collapse in 
revenues in the media delivered by the loss of advertising money to social 
media, the loss of small adds to Google and Gumtree and the loss of cover 
prices to the norm that online content is free means that the future of the 
press is up for grabs. And while it is not a future which always fills me 
with hope, this chance to invent new things is exciting.
While revenues are falling, the capital and payroll costs of producing 
media are collapsing too. Where once you needed a printing press to 
disseminate a pamphlet to a few hundred people, now you can access 
thousands with just a laptop, Wordpress blog and a Twitter account. Where, 
only recently, you needed a TV studio and network access to produce video 
that anyone beyond your friends could see, now, a decent smartphone and 
a little editing software are enough to make reasonable quality videos. 
Where once, typesetting was skilled work, now, it is all done automatically.
In this context, it seems likely that the media landscape across 
Europe will remain fluid for some time: new publications will appear, 
build audiences, and then collapse as fast as they arrived. Oligarchs will 
continue to buy up media empires to assert their political influence, but 
smaller projects have a chance of breaking through in a way they have not 
in recent decades. It is worth remembering that the best-read newspaper 
on earth in 1933 was the now defunct Daily Herald – the paper of Britain’s 
trade union movement. There is little reason to believe that modern social 
movements could not grow our own media to a similar scale. After all, 
America’s radical right has managed to do so (though cash is always easier 
for those on the side of the rich).
If these new players want to build cross-continental and international 
narratives, to hold European power to account and build movements across 
borders, it seems to me that the simplest way to do this is not through 
new conglomerates, but through practical collaboration between different 
projects. Expertise needn’t all lie on one payroll or one website, so long 
as people are happy to share, collaborate and support each other rather 
than competing. It will not be through one large organisation, but lots of 
different groups, reaching their own audiences, where they are: whether 
that is a geographical community or a community of interest. 
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Some of the more liberal media have become obsessed of late with 
questions of filter-bubbles and social media echo-chambers, believing 
they were the protectors of truth. But that is now the terrain of reality, and 
while it can be scary to watch as the right seize the initiative in this new 
world, there is no reason to believe that the left cannot win it back. It is the 
old order which got us here in the first place, after all. 
Building the solidarity we will need in the future will be difficult: it is 
hard to escape from the endless turning of the news cycle in each country 
to try and make the time to create your own narratives. But it will be vital. 
Because the problems we face are international and so our media must 
be too.
Networked protest for a populist age
Jakub Dymek
In the autumn of 2016, the parliament in Poland was presented with one 
of the most restrictive anti-abortion bills in the modern world. Proposals 
included jail terms for women terminating pregnancies, the possibility 
of persecution for miscarriages and provisions posing legal risks even 
for performing prenatal diagnostics on the foetus. It understandably 
provoked wide outrage in society. This began through the usual social-
media channels and soon the spark had ignited into the explosion of 
mobilisation – it culminated in a nationwide women’s strike that involved 
around 100,000 people not showing-up at schools and offices and instead 
taking to the streets in protests that spanned the entire country and 
went beyond the borders of Poland, with demonstrations of solidarity 
taking place in Berlin, London and Brussels among other places. While 
demonstrators in Poland formed a human chain around the headquarters 
of the ruling party, those in solidarity with them outside the country 
picketed Polish embassies in European capitals with banners in Polish, 
English and French. 
It did not take long after the protests began for my phone to start 
beeping – friends, fellow journalists and activists requesting information 
and up-to-date assessments of the situation. Although that quickly 
changed later, I found out, to my surprise, that there was really next 
to no information about the situation as it unfolded. No wonder, since 
the scale and intensity of the protest came as a shock in Poland as well. 
“What is going on?”, “Translate this for us”, “Do you have some pictures” 
– requests poured in. Of course, subsequently, respected European news 
organisations either sent their correspondents to report on the issue or 
provided their readers with detailed accounts post-factum. But at the very 
moment, timely, passionate and potentially viral messages were what was 
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demanded. Those few who provided it benefitted clearly – retweets and 
likes went into the thousands worldwide. Thanks to that, the protests 
indeed gained worldwide attention and were noticed globally. 
If this example would conclude with the usual thesis on the strength 
of social-media and the “networked individual”, there would be little 
to ponder. Multiple examples from the past, of situations of extreme 
importance for communities and nations – like the Maidan in Kiev or 
Tahrir Square protests in Cairo – have been embedded in our collective 
imaginations for years already. The Polish Black Protest is however 
important in the way it contradicts some prevailing narratives, not in the 
way it reinforces them. 
What happened quickly after the national strike dissolved and the 
organisers, as well as participants, went back from the streets to online 
debates – as well a number of televised ones, thanks to the broad interest 
the protests got – is that knowledge sharing, gestures of solidarity and 
support and inspiration created networks where there previously were 
none. Coincidentally, the same week the clergy of the Russian Orthodox 
Church came forward with an idea to restrict abortion, which had until then 
been legal in Russia. Images of protesters against this proposal in Moscow, 
when they surfaced online, showed an image very familiar to those who 
had seen the protests in Poland from a few days before. Protesters were 
spotted bearing placards with an easily identifiable illustration: a sketch 
of an uterus with ovaries crossed to show a “fuck you” gesture – the same 
image that came to symbolise all of the earlier protests in Poland this year, 
including of course the last one. How did this come about? The usual 
means of exchange between the liberal opposition in Russia and Polish 
civil society – foundations, exchanges and scholarship programmes – of 
course exist, but here was a clear example of peer-to-peer, community-to-
community, protest-to-protest exchange in the absence of any meaningful 
dialogue on the official level. 
This by no means is an argument against traditional media and the 
need for sustaining and fostering real face-to-face debate whenever possible 
to help social movements in Europe and beyond. On the contrary: it is an 
argument for media and civil society to utilise all forms of communication 
and inspiration and new networks, for they most often spring from the 
bottom up. Images, slogans and ways of organising from one country or 
community prove themselves most useful and universal when they can be 
utilised elsewhere.
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Sometimes one can see herself or himself best in somebody else’s 
struggle. And let us put the notion of “cultural” or geographical proximity 
as a necessary condition for that to flourish aside – it seems that initiatives 
inspired (at least in part) by the Polish Black Protest are taken from 
initiatives in South America and South Korea. And the Black Protest and 
national women’s strike were also in themselves modelled and inspired 
by different historical and political influences – the idea for a strike was 
directly based on the women’s strike in Iceland in the mid 1970s when 
women, outraged about the lack of political rights, practically brought 
the country to a halt when they took to the streets. Black, which became 
synonymous with the Polish protest, as a symbol of indignation, anger 
and mourning is a clear reference to traditions as diverse as the Catholic 
Church and the anarchist movement. Like many successful initiatives 
this was also a brainchild of many diverse influences. And a profoundly 
networked idea. 
One can learn a couple of things when the Black Protest and 
Women’s Strike are put in the broader European context of conflicting 
narratives, contrary political responses and institutional impasse that 
is troubling the continent. It is true that it is next to impossible for the 
European Institutions – the Commission, Parliament and Council with 
their PR departments and communications strategists – to put forward a 
progressive idea or image that will genuinely involve and inspire people 
across the EU and possibly beyond. For good and bad even the best (or 
worst) single idea or message conceived between the corridors and 
in the back rooms in Brussels or Strasbourg is bound to lose traction, 
dilute and eventually disappear among broad discontent with European 
elites and political institutions. What is painfully true for the institutions 
however, does not hinder or stifle ideas and initiatives that spring from 
the bottom up. Grassroots ideas, conceived by people not belonging to 
the transnational caste of professional politicians and lobbyists, have the 
attribute of authenticity, universality and intuitiveness to them that so 
many PR efforts of parties and political bodies lack. It would be unwise and 
ill-informed to only look to nationalist and xenophobic surges in Europe to 
discover that, especially in times when so many ideas are bubbling under 
the surface of mainstream politics and discourse and the vast majority of 
them are neither violent nor anti-European.
The international media, too, are learning just that – that however good 
their coverage and message is, it will be harder for them to fully participate 
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in social and political processes unless they, instead of only reporting, take 
the effort to amplify the messages that are already there and work along 
the lines of popular demand. Nothing will obliterate the need for good 
reporting and the necessity of having correspondents wherever something 
important happens. But there is a visible change – from institutions to 
individuals, from established trademarks to alternative sources, from just 
covering issues to participating in them. 
That is what my beeping phone made me think of, on the day of the 
protest – that there is some aspect of media and political verticality that 
is coming to an end. All of those who called or messaged me that day 
wanted, in principle, one thing: to know what the protest – the community 
or multitude – was saying right here and now. They did not want to 
know what was being said to the protest by the politicians and experts, 
neither did they want to wait for what the reporters had to say about what 
they thought of it. What was prized most was timely and networked 
transmission of the most accurate messages, the relaying of the demands 
and giving space for visions that are present at the moment – is that not 
what today’s journalism should be about?
Journalism in spite of everything
Interview with Esther Alonso, eldiario.es1
Following the decision of the Socialist Party to abstain in a confidence 
vote on the Popular Party government, the same prime minister who 
governed the country with a majority for the past four years will stay 
in power. Mariano Rajoy, who has been implicated in several cases of 
corruption within his own party, will continue as Spain’s prime minister 
thanks to the abstention of the Socialist Party deputies. Spain appears to 
be one of the most corrupt countries in Europe and it is in this context 
that the online newspaper eldiario.es was launched in 2012, in the midst 
of the worst economic crisis the country has ever experienced. Eldiario.
es is a digital newspaper that defines itself as an online media newspaper 
that provides “information and analysis with a focus on politics and the 
economy in their broadest sense: on how they affect people rather than 
how they affect the parties or the markets”, explains Esther Alonso, 
Marketing and Development director at the newspaper. Eldiario.es works 
independently (more than 70 per cent of the company that edits eldiario.
es belongs to the journalists who write for it) to give a voice to the many 
people in Spain who are suffering the consequences of a media that is 
becoming less and less plural. 
***
Eldiario.es is proving to be a sustainable business model for journalism, having 
established itself as an authoritative and reliable source for its readers. Can you 
explain what the key to eldiario’s success is, and to what extent your model 
1 | This interview took place in November 2016.
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could be reproduced in other European countries? What is its audience profile 
and what is making readers trust your content?
Our key to success is a unique business model based on the support of 
our community of readers. 20,000 people (“socios”) make financial 
contributions to eldiario.es in order to strengthen our editorial and 
financial independence. But there is no paywall: our “socios” do not pay 
to read the content, they pay for it to circulate freely and thus have a social 
impact. They pay to belong to a community of citizens who share values 
like equality, democracy, social justice, and more importantly, independent 
journalism. Our model could easily be implemented in other European 
countries. I see no reason why it would not work outside Spain. There 
are examples of other digital media outlets that are experimenting with 
similar models in Europe and America, for instance The Texas Tribune, 
Tiempo Argentino, and Ojo Público in Perú.
As regards gender, 53 per cent of our readers are men and 47 per cent 
are women. And 52 per cent of our readers are aged between 24 and 44. 
They trust our content because we deliver what we promised to deliver: 
independent journalism based on values like transparency and honesty. 
Their expectations are fulfilled.
The information most mainstream newspapers and journals provide on Europe 
tends to focus on the EU institutions and the austerity measures imposed on 
member states. What type of stories do you think should be covered in order to 
communicate more and more effectively about Europe and the EU? Do you 
think a shared European agenda is needed? If so, how should journalists go 
about creating such an agenda?
I think the general public might be interested in a deeper analysis of why 
and how certain decisions are being taken at the EU level, and what the 
alternatives to those decisions might be. In addition I would like to believe 
that readers would enjoy content with a focus on social values that informs 
people about the impact European policies have on the citizens. As regards 
creating a shared European agenda, it is important for each media outlet 
to ask itself this question first and find its own agenda before addressing 
the task of creating a common one.
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Although nowadays there are examples of good media platforms, newspapers 
and video formats operating around Europe, it seems they still lack the capacity 
to connect and cooperate with similar platforms beyond the national level. How 
would eldiario.es and its readers benefit from collaboration with similar media 
platforms? And what challenges does establishing these synergies pose?
Bringing voices together is a good practice that enriches your content as 
a media outlet and gives your readers a more comprehensive perspective 
on certain topics. At eldiario.es we warmly invite collaborators and other 
media projects that share our values to publish on our site. When it 
comes to cooperation between media projects beyond the national level, 
one of the main challenges is to agree on the mission and purpose of the 
collaboration, as well as to find the right balance between the different 
members of a network in terms of the level of participation. Once these 
challenges have been met the next step is to develop the collaboration to 
the point where it is mature.
Economic crisis, unemployment, new forms of government, migration... Many 
of the issues the Continent faces affect most European countries. Yet we lack 
the capacity to establish transnational movements that can provide effective 
solutions. What do you think should be the role of journalists and media 
platforms in the process of challenging the status quo in Europe? And what can 
the media do to help restore trust in the European project?
Nowadays there are media projects like eldiario.es that focus on social 
values and new forms of government and democracy and that are 
generating content on these shared issues. Media platforms can cover these 
issues provided this is consistent with their editorial line. Restoring trust 
in the European project is a complex task that should not be performed by 
media platforms alone. I believe there are other social agents that should 
be part of this process, and we the citizens are one of them.
Online media can use new narratives and participative formats, 
beyond commentaries, to help restore their readers’ trust in the European 
Project. For example media outlets can host online debates with members 
of the EU parliament and/or other institutions, and invite the public to 
participate by asking questions on social networks. Another idea might be 
to launch a blog and invite different European media partners to submit 
posts.
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The journalists of Hungary’s leading daily, Nepszabadsag, are facing the 
newspaper’s demise and have expressed doubts about the official explanation 
that it was closed for purely financial reasons. How do you keep eldiario.es 
independent, and what pressures from power structures are you exposed to?
Our editorial independence is a result of the financial independence our 
socios give us. These 20,000 “socios” are our partners in crime, and they 
make our project viable and sustainable. They shield us from pressure 
from power structures and we thank them for supporting independent 
journalism. We do the journalism we know we have to do and no pressure 
from above can stop us from doing this. We do investigative journalism 
and publish exclusives that sometimes expose political or economic power 
structures unconditionally and without restrictions.
We are the newcomers
Interview with Ramy Al-Asheq, Abwab1
Germany has long been a primary destination for asylum seekers. 
According to the Pew Research Center, over the past 30 years Germany 
has received at least 3.6 million asylum applications or nearly one-third 
(32 per cent) of all asylum applications in Europe. The overall increase 
of asylum seekers between 2013 and 2015 is a reflection of the trajectory 
of migrants arriving from each of the three leading countries of origin: 
Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. Abwab (‘Doors’) is the first Arabic newspaper 
in Germany. An independent monthly newspaper that addresses the 
needs and concerns of Syrian, Iraqi and other Arabic-speaking refugees in 
Germany. Over 60,000 copies of Abwab are printed and freely distributed 
every month in public libraries, NGO centres and refugee shelters across 
Germany. Ramy Al-Asheq is its editor-in-chief.
***
Abwab is the name of the first and so far only Arabic-language newspaper for 
refugees in Germany. It aims to provide information and serve as a platform 
for discussing integration-related issues. Who is your target audience? Who are 
‘the newcomers’ and why do you refuse to use the word refugee? In using the 
term ‘newcomer’, how do you hope to change people’s perceptions of migrants?
Well, let us say, it was a newspaper for ‘refugees’, but after just one month 
we realised that we cannot talk about understanding, integration and 
living together without also talking to the locals. So from the second issue 
onwards, we started to address a German audience too, with two pages 
1 | This interview took place in January 2017.
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written in German. Not only that, we also wanted to ‘integrate’ German 
authors, journalists and writers into the Abwab family. Abwab has now 
become a newspaper by refugees and locals, for refugees and locals.
I think there has been a huge misunderstanding regarding my 
critical stance on the topic of integration. This is especially true when 
you look at the response to my article ‘This integration is a big lie’. I did 
not at all refuse to use the word ‘refugee’. I am a refugee. I was born a 
refugee in Syria, because my grandfather was kicked out of his house in 
the city of Akka, when Israel occupied Palestine in 1948. My father was 
also born a refugee in Syria. I do not have a passport and I do not have a 
nationality on paper. I have always been a refugee. I was never anything 
else, except that here in Germany I became a ‘stateless’ refugee. I brought 
my personal story to tell you: I have no problem with this term at all. Being 
a refugee means you are seeking refuge, safety, dignity and freedom. In 
this context, the term ‘newcomer’ is meaningless. ‘Newcomer’ does not 
give any information about what the other person needs. However, I do 
have a problem with the German version of refugee, which is ‘Flüchtling’, 
because it means ‘runaway’. It is negative and does not carry the meaning 
of asking for refuge, safety, dignity and freedom. In addition to that, it only 
has a masculine form. 
But the question is not always the meaning of the term ‘refugee’. At the 
moment, we see the entire media machine trying to demonise refugees. 
We see how the police, media and society at large care more about the 
nationality of the criminal, than about the crime itself, and definitely 
more than about the victim. If the criminal is a refugee, all international 
and local media will talk about the crime. But if it is the same crime, the 
same victim, but committed by a criminal who is not a refugee, nobody 
will care. To be a refugee now is to have a ‘sexy’ identity. Some people will 
help you, take a selfie and post it on Facebook with the caption “with my 
refugee”. Some people will say, you should look poor and ugly, “you do not 
look like a refugee!” Some people will ignore your experience, education 
and thoughts and will deal with you as if you were nothing. The point 
is; you are only a refugee. In this way, you will find many events called 
‘refugee in concert’, ‘refugee reading’, ‘refugee carnival’. But when I want 
to attend a music concert, I am not going to watch refugees, I am going 
to watch and listen to musicians. Refugees are not monkeys in a zoo or a 
circus.
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When we see how the word ‘refugee’ is being used to discriminate 
against people and create barriers between humans, when we see how it 
is used to put a large number of people of many different backgrounds, 
nationalities, religions, ideologies, levels of education and generations in 
one box called ‘refugees’, then I do not believe it makes sense to use it. It 
does not make sense to me to create a team of ‘refugees’ to participate in 
the 2016 Olympics. In fact, it is shameful! We are living in a world that, in 
2015, had created 65.3 million refugees. This fact is really shameful and 
not a reason to celebrate. To be a refugee is not shameful, but to live in a 
world that has created 65.3 million refugees is extremely shameful. 
So when you see this discrimination, labelling and stereotyping, 
you will refuse to be labelled. Even if that means that you will lose the 
meaning of refuge, safety dignity and freedom. This is why a lot of people 
decided to use the term ‘newcomer’, which carries a different meaning; 
newcomers are also human beings, they are equal to the locals. The only 
difference is that they arrived in this country later, and now they just need 
to feel welcome and part of the whole, not to be seen or treated as guests. 
Abwab addresses issues such as foreign policy, integration and social issues 
for migrants. Who writes for Abwab and from what perspectives? Do you also 
aim to reach other sectors of society and have an impact tackling racism and 
xenophobia, for example? What have been the results so far?
Abwab is the Arabic word for ‘doors’. That is why our newspaper has 
a number of doors: international news, local news, Arabic-speaking 
community news, a guide to Germany for newcomers, feminism pages, 
success and survival stories, art and literature pages, and German pages. 
The authors of Abwab are from Syria, Palestine, Germany, Egypt, Morocco, 
Tunisia, Eritrea, and Jordan. All of us have different perspectives, which 
are reflected in our writing, and there is a lot of communication going on 
between the different editors and contributors. Our aim is to be a bridge 
and facilitate communication between people on the same level. We are 
trying to communicate with activists from both societies. For example, in 
Dresden we met a group of German anti-racist activists and now we are 
planning to do a project together. We are equally in contact and engaged 
with different initiatives run by newcomers.
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With Abwab, we were very successful in reaching locals and refugees alike 
and we had a lot of interesting input. We print more than 60,000 copies 
every month and have 50,000 unique user sessions per month on our 
website, which also has a German and English version. We are focusing 
on both societies, opening critical perspectives to allow both “criticism 
and self-criticism”, because both societies have their own stereotypes and 
ready-made images. I have received many emails from Germans who 
I do not know, telling me that they appreciate our newspaper. I am not 
exaggerating when I say that there are dozens of messages that make 
me feel proud and hopeful. All the Germans that I have met have been 
positive and friendly. Maybe I am lucky in this, as my German friends tell 
me, but I think that everywhere in the world the percentage of good people 
is always greater than the percentage of bad people. 
For many European citizens, Facebook, Twitter and even Instagram are 
becoming important sources of information on topics such as Brexit, the US 
elections, but also on the migration crisis and the war in Syria. How do you 
evaluate the information people are getting from social media? How does 
Abwab contribute to clarifying doubts, fake-news and misconceptions around 
such a complex crisis, whilst also fighting against stereotypes about migrants?
One of the reasons that Abwab was created was to give refugees access to 
quality news and journalistic stories in their own language. Facebook is 
full of fake news and hate speech. We are trying to fight that as much as 
we can. Abwab now has around 93,500 followers on Facebook. As great as 
that is, it has also meant that we have faced a lot of hate speech, but this 
was expected from the beginning, and it definitely happens less now than 
before.
If you want to create a deeper understanding, you need to talk to people 
in their language and from their cultural point of view. Our German 
editor Lilian Pithan has made a lot of tasks easier with her comments and 
editing, especially when she manages to make the stories closer to German 
understanding and culture. And this is also why we manage to be closer to 
our Arabic-speaking audience, because we are from the same culture and 
we know it very well and we know how to use the right language to critique 
and inform, etc. So we’re not making the ‘teaching refugees how to use 
the toilet’, or ‘teaching refugees how to have sex’, mistakes.
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As the migration crisis in Europe continues, one particular fact gets cited over 
and over: that this is the biggest migration movement since World War II. Do 
you think the model of Abwab can and should be reproduced in other European 
countries? Can you imagine establishing a partnership, or alliances, with other 
European countries to develop such a project? What would you need in order to 
develop such collaboration?
First of all, I do not believe in the term ‘migrant / refugee crisis in Europe’. 
The real crisis is in Lebanon and Jordan, which have taken in the biggest 
number of refugees, being the poor, small countries that they are. More 
than 40 per cent of the current population of Lebanon are refugees. This 
is where the crisis is. Furthermore, I think that there is no migration 
crisis in Europe as a whole, but only in some European countries. For 
example, there is no huge migration movement in the direction of France, 
Switzerland, Portugal, the UK, or the Eastern European countries. The 
crisis is in Greece and in other countries, which are closer to Asia and 
Africa. The EU definitely did not assume its responsibilities as a union 
in this context of events. Even in the case of Germany, I do not see what 
is happening as a crisis. If you look at the total population number and 
compare it with the number of refugees, can 1 per cent really unleash a 
crisis?
However, for refugees the ‘refugee crisis’ really is a crisis. For those 
who have been kicked out of their homes and cities, who have lost their 
families, hope and lives. It is not only a crisis, it is a catastrophe. Since we 
started Abwab, we have had many requests to launch similar newspapers 
in countries like France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden and the 
UK. Unfortunately, our capabilities are limited. Our network of writers 
and journalists is ready, the audience exists, but it is very hard to find 
financial support. We are an independent newspaper, which also means 
that there are many funding sources we would never accept, for example 
funding from government, political parties, companies or any other 
source which would seek to influence our content. 
How do you finance Abwab? Have you faced political obstacles or pressures 
thus far? 
We finance Abwab through advertising. Our publisher New German 
Media Ltd has a marketing department which is responsible for that. We 
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started with two sponsors, MoneyGram and Ortel, and now have some 
more advertisers like the German Ministry of Education and the German 
Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. Until now, we have not faced 
any political obstacles or pressure. 
Germany has filled a particular position in the migration debate, as Merkel 
is often celebrated for her ‘open door policy’, while also having contributed 
to the tightening of asylum laws, having signed the deal with Turkey to curb 
migration to the EU. In this debate the term ‘Lügenpresse’ has gained renewed 
popularity with the far right, often being used to discredit the media. How have 
you witnessed these developments? What responsibility do you see, on the side 
of the media, in shaping this discourse, and what room for change can you see?
In general, people like to hear what they believe in or accept. This is not 
only true for Germans, but also for Syrians and all other nationalities. The 
mission of a journalist is to show the truth. The question we are facing now 
is, which media outlets are showing us the truth? How much propaganda 
is out there? We cannot deny that there are media outlets out there who 
do not show the truth. People have the right to say that something is a lie, 
but then the media has to prove what they say is true, nevertheless. This 
said, it does not make sense to me, when the right wing groups attack 
the media, because they know that a lot of media indeed support their 
extreme ideas. In addition to that, the media does not talk enough about 
crimes committed by members of the extreme right, like burning refugee 
shelters, or attacking people. In my opinion, if you tell half the truth, you 
are a liar. We do not need to present people as angels, but neither do we 
need to present them as demons. This is the biggest mistake the media is 
making at the moment, and you could say the same for politicians. 
How do you foresee the next steps for Abwab? 
Abwab is bigger now and our responsibilities have grown accordingly. Our 
plan is to make Abwab into a bilingual newspaper as soon as possible, 
and to create a platform to discuss all essential issues for German and 
European societies. We are already actively pursuing our goal of addressing 
a larger German audience.
Our digitally mediated society
Robin Mansell1
This article focuses on how we imagine our digitally mediated society 
and on whether alternative worlds or pathways are possible (Mansell, 
2012). What is happening to the public’s right to access information, to 
the right of citizens to be free from surveillance, and to their privacy, 
as a result of the growing technical ability to track, analyse and act on 
data? Have dominant trends in digitally mediated surveillance, power and 
practice congealed, or, can they be better aligned with citizen interests in 
social democracy and a good society? What algorithms are, who or what 
governs them, and what values are embedded in them, are questions that 
are crucial to answer. Research on algorithms, artificial intelligence and 
their applications is a growth industry and is attracting a lot of research 
funding. Researchers treat algorithms as a sensitising concept, as active 
agents, or as black boxes that need to be unpacked. Some work is focusing 
on the consequences of algorithms for social sorting and discrimination, 
on whether users are aware of them and on whether they are politically 
accountable through governance measures. 
It is essential to locate these questions in the context of what kind of 
society is desirable and for whom.  Surveillance using today’s networks 
and algorithms is obviously connected with power relationships. These 
relationships are understood differently by algorithm makers and their 
corporate and state overseers, as compared to many social science scholars 
and internet users. Common to many perspectives on the growing use of 
1 | An earlier version of this essay was presented as a keynote at the International 
Communication Association Conference, Fukoka, 13th June 2016 and published 
in modified form at openDemocracy, 20th July 2016 (https://www.opendemoc-
racy.net/digitaliberties/robin-mansell/surveillance-power-and-communication)
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algorithms is a core societal problem. This is an increasing fascination 
with – and attachment to – the quantifiable. Even when the algorithm is 
treated as a sensitising concept, research is often very algorithm-centric, 
and it is at risk of forgetting why questions about power, surveillance and 
algorithms matter. They matter because of their relation to very big social, 
political and economic problems.
Wittgenstein said that ‘we cannot […] say what we cannot think’ and 
in this sense algorithms are both effective and unfathomable.   Most 
people, most of the time, do not think about what is happening when 
they go online and algorithms are at work. Bucher’s (2016) work shows 
that we can imagine that something is happening, but that it is almost 
impossible for us to think about what choices are being made for us and 
by whom. For algorithm makers, however, algorithmic computation is 
mainly about patterns of data.  The problems are about prediction, with 
the aim of rubbing out the foibles of human beings, and of optimising the 
quantification of behaviour. 
A societ y mediated by algorithms
Algorithms make digitally mediated surveillance, or watching over us, 
technically very easy. Applications can support and mitigate the damage 
of disasters, they can help protect people in public spaces, they can help 
signal health risks and, in that sense, they combat disease.   They also 
help in monitoring climate change. Algorithms are being used to help 
companies to boost profits and countries are (in some cases) experiencing 
economic growth as a result – a claim that can be verified. Algorithms also 
support surveillance or undersight, as Mann (2003) and others call it; and 
so algorithmic based watching from below can support a radical politics 
of resistance.
The digitised world is becoming more inclusive by some measures. 
Some 914 million people have at least one international connection on 
social media such as Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn and WeChat and 
most are using it for electronic commerce. Global data flows raised the 
world’s GDP by more than 10 per cent to USD 7.8 trillion in 2014.  Small 
businesses can become ‘micro-multinationals’ and around 12 per cent 
of global goods trade is done via electronic commerce on platforms like 
Alibaba, Amazon, eBay, Flipkart, and Rakuten. Company platforms and 
automated processes are operating at hyperscale and, thanks to Airbnb, 
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Agoda and TripAdvisor, data analytics-driven decision-making is the 
order of the day. The Internet of Things is feeding this and companies 
are investing to improve productivity, innovation and customer retention.
Digital services are becoming central to the majority of people’s lives 
in the Global North. Global flows of data are becoming more inclusive 
of people in the Global South, although McKinsey notes that lagging 
countries are catching up extremely slowly (Manyika et al., 2016). Some 
six billion people do not have high speed broadband, some four billion do 
not have Internet access at all, and some two billion do not have a mobile 
phone. With the growth of the big data ecology, new types of risk are 
commanding public attention, but data processing using algorithms is 
expected to come to the rescue if power grids fail, financial crises worsen, 
or there are information leaks.  For McKinsey and some other corporate 
analysts, the biggest sources of vulnerability for society are disgruntled 
employees, criminals, political activists, and other countries, not the 
algorithms themselves. 
The rate of inclusion and the penetration of digital technology and 
statistics on gaps cannot be the sole criteria for deciding whether the 
pathway towards an algorithmic society is a good one. Alongside the spread 
of algorithms, inequality is growing within countries, even as digital 
divides start to close. Countries are facing economic instability, bubbles 
and financial crashes. Poverty, lack of housing and poor water sanitation 
and asylum seeking, are all too visible. For some, these are symptoms of 
calculable risks that can be managed by relying on algorithms and data 
analytics.
We have a society that increasingly privileges quantification. We 
encounter big data and algorithmic computing as if it is novel in a way 
that is similar to the way we responded several decades ago to the birth 
of the digital revolution and the information society. We encounter it as 
new partly because debate about big data and algorithms is being hyped 
by powerful actors as a solution to big social problems. There is no co-
ordinated or organised conspiracy, but there is a campaign to assure people 
that, whatever the functions of today’s algorithms, they are designed to 
keep us safe, happy, and make us wealthier.  Attention in the media to the 
role of the state in war, migration and terrorism threats is bringing digital 
monitoring and algorithms more prominently into the public eye. This, 
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to some extent, is deflecting citizens’ attention away from threats to their 
privacy and their rights to freedom of expression – at least for a while.
The catch phrase, ‘big data’, is new, but data processing itself is not. 
What is new to the public realm is the move into behavioural analytics and 
learning algorithms where the analytics may occur beyond the knowledge 
of the algorithm makers.   It is this possibility, which is deepening the 
fascination with the quantification of everyday life. MIT’s new AI-
based Cyber Threat Analysis Framework, for example, aims to ramp up 
the speed and accuracy of analytics to find threats in the Dark Web by 
scanning for malware releases and ransom-ware tools. The technology is 
intended to be used to identify new threats and observe the activities of 
hackers, but some experts question both the effectiveness and the human 
rights implications of the algorithm-driven techniques – they are not a 
‘silver bullet’. The digital communications skills gap generally is big and 
there is much debate about deskilling and up-skilling. Few people have 
the knowledge to understand what an algorithm is or what it means to 
do data analytics. Skilled people in areas like artificial intelligence, data 
management, data quality control, and data visualisation are short in 
supply, but debate about what to do about this is not new and solutions 
continue to fall short of aspirations especially for the general population. 
We are moving ever more rapidly towards a computational theocracy as 
Ian Bogost suggests in the US The Atlantic 2015. The cathedral or temple 
of computation is a societal issue that is becoming more problematic 
alongside growing social and economic inequality. The challenge isn’t 
only whether digital communication – based on algorithmic computation 
– is exploitative or liberating, inclusive or excluding. It is to keep in mind 
that, although it may seem as if algorithms are the drivers of society and 
that these developments are negating human agency, human agency still 
matters.  All these developments are influenced by norms and rules of 
governance and these are humanly constituted. 
Governing computational black boxes
The term governance is often used loosely, but it refers to the rules, norms, 
and practices that are accepted or resisted in a given society.  Governance 
influences the kind of world that is being borne; it is about the fundamentals 
of life, the quality of people’s lives, and whether, by any measure, societies 
aspire to be good societies – societies that are inclusive, respectful, and 
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enabling. Governance involves legislation and policy and it is needed 
to make sure that the algorithms that are currently signposting Twitter 
tends and the most read press articles or supporting surveillance by the 
police are as transparent as possible. It would be useful to understand 
computational biases, who or what algorithms hide, and when they 
are successful and when they fail. But governance is also about more 
subtle issues. Algorithms involve networked information assemblages 
– ‘institutionally situated code, practices, and norms with the power to 
create, sustain, and signify relationships among people and data through 
minimally observable, semi-autonomous action’ (Ananny, 2016: 93). In 
this sense, algorithms can govern by structuring future possibilities. 
When the results they produce are treated as if they are certain, our 
capacity to think about alternative worlds and development pathways is 
discouraged because these assemblages are disciplining technologies and 
they discipline the mind.  
If governance is the ‘the ensemble of techniques and procedures put 
into place to direct the conduct of men and women and to take account 
of the probabilities of their action and their relations’ (Lazzarato, 2009: 
114), then we need to understand why it is acceptable to so many that 
machine learning or algorithmic computation are set to become an even 
greater part of our lives in the future. Algorithmic ‘calculative practices 
are established as legitimate (or true)’ (Introna, 2016: 39) increasingly, 
and they are being internalised.  But, while they may be more effective 
in producing self-governing subjects than earlier technologies, they are 
not 100 percent effective. We need to remember that algorithms do not 
make a society. It is human beings in their institutional settings who 
make the world. The biggest governance challenge today in this area is 
not so much the algorithm itself, but the assumption that human conduct 
is predictable enough to allow human beings to defer to machine-driven 
decisions.   When such decisions exacerbate inequality, unfairness, and 
discrimination, we are not on a pathway aligned with most people’s ideas 
of a good society. 
Resistance to the algorithmic computational drama, as it has been 
called, is definitely needed. The black box that needs unpacking is not 
the inner workings of an algorithm – although this is a nice theoretical 
challenge. A different black box should be the principal concern. In 
digitalisation’s earlier history, a Stanford University economist who 
studied technological innovation said that researchers should look inside 
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the black box of technology (Rosenberg, 1982), but he meant research 
should focus on points of economic or political power and control. This 
means that instrumental social science treatments of algorithmic black 
boxed power need to be challenged with the aim of understanding how 
the velocity, volume, and value of data are increasingly encouraging us to 
bow to the cathedral of computation and quantification. 
Data derivatives – the combinations of data traces left by people – are 
being used with probabilistic techniques to yield correlations and new 
possible risks in the surveillance and security field (Amoore, 2011). These 
risks are acted upon, but who has the power to act and which companies, 
states or social movement groups can and do respond? Empirical analysis 
of who has the power to act is needed to examine which data analytic 
results are privileged. Power asymmetries in the digital ecology are 
framed by global capitalism and we should not forget this.  But when the 
present and future are visualised as risk maps, scores or flags based on 
sophisticated computations, someone – a human – takes a decision to act. 
Designers and engineers choose algorithms based on how quickly they 
return results or on their computational elegance, but this should not be 
the main determinant of actions that are taken. 
The shift from data analysis and patterns to action is a gateway or 
control point through which power is exercised. This is the control point 
we should focus on – who can and does take action? The algorithmic world 
negates the vast majority of people’s agency, but some retain the power 
to make choices for us. Citizens who rely on the Cloud, self-managed 
bioteams, avatars or Facebook have little chance of mastery.  They have 
few resources to take action.  But for others, such as the military and big 
companies, choices and actions are leading to judgements about the use, 
for example, of aerial surveillance and drones or geo-mapping, and the 
targeting ‘persons of concern’. These actions reinforce inequalities and 
they expose marginalised populations. Those who interpret, make choices 
and act on data analytics results can be questioned and formal governance 
arrangements could be devised to hold them to account, at least in 
societies that respect the fundamental rights of citizens. Unfortunately, 
growing captivation by a computational theocracy means that relatively 
little research is focusing on how the people who act on data can be held 
to account more effectively. This is different than seeking to hold the 
algorithmic code itself to account or the individual algorithm designers. 
Our digitally mediated society 125
A seductive computational theocracy 
A computational theocracy is very attractive because a reification of a 
calculated future is taking hold. An example comes from social computing, 
a field that brings computing science together with engineering and social 
science. Social machines are being built with the aim of achieving a web 
based social and technical system for ‘the mechanistic realisation of 
system-level processes’ (Smart & Shadbolt, 2014). The goal is the ‘web-
extended mind’, which can participate in the mental states of human 
beings. Developers aim to give equal weight to the technological and the 
social. But how do the social machine makers understand social issues? 
They draw from business and management studies in which desirable 
behaviour is anything that helps to exploit economic returns. The digital 
platforms supporting algorithm-based services are seen as neutral 
conduits for data transmission. Algorithms are likely to be seen self-
organising agents in a system that ‘creates itself out of itself’ and selects 
the fittest (Arthur, 2009). The human being is seen as an object to be 
predicted as a rational agent. Values are not neglected, but justice linked to 
how well resources are allocated using rational choice procedural models 
and transparency is a property of the technical system. In relation to 
policy requirements such as privacy, the goal is to make digital records 
of behaviour automatically and to accurately predict personal attributes. 
Rational expectations models are preferred because they help with the 
coding of human behaviour, and uncertainty and emotion are not yet 
reliably codable. The aim is to develop an axiomatised computational logic 
in order to formalise values such as fairness and equity (Pitt et al., 2013). 
For decades the ultimate aim has been to build a unified theory of 
artificial intelligence. This involves solving the problem of making 
inferences about the internal structure of a system when all that is known 
about that system is the input and output signals. The aim is to automate 
human intelligence by creating ‘an all-powerful executive homunculus 
whose duties require almost Godlike omniscience’ (Dennett, 1978: 164). 
Examples of technologies moving in this direction are driverless cars, the 
augmented soldier and the digitally enabled consumer. The semiconductor 
manufacturer, Qualcomm, is working on neuroprocessing engines 
for smart phones and many more artificial intelligence developments 
are starting to come out of the laboratory. In summary, for scientists 
and engineers, despite a commitment to working with social scientists, 
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algorithms are understood to ‘reason’ about reliability and honesty and 
they are expected to facilitate good behaviour. 
The computational goal is, ‘changing what it means to be human’ 
(Rheingold, 2002) and there is resistance to a calculable good life in 
other areas of the social sciences. Some scholars understand, for example, 
that the internet is radically incomplete and so is the development of 
algorithms. But relatively few researchers are asking fundamental 
questions about what it means to be human and about whether a different 
pathway is possible. Algorithmic techniques can ‘rule out, [and] render 
invisible, other potential futures’ (Amoore, 2011: 38), but when it comes 
to big social problems – policing, migration, climate change or inequality 
and poverty – what alternatives are being concealed by the gleam of risk-
based algorithmic solutions? Even if algorithms operate at speeds and 
scales beyond the threshold of human perception, this doesn’t mean we 
should give up on governing the control points where the algorithmic 
results are translated into action.   
Conclusion
What alternative pathways are there? Much more attention needs to be 
given to the control points of surveillance, power and action.   This is 
where choices are made and action is taken by relatively limited numbers 
of human beings who are setting the pathway for social, economic and 
political development. Governance is needed, not so much of individual 
algorithm developers, but of states and companies who finance their work. 
Governance using conventional approaches to privacy legislation and 
policy are one part of this and countries are limiting data processing and 
data flows in ways that are more or less democratic. Indonesia, Nigeria, 
Russia, Vietnam and the United Kingdom have passed legislation and 
Brazil has its ‘Internet Bill of Rights’. The European Court of Justice has 
upheld the ‘right to be forgotten’.   But companies are innovative. They 
can evade legislation by, for instance, running their analytics engines on 
separate databases without breaking the law. States are calling for open 
data flows to facilitate their security agendas and companies are lobbying 
for self-governance, claiming their formal representations of data access 
rights, copyright, and privacy norms in algorithms are, by definition, 
consistent with good behaviour and a better life. 
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Conventional privacy protection and human rights legislation has 
some traction, but rights-based approaches to privacy and surveillance 
that rely on informed consent are becoming unenforceable. If the 
quantification of everything means that life itself is likely to become 
humanly ungovernable, then care of the self and others could also start 
to become meaningless. The default assumption is that humans are 
empowered by an immersive mediated environment and they benefit as a 
result. Focusing on regulatory toolkits that might govern social machines 
and their developers is important, but better insight is needed into how to 
combat the notion that quantification is synonymous with the good life. 
The digital world is not benign, but it is not predetermined either. 
Alternative societal outcomes are possible, but only if we can say and 
think about them; only if we can imagine them. Research is needed on 
who orchestrates actions based on the technologies of surveillance. We 
need a clearer view of who funds algorithmic computational research, 
who commercialises it, and who is using it to act on and shape our world. 
Coalitions of actors – scholars, activists, politicians and captains of industry 
will need to collaborate if the pathway we are following to a calculated – 
and unequal – future is to change. The current pathway is incompatible 
with human agency, and most likely with greater equality, for the great 
majority of the world’s citizens. It is for this reason that the overwhelming 
fascination with the quantification of society needs to be questioned 
and resisted when it is inconsistent with human rights and values. The 
growing data driven intensity of our lives is only pre-determined if we 
persist in believing that it is and if we fail to change direction. 
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Shifting Alliances

Introduction
All of the latest major events in European politics have had a twofold 
implication. Wherever the challenges grew, the potential for a progressive 
European civil society also became visible. From austerity politics to 
free trade negotiations, from  the refugee movement to Brexit, from 
nationalist governments to the rise of far right movements: in all these 
cases European citizens organised themselves and stood up for a Europe 
of openness, tolerance and solidarity. But despite these signs of hope, the 
overall political situation undoubtedly requires much more in terms of 
coordinated answers from a progressive left. The challenges, with right-
wing populism at the top of the list, can only be faced through broad 
alliances that have the capacity for strategic political thinking and acting. 
In order to reclaim discourses, streets, parliaments and governments, 
liberal civil society has to “get out of its comfort zone” as Pia Eberhardt 
from the Anti-TTIP protests puts it: “Let’s not lecture ourselves on our 
positions, but let’s focus on what we have in common”.
Therefore the main question of this chapter is: how can existing 
actors and networks improve their cooperation in order to build capacity 
and gain political influence? Finding answers to this question, which has 
often been a struggle for the internationalist left, is now more important 
than ever with major elections ahead that will set the course for the future 
of Europe. Which approaches will help stop the paradoxical development 
of nationalism becoming the most dominant internationalist movement 
again? 
By bringing together some more general thoughts with examples of 
successful European protests and movements, we hope to not only present 
important lessons learned from past experiences, but also to outline 
possible paths for the future. Lorenzo Marsili, co-founder of European 
Alternatives, opens the chapter with reflections on the need of establishing 
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democracy beyond the nation-state. It follows with his conversation with 
Barbara Spinelli, Member of the European Parliament for the European 
United Left group (GUE/NGL), about fundamental strategic questions 
concerning the future of the European Union. Dieter Plehwe, senior 
research fellow at the Berlin Social Sciences Centre, traces back the 
dominant neoliberal ideology and shows the role political networks played 
in its path to hegemony. Andreas Karitzis, former member of Syriza, 
asks which conclusions the left should draw from the case of Syriza and 
Sophie Bloemen, policy advisor and co-founder of the Commons network, 
proposes the commons as a unifying political vision and practice. Three 
interviews follow: Pia Eberhardt presents the case of the Anti-TTIP protest 
and ideas for what other movements can learn from it. Two new movements 
from Eastern Europe follow: we talk with Razem (the new political party 
in Poland) and Demos (a civic coalition in Romania) about their origins 
and the ways they are organising. The chapter ends with an exciting 
example of political organisation and culture beyond the nation state, 
Europe and state-based democracy: The Rojava Revolution that happened 
in the middle of the Syrian civil war. Jonas Staal, visual artist and scholar, 
introduces the Revolution and the model of stateless democracy together 
with Sheruan Hassan, member of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party 
(PYD) and Staal ends the chapter with an interview with Salih Muslim, 
Co-Chair of PYD, about the fight for democratic autonomy and the concept 
of democratic confederalism. To illustrate these two contributions from 
Jonas Staal, we also included a series of his pictures on the construction of 
the parliamentary assembly in Rojava. 
A rigged economy in a rigged democracy
Lorenzo Marsili
Beijing. Late summer 2015. A few weeks have passed since the surrender 
of Syriza, the Greek anti-austerity governing party. Greece is forced to sign 
a new memorandum with its creditors and to hold new elections. Despite 
a crisis that has wiped out 30 per cent of the economy, left over half of 
the country’s youth unemployed and rendered all of the political parties 
illegitimate, the Greek parliamentary system remains intact. Widespread 
protest is followed by an orderly vote at the polls and growing apathy and 
abstention in the streets.
“All of this would have been unthinkable in China” says Zhang Ying, a 
prominent spokesperson of the Chinese Communist Party. “There is one 
thing we envy greatly about your democratic system: its resilience. In our 
country, an economic crisis of such a magnitude and social conflicts of 
such a scale would have brought a collapse of the system. Instead, you are 
waiting for the next elections.”
The long years of the European crisis have not passed unobserved. 
While on the one hand they have confirmed all of the prejudices of the 
Chinese elite about the inefficiency and short-termism of democracy, 
they have also demonstrated its capacity to survive prolonged periods 
of economic collapse and social discontent. This resilience, it should be 
noted, is absent in authoritarian regimes, which are instead rigid, often 
incapable of adapting themselves to new circumstances and therefore 
structurally fragile and prone to rupture. In the Middle East, the Arab 
Spring transformed rapidly into a revolutionary wave precisely due to the 
incapacity of the political system to insert the demands for transformation 
that were coming from the squares into a framework of non-violent 
change. The first meeting of the Politburo after the collapse of the Berlin 
Wall in 1989 was dedicated, as planned, to discussions of agricultural 
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reform. ‘Stiffing up’, pretending nothing is going on, using coercion 
and authority to avoid change can prolong the life of a discredited and 
unpopular system. But when change comes – as it no doubt will – it will 
be disruptive and destructive. 
By contrast the democratic system appears, at least in principle, 
highly elastic, able to transform the conflict between political parties into 
a conflict with agreed rules – to regulate demands for change, allowing 
them expression before they reach breaking point. 
There is a great body of work describing the profound anxieties of 
the early 20th century elite that the expansion of suffrage might allow 
the proletarian masses to take power and upturn the system. It was 
argument that also resonated among the first Marxists, who imagined 
that a politically emancipated working class could potentially seize 
power through democratic means. But the opposite happened. Liberal 
capitalism used the enfranchisement of workers and the majority of 
peasants to bring revolutionary fervour and popular rage inside the 
system. The parliamenterisation of class conflict provided a mechanism 
for channelling social unrest and gave birth to a new set of policies which, 
however incompletely, were able to respond to some of the concerns of the 
weakest in society, ultimately saving capitalism from itself. 
Take the United States following the Great Depression of 1929. 
Roosevelt’s New Deal was the most significant intervention in the 
economy to that date and marked a significant split with the unfettered 
and unequal laissez-faire capitalism of the 19th and early 20th century. 
It put a nation back to work, built income support structures and social 
security, restarted the economy with a fairer distribution of resources and 
put a halt to the excesses of financial speculation through the separation of 
commercial and investment banks. It saved American capitalism through 
a profound transformation of its premises, even at the cost of attacking the 
privileges of the ruling classes themselves. 
We could tell a similar stories for the ‘boom years’, the glorious thirties 
that followed the Second World War. From the ashes of conflict European 
capitalism transformed once again, giving life to an articulated vision of a 
welfare state that seemed to indicate a third space between the excesses of 
liberalism and of communism. It was a period of hegemony for the system 
born out of the New Deal; a capitalism guided strongly by the public 
hand, protected by the Breton Woods agreements – which restrained 
global finance – and which codified important social and labour rights. 
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The terrible inequality of the first half of the 20th century was outlawed 
and a new pact between labour and capital brought a new and fairer 
distribution of the fruits of development. So much so that large sections 
of the proletariat and peasantry were transformed into the new ‘middle 
class’ of advanced capitalism.
Ultimately, these were years characterised by the primacy of democracy 
over economics, with policy decisions directly reflecting struggles for social 
justice, equality and the extension of rights. Parties, mass trade unions, 
social movements and a high electoral turnout helped to keep power in 
check, while the threat of the Soviet model put pressure on the ruling class 
to meet popular demands. It was widely agreed that democratic processes, 
rather than market forces, should guide economic policy and that full 
employment and the provision of social protections were the responsibility 
of the state. It was no El Dorado, as the intensity of public protests in those 
years clearly shows, but it was democracy, with an economic model that 
worked for the majority and was capable of responding to the will of the 
people. 
Today, this is no longer the case.  
“Miser y acquaints a man with strange bedfellows”
Faced with the proliferation of openly anti-systemic forces and the increa-
singly real prospect of the disintegration of the European Union, many 
have implicitly referred to this prophetic expression from Shakespeare’s 
masterpiece ‘The Tempest’. It’s the austerity, stupid!
Donald Trump’s victory disproves those who have tried to maintain 
that, unlike Europe, the United States has successfully exited from the 
economic crisis. Yet the signs were there. One might point to the fact that 
food stamps, alimentary assistance for the poorest, almost doubled under 
Obama’s presidency; that the majority of new jobs are those that David 
Graeber defines as ‘bullshit jobs’, repetitive, badly paid and with little social 
value; that a large part of these are ‘fake’ forms of self-employment, such 
as people that work for home delivery services in the gig economy or Uber 
drivers who work without any contractual guarantees. Yes, unemployment 
has fallen to a historic low, but only because 90 million Americans have 
stopped searching for jobs. If these individuals were to be included, 
the real figure would be over 20 per cent. Meanwhile, unprecedented 
inequality and the decline of the middle class has undermined social 
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cohesion, leading to increased violence, an exploding prison population 
and even decreased life expectancy.    
A similar but even more extreme situation can be found in Europe, 
where growing inequality and the devaluation of work have generated 
paradoxical effects such as declining living standards even in conditions of 
economic growth. Just think of Germany, the continent’s largest economic 
power but also the EU country with the highest number of ‘working poor.’ 
It is not often remarked upon, but over 20 per cent of Germans live below 
the poverty line. Or Britain, which despite having monetary sovereignty, 
and soon perhaps control of its borders, has the highest level of child 
malnutrition in Europe.
The misery of Southern Europe we know well. If a third of the 
inhabitants of the world’s eighth largest economy and, the second industrial 
power in Europe – Italy – are at risk of poverty and social exclusion, this 
means that the system is profoundly dysfunctional. This dysfunction is 
accentuated by the poor design of the Eurozone, and in turn by the great 
differences within the European Union. ‘Two speed Europe’ is visible not 
only in the asphyxiated economic growth figures but also and especially 
in the varying life possibilities available for the youngest. The European 
space was supposed to guarantee freedom of movement and the sharing of 
intelligence and creativity. But the reality for most looks more like the sad 
forced migrations of the past than the ideal of the much-lauded Erasmus 
generation. Indeed, the flux of people across the European space is one of 
the most powerful symbols of the imbalances of power: it is young people 
from the South that are moving to the North. This one-way migration 
creates a huge loss of resources in some countries and, in a tragic, vicious 
circle, becomes an additional cause of impoverishment in and of itself. In 
2016 more than 100,000 Italians abandoned their home country, while 
countries like Latvia and Romania have lost more than 10 per cent of their 
populations since the start of the crisis. 
There is much that is true in the view that sees the rejection of the 
establishment – whether that of the European Union or of national elites 
– as a result of years of shambolic economic policy and of a growing 
exclusion and marginalisation of increasingly more important sectors 
of society. The economy is rigged. And in these conditions, demands 
for dignity and equality are no doubt central points. But we need to add 
another element to the equation. 
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“You are destined for a great Monday!  
Pit y that Sunday will never end.”
So wrote Franz Kafka in his diaries in a moment of profound melancholy. 
Today, this line appears to be the only response that the governing elite is 
able to offer to those arguing for real change. The exit from the ‘tempest’ 
of poverty and exclusion, from a rigged economy that works only for a 
minority, continues to represent a Monday that will never arrive. What’s 
offered in its place is the eternal return of the same, a Sunday defined by 
the status quo, propped up by repression and cosmetic changes: business 
as usual.
If the crisis that erupted in 2007-8 has the dignity of being compared 
to that of 1929, the same cannot be said of the political response offered by 
Western democracies. Unfortunately, and despite his many merits, Barack 
Obama is the most significant example. A few days after his first election, 
Newsweek wrote candidly that the task for the new President would be 
nothing less than “to lead the conceptual counterrevolution against an 
idea that has dominated the globe since the end of the cold war but is 
now in the final stages of flaming out: free-market absolutism.” Obama 
came to power shortly after the financial bubble burst, on the back of an 
extraordinary wave of public participation. With a Senate still under the 
control of the Democrats and the image of the economic establishment 
in pieces, he had a great window of opportunity to put into act his own 
New Deal and break with a system in crisis. Instead he chose the old path. 
He appointed Tim Geithner and Larry Summers to the Treasury, the 
same individuals who during the Clinton administration enthusiastically 
removed the last obstacles that were holding back the financial sector, 
among them the Glass-Steagall legislation, approved by Roosevelt himself 
and which prevented speculators playing roulette with the savings of the 
middle class. Instead of fixing the disaster, Obama called for help from 
the same people that had created it. This was no moral drama of penitence 
and redemption but the reproduction of the same financial privileges that 
had brought the world to the brink of abyss. In the words of Tim Geithner, 
the role of the States was to “foam the runway” for the banks in crisis. 
Europe of course is little different. In the course of many years of 
permanent crisis we have seen the proliferation of various protests, 
platforms and social movements arguing for a reconfiguration of the 
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European system. Some of these initiatives have come from parts of the 
establishment, others from a grassroots level, some are composed of 
intellectuals and academics, others come from political parties and in a 
few cases have emerged directly from progressive governments. And yet 
it has all led to nothing. On the contrary, the direction of travel appears 
stubbornly wrong, with the economy managed in an increasingly inept 
manner and the absence of democracy more entrenched by the day.
The result of all of this is that more and more people have lost faith 
that the European Union can be transformed in a positive manner. Some 
critics focus on an institutional system that is irredeemably dysfunctional, 
others on the damaging intransigence of Germany, others still on the 
intrinsically neoliberal nature of the European project. Some of these 
voices come from the right, others from the left. But whatever the analysis 
or political position the conclusion is always the same: the time has come 
to limit the damage and declare the end of a disastrous project incapable 
of reforming itself. For many, the experience of the defeat of Syriza by the 
Troika and Eurogroup was a watershed moment. The enthusiasm with 
which so many people had participated in and supported the struggle 
against the politics of austerity was replaced by a widespread feeling of 
melancholy and hopelessness. Democracy returned from the Athens 
Spring with broken bones. 
 
The elasticity of democracy resides in the capacity of political struggle 
and the demands of the weakest to produce real compromises and real 
social changes in institutions and in politics, opening up the possibility of 
going beyond the failed status quo within the very system that is in crisis. 
Democracy is a constituent process, capable of redefining the distribution 
of wealth, power and privilege. Today, however, our democracies are less 
and less capable of guaranteeing the effective transformation of dissensus 
into coherent political alternatives. More and more they are the victims 
of oligarchies that thrive with an extraordinary concentration of wealth 
and power. Disliked by most, these democracies are becoming rigid 
systems, capable of offering no alternative to the status quo other than 
their own implosion. The resilience of which Zhang Ying was speaking 
is disappearing. Is it still possible to create change without rejecting the 
system in its entirety? More and more people have begun to believe that 
it is not. 
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This is why Trump, the Brexiteers and many other of the forces of the 
new far right have become the symbols of an exit from the eternal Sunday 
of the Clintons, Camerons and Junkers of this world. An exit that doesn’t 
care where the road is leading and which is driven by exasperation at the 
terrifying mix of authoritarianism and economic failure that characterise 
Western democracies today: a rigged economy in a rigged democracy. 
After years in which the act of voting seemed to have become a purely 
performative act, charged with symbolism but lacking real agency, it is 
anti-systemic populism itself that has restored seriousness and weight to 
the electoral ballot. Capable, with a vote in London or Paris, of making 
Europe tremble; with a vote in Washington of making the world shake. 
Tragically, it seems that it is the far-right populists to have been the first 
to have clearly broken the mantra of there is no alternative and to have 
restored an illusion of sovereignty and democracy. 
The real crisis of our time is a democratic crisis. Change you can believe 
in was one of the most famous slogans of the Obama campaign. But those 
promises of change, in the US and even more so in Europe, have been 
dashed again and again. The system is entrenched in a failing status quo, 
incapable of offering real alternatives to the poverty and exclusion of a 
growing number of citizens. Countless promises of splendid Mondays to 
come have been wasted without us ever arriving an hour closer. The great 
clock of democracy appears jammed. Or rigged. 
This is no time for despair. Just as the Greek sailors sung by Homer, we 
know that melancholy and sadness are the first enemies to fight. And that 
we need to look towards the horizon if we are to set sail again. This is the 
time to come together and to show that beyond a bankrupt establishment 
and a rising nationalist international we can open up a third space: a 
joyous, victorious, future-oriented alliance of all those Europeans that 
refuse to be mere spectators of the decay of their continent. For every 
Trump there is a Sanders; for every Le Pen there is an Ada Colau; for every 
xenophobic movement there are millions on the streets of Europe to say 
refugees welcome and even for every ISIS fighter there is a woman or a man 
in Rojava building another Syria. Another Europe is not merely possible: 
it exists already all around us. In the countless municipal movements that 
are changing the meaning of local democracy from Barcelona to Naples; 
in the pan-European mobilisation for the commons, against unfair 
commercial treaties, for gender equality and much more; in the countless 
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instances of cooperative economies and autonomous spaces; in the new 
social movements that are rising up to take head on the political challenge, 
from Podemos in Spain to Razem in Poland and Demos in Romania; in 
the tens of millions of Europeans who already inhabit a shared continental 
space by living, studying or working abroad, and in the many more who 
have children or grandchildren who do so. There are countless numbers 
out there working to go beyond our failing system without listening for a 
second to the devil’s tune of the xenophobes. 
It is time for us to come together in a European mobilisation capable 
of saving Europe from itself by transforming it. It is time to settle 
accounts with one democratic deficit that in good part still depends on 
us to repair: the construction of transnational movements, transnational 
parties, transnational activism and active citizenship, and the symbolic 
presentation of such an alliance as a democratic front representing a clear 
alternative to both the status quo and the sirens of national retreat. The 
European elections of 2019 should give us a deadline for this to happen by. 
Yes, the economy is rigged and our democracy is broken and this is when 
we come together to repair it. 
Breaking with the rules that ruin the Union
Lorenzo Marsili in conversation with Barbara Spinelli1
In your response to Verhofstadt2, you have argued that before considering any 
constitutional change to the European institutions, we need to invest in policies 
capable of restoring citizens’ trust in the European project. Failing that, any 
effort of Treaty reform will likely be hindered by a profound mistrust towards 
the EU. This two-step approach is also at the core of the manifesto of DiEM253: 
stabilisation of the Eurozone first, and then constitutional reform. Can you tell 
us what kind of reforms you think are necessary to recover trust in the European 
project?
If we really want to defend the European project, it is completely illogical 
to start institutional revisions without first radically changing the policies 
that brought us to this multi-faceted crisis, so similar to that of the 
Thirties. The root cause is not only in the EU’s economic-financial make-
up, but also in its democratic failure, the disintegration of societies, and a 
loss of orientation and hope experienced collectively by European citizens. 
The mainstream version of institutional federalism is essentially no more, 
but yet it somehow still clings to the belief that modifying the balance 
of power between the different bodies of the Union will be enough to 
solve all the current problems. But the revolution has already taken place, 
or rather, it is still under way, and we know that it has produced what 
Jürgen Habermas calls “post democratic executive federalism”. The 
1 | This interview was first published in openDemocracy in August 2016.
2 | “Il Cigno Nero che Verhosftadt ignora” Barbara Spinelli July 2016 (http://
barbara-spinelli.it/2016/07/14/il-cigno-nero-che-verhofstadt-ignora/)
3 | DiEM25 (Democracy in Europe Movement by 2025) is a pan-European and 
cross-border movement founded by Yanis Varoufakis in 2016.
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repercussions of a breakdown of the Union would be so great that the 
order of priorities must change. Politics is not losing importance, but 
policy is the priority today. European politics will hopefully be of a federal 
nature, but such a goal must be the consequence, and formalisation, of 
a fundamental reconsideration of the policies adopted as of now. In the 
EU, we have arrived at a tipping point where the obsessive insistence on 
the institutional method – be it intergovernmental or community-based 
– is not sufficient alone. It is a technical masking of a political substance 
that does not change, of a European project that does not want to become 
either political or democratic, but deliberately tends towards a programme 
of oligarchic domination. 
In other words, we are facing a clear strategy: the aim is not 
advancing towards a normal democratic government, but towards a so-
called administrative “governance” that serves to protect the interests 
of small power cliques and privileged groups, insulating them not from 
the markets, but from the uncertainties of universal suffrage and of 
constitutional democracy.
Why should we believe that a shift of gear is any more likely today, after eight 
years of avoidable crises? We are yet to hear of a convincing argument as 
to how any ambitious and disruptive proposal would be able to survive the 
haggling between 27 Members States, all of which have national vetoes, several 
of which are ruled by openly nationalist and xenophobic governments, and 
some of which have deeply ingrained economic obsessions. We have seen it all 
before: ambitious proposals for investment reduced to the risible Juncker plan; 
a migration agreement reduced to a few hundred relocations from Greece and 
a bribe to Turkey’s Erdogan. And then there is the ineffective Youth Guarantee, 
and a dysfunctional Banking Union. Why should it be any different this time?
Clearly the current Treaties are not enough. And we definitely need an 
authentic Constitution, signed not by the governments of the Member 
States but starting, as the American Constitution does, with the words: 
“We, the people …”. However, policies must change before this. How 
can this be done with the current institutions? I am convinced that a 
democratisation of their mechanisms and their decision-making would be 
a first step, although certainly not the only step to be made. If the heads of 
government, the ministers, the commissioners, and the members of the 
Parliament felt themselves under permanent scrutiny from well-informed 
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citizens (and thus “enlightened”, according to Kant, and treated as adults), 
they would have quite some difficulty behaving as an oligarchy. It would 
not be possible for the Eurogroup to take a decision against the opinion 
of a Member State, as happened in the meeting of 27th June 2015, when 
the former Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis demanded for the Greek 
objections to be formalised, and the legal services of the Union replied 
that it would not be possible, in light of the fact that the “Eurogroup is not 
mentioned in the EU Treaties and operates as an informal grouping. As 
such, it is not subject to any written rule”.
Concrete transformation plans could come from citizens and not only 
from the European Parliament. Transparency is important but it is not 
everything, the citizens ask for more. They demand first and foremost a 
true European New Deal, which would create jobs and fight against poverty 
and growing inequality. The proposals are many: from those illustrated by 
Yanis Varoufakis, to those which came out from the Citizens Initiative 
“New Deal 4 Europe” (tax on financial transactions and carbon tax for 
investments in ecologically sustainable growth). Only by starting a New 
Deal will we be able to face the refugee crisis, build an economy based 
on solidarity and avoid falling into xenophobia, racism and widespread 
violence.
Agreed. But who are the subjects capable of filling the gap? We hear over and 
over a string of empty exhortations to build “another Europe”, but few believe 
in this rhetoric any more. National parties do not seem interested, or able, 
to see beyond the failed Euro-reformist rhetoric (Francois Hollande was the 
first to promise a transformation of austerity policies – we are now left with 
the Loi Travail and the State of Emergency). Transnational parties, a series of 
acronyms without a true strategy or common campaign, have proven to be unfit 
to lead a democratic revolution. Is it perhaps time to imagine a true European 
party? Or maybe even, in light of the next European elections, to imagine a 
“democratic front” to bring different political and social forces together with a 
simple but firm reform programme of the Union? Could this include disobeying 
EU rules? 
In reality, the subjects are there, one just needs better eyesight, the 
language, the curiosity and the capacity to listen and meet halfway, 
because this is what is needed so that we are able to tell them, as the 
old prophets did, “here we are”. Here not only to represent you, but also 
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to understand and spread what you think, what you fear, what you need, 
what has happened to you and what has let you down. Class war has not 
ended, even if the social question naturally presents itself in new clothes 
today. It is not only that the representation of these subjects is missing, 
and that all intermediary bodies of society – beginning with the trade 
unions – are under attack, but there is something more: the division 
today is not between who is “up” and who is “down”, but between who is 
“in” and who is “out”. We are faced with old impoverished classes, with a 
new, downgraded middle class full of fears, and with new classes that are 
deprived even of a name. And all of them tell us, as the Commendatore 
in Don Giovanni: “Ah tempo più non v’è” – “Your time is up”. We have to 
speak with these groups, so as not to fool ourselves into denial about the 
reality we are stigmatising.
Let us not keep to ourselves the fact that Syriza’s failure has left 
many, far-reaching wounds, to the point that millions of citizens today 
just do not believe that there are possible alternatives any more, and this 
is not only in Greece. Quite rightly, they think that universal suffrage 
has been undermined. We have to admit that democracy, as a whole, is 
left with broken bones. The capitulation of the Syriza government after 
the referendum of 5th July 2015 has to be recognised and represented as 
something similar to the primal scene, which unsettles the child who was 
used to imagining his parents as gender-neutral, as “innocents”. Once the 
primal scene has been recognised, you can decide not to consider it, or 
pretend to have not seen what you have seen, but the effect remains and 
it will be devastating if you do not go forward with some precautions and 
new knowledge.
Such a denial of reality is also one of our ruinous deficiencies. The 
Greek traumatic breaking point is still being hidden, or worse, is being 
totally repressed, or embellished, even by a great part of the radical left 
who keep demanding “another Europe”. What we must restore is the 
relationship with reality and the truths that it tells us: the reality of a 
humiliation which Syriza does not recognise, the reality of Trump’s 
success, the reality of Brexit, the reality of a Polish society that has had 
enough with the pseudo-liberal lies of the post-communist élite and has 
given the majority to Jaroslav Kaczynski and the PiS. 
You ask me what can be done concretely in order to build a European 
transnational party, a sort of “popular front” that could stand in the next 
European elections with a programme of rupture with the powers-that-
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be of the Union. First of all, we have to clarify a few concepts by asking 
ourselves some fundamental questions: what does it exactly mean to take 
back our sovereignty? How do we distinguish between popular sovereignty 
and national sovereignty? What is the cost of a non-Europe? What are 
the demands of the impoverished and expelled classes? And what is the 
meaning of the rupture strategy you have mentioned?
Then we have to respond to the fears of the people, voluntarily provoked 
by the hegemonic powers, but fears nevertheless. Let us take the migration 
and refugee question as an example: we have to condemn the indecency of 
the construction of walls and the carrying out of collective expulsions by 
Member States, with the complicity of the European Commission, and we 
have to denounce their will to bolster the extreme right with the purpose 
of using it as a scarecrow deterrent. But at the same time, we must help to 
get rid of the feeling of fear of our fellow citizens, because this sentiment 
too is a “reality”. 
We have to break with the rules that ruin the Union, but we must 
also reassure citizens: it is a matter of urgency. It is useless to say that we 
will “mobilise the masses” against racisms and neo-fascisms, because the 
masses we are talking about simply do not exist as they did, and a great 
number of them have ceased to vote anyway.
This much we have learnt over the last years: it is EU decision-making itself 
that is broken and unable to result in coherent and ambitious policies. We 
must, at some point, talk about reforming the European institutional structure. 
But this is a tortuous path. The so-called “Schäuble plan”, namely the 
integration of the Eurozone through the appointment of a European Finance 
Minister essentially tasked with enforcing the austerity rule-book, seems a step 
in the wrong direction. Many speak about the need for a Constituent Assembly 
directly elected by European citizens. Others, such as Piketty, advocate the idea 
of a Parliament of the Eurozone. What is the most promising path to trigger a 
reform of the government of the European Union?
I agree with the idea of a Constituent Assembly, but without leaving the 
project in the hands of an intergovernmental process. It already happened 
once, in 1984, when a constitutional project put forward by the European 
Parliament was devitalised and deformed in this way.
The Schäuble plan you are talking about goes in a completely different 
direction. It does not even limit itself to proclaiming a European Finance 
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Minister. Since Great Britain voted for Brexit, Schäuble is recommending 
the simple return to an intergovernmental Europe, to the old “balance of 
power” which caused two world wars in the previous century. He distances 
himself from any federal vision in order to save and protect the austerity 
policies imposed during these years. The very word “vision” is abhorred. 
The key expression today, according to Habermas, is the following: “No 
more vision, everything by now is just a question of “Lösungskompetenz”, 
of solution skills”. The goal of the German establishment, and Schäuble, 
is to consolidate the definitive victory of ordoliberalism.
Every State must first reorder its accounts, and only then common 
economic resources, cooperation and New Deals may come. In the 
international headquarters nothing must be decided in common; at most, 
it is a place of information where the strongest impose adjustments on 
the weakest. Ultimately, the essence of this doctrine, pure and simple, is a 
return to nationalism. A nationalism that today also risks contaminating 
the minds of left-wing anti-austerity forces. To them, I would like to say: 
be careful, in the battles for an “exit” from the Euro, or the Union, you risk 
finding at your side not those who want to shield Europe from the global 
markets, but the barely masked nationalism of Wolfgang Schäuble.
Social networks of influence in Europe – 
and beyond
Dieter Plehwe
The transatlantic financial crisis has led to a backlash against European 
democracy. Even if the previous efforts to increase participation remained 
quite limited (Quittkat, 2011: 653-674; Hüller, 2010: 77-107), there had 
been a clear emphasis on strengthening supra-national and trans-
national democracy in Europe up until around 2008. Enhanced NGO 
participation, citizen initiatives and online consultations reached out to 
social groups not normally involved in supra-national policy-making. 
After 2008 however, austerity policies were imposed by regimes outside 
the community framework, pitting rich States against poor States and 
reviving old centre-periphery notions and constitutionalising inequality. It 
is not entirely wrong to blame these developments on the Schäuble model, 
or, previously, that of Tietmayer (as argued by Bourdieu, 1998). The 
“dangerous idea of austerity” (Blyth, 2013) has certainly been promoted 
by Germany’s treasury and the Bundesbank. Lids on budget deficits, an 
eye to a maximum level on public debt and low inflation are trademarks of 
German supply-side economics and stealth neo-mercantilism.
But simply blaming Germany does not answer important questions 
relating to structural and ideational change, which in fact does not rest 
within national borders. And with regards to this, we need to ask a number 
of questions. Where did the ideas, which have strangled Europe for quite 
some time now, come from? And why do influential circles in many EU 
Member States support these ideas, rather than call for a united opposition 
to German austerity leadership? Why do so many neighbouring countries 
defy calls for solidarity in the refugee crisis, rather than asking for a quid 
pro quo deal on public finance and crisis management? Why has Europe 
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seemingly become stuck on notions of neo-liberalism and nationalism, 
eventually paving the way for Brexit?
In this essay, I will argue that the once, more dominant frame of 
European inter-governmentalism is indeed misleading and inadequate 
in explaining the transnational rise of neo-liberal ideas behind much 
of the recent orientation of European integration. In order to explain 
this paradigm shift, we have to pay more attention to cross border elite 
networks, which have been involved in important controversies regarding 
European integration.
The competing European integration framework of neo-functionalism 
has always emphasised the role of elites in European integration 
processes, but scholars working in this tradition were exclusively focused 
on pro-European elites. The trajectory of integration, spill over, or more 
integration, never considered competing elites with different orientations. 
Elites were naively perceived as being in favour of Europe, not against it. 
In order to comprehend the recent struggles over the future of Europe, 
we have to disentangle this allegedly homogeneous social class, to make 
visible competing political elites.
Serious competition has emerged to the traditional mainstream elite 
perspective of an ever-closer union. The roots of this opposition are not 
nationalist, as one might think, in light of the also growing opposition 
from Le Pen and friends. The roots of ‘limited integration’, or ‘economic 
integration only’-elites, can rather be traced back to organised neo-liberal 
circles that already opposed important aspects of the European project in 
the early days of the Treaty of Rome. The 1980s moved European integration 
and globalisation a good deal closer to ideals of free market capitalism. 
But the prospect of economic and monetary union followed by political 
union, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and German unification, 
reinvigorated neo-liberal opposition to deeper integration. Instead of the 
inter-State federalism, which Hayek had envisioned, already back in 1939 
(Hayek, 1980 [1948]: 255–72), a centralised supra-national State – political 
union – seemed to be on the horizon. From Maastricht onward, European 
networks of organised neo-liberals mobilised to intervene in European 
debates in unprecedented ways.
We can trace some of the trails of the groups involved in the formation 
of neo-liberal perspectives back to the Mont Pèlerin Society and related 
think tank networks. The Mont Pèlerin Society was founded, amongst 
others, by Friedrich August von Hayek and Wilhelm Röpke in 1947, to start 
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competing with Socialist and Social Liberal (‘Collectivist’) convictions 
in particular, but also to work against certain strands of Conservatism. 
Hayek’s reflections on the competitive implications of inter-State 
federalism has been credited, by Wolfgang Streeck (2014), for much of 
Europe’s development. But Hayek’s ideas did not play such a big role in 
Europe in the 1960s and 1970s, which begs the question, why they took 
on such a major role from the 1990s onwards (Höpner&Schäfer, 2012: 
429–55).
Mont Pèlerin’s neo-liberal Europe:  
From opposition to ambivalence to partial disintegration 
(never closer union!)
Hayek had in mind the model of the Fabian Society when he called a 
number of ideologically close colleagues and friends to convene in the Swiss 
Alps in 1947. The Fabian elite socialists developed a reformist programme 
of social reform in the late 19th century. Instead of entering party politics, 
public debate and politics at large, Fabians preferred to devote their effort 
to research, and to channel their findings and interpretations to powerful 
decision-makers.
From a liberal perspective, the 1930s were a dramatic, if not traumatic 
period. The Great Depression, Soviet rule in Russia and Nazi rule in 
Germany, were all not promising in terms of the prospect of global market 
Liberalism. Concerned circles of intellectuals were invited to Paris in 
1938 in the framework of the League of Nations intellectual committees 
to discuss Walter Lippmann’s book ‘The good society’. At the Walter 
Lippmann meeting, participants which included Hayek, Mises and Röpke 
agreed on the need for a new programme in the face of (a) the failure 
of traditional Liberalism and (b) the rise of Collectivism, a lose category 
designed to capture all perceived enemies of the market and individuals 
on the Left and the Right. This programme was given the name “neo-
liberal” (Denord, 2009: 45-67).
Critics of neo-liberalism frequently overlook the first part of the 
mission: addressing the weaknesses of classical Liberalism, which 
had perceived market capitalism as a natural, self-stabilising order. 
Neo-liberals instead recognised the need to secure market-capitalism, 
and ventured to compete with others ideologies on what kind of future 
direction social orders should take. For neo-liberals, it was clear that 
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market capitalism was preferable to alternative perspectives of mixed or 
planned economies. But the statement of aims of the Mont Pèlerin Society 
embraced social minimum standards “not inimical to initiative and the 
functioning of the market”, and aimed at redefining “the functions of the 
State so as to distinguish more clearly between the totalitarian and the 
liberal order” (Hartwell, 1995: 41-42), making clear that the State should 
be in support of freedom (of contract), property rights and individualism. 
Democracy, on the other hand, was notably absent from the core of the 
neo-liberal programme. In any case, neo-liberals were, and are, looking 
for public policies that suit their project, not naïve supporters of pure or 
free markets, no matter how important this slogan became in the fight 
against the welfare state.
Already in the 1930s, participating scholars were to join forces in 
think tank offices in different countries, including in the UK, France, 
Switzerland and the U.S. The war intercepted this effort, which was taken 
up again by Röpke and Hayek when they allied after World War II to found 
the Mont Pèlerin Society. Much like the Fabians, Mont Pèlerin members 
did not directly seek political influence. They focused on internal debates 
and networking on the basis of shared norms and principled beliefs, 
like property rights, individualism, rule of law, and an adherence to 
absolute values in religious and philosophically idealist traditions. The 
values and principled beliefs of neo-liberalism have subsequently been 
constantly reproduced and applied to concrete fields in many discussions 
of the Mont Pèlerin Society conferences. For public purposes, many Mont 
Pèlerin members helped directing and staffing neo-liberal think tanks, 
like the Institute of Economic Affairs in the UK, and the Foundation of 
Economic Education and the American Enterprise Institute in the U.S., 
as well as the Aktionsgemeinschaft Soziale Marktwirtschaft in Germany 
(compare Walpen, 2004). The Mont Pèlerin Society meetings and think 
tank activities in turn were supported by a broad range of businesses 
and corporate foundations. Neo-liberalism was not created by business 
interests, but there clearly has been an elective affinity between neo-
liberals and certain business perspectives from the very beginning. More 
importantly, Mont Pèlerin and think tank venues secured the interrelation 
of academic, business, media and policy making circles. The conscious 
networking across fields and domains provided neo-liberal networks 
with interdisciplinary and inter-professional competencies, which have 
undoubtedly proved very useful in exercising influence in policy arenas 
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and political circles. Operating in a mode “between network and complex 
organisation” (Plehwe&Walpen, 2006: 27-70), Mont Pèlerin searched for 
and directed efforts at developing alternatives to modern welfare state 
capitalism.
Ironically, a publication of the Fabian Society was early to observe the 
development of considerable intellectual capacities and new orientations 
challenging the mainstream in public debate emanating from Mont 
Pèlerin related circles:
“Hardly a week goes by without some conference of teachers, social workers or 
medical men being told that, for economic reasons, consumers must be charged 
directly for welfare services [...] Bits and pieces of the New Right’s doctrine 
appear in various places, from the writings of Enoch Powell or the Bow Group to 
the propaganda of Aims of Industry, but it is most coherently expressed in the 
publications of the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA). The IEA’s output has been 
considerable.” (Collard, 1968: 1)
Collard pointed to the systematic publishing activities of the neo-liberal 
think tanks and warned the Progressive movements as early as 1968(!) of 
the rise of a new social force:
“My own rather dif ferent worry is that the Left is being successfully outflanked 
by the New Right. While we argue about possible (marginal) extensions of public 
ownership the really important hard core of the present public sector (health, 
education and other social services) is being undermined. We are now at the 
beginning of a series of major assaults on the welfare services and rather than 
foraging around in the private sector we should look to our defences.” (Collard, 
1968: 5)
From defence to offence and flexible response:  
Neo-liberal ambivalence with regard to Europe
Between 1959 and 1987, Europe’s economic and social policy was torn 
between the protection of mixed economies, public services, industrial 
policies and agriculture on the one hand, and the drive to remove obstacles 
to cross-border economic integration. Up until the 1980s, harmonisation 
played a considerable role as a perceived precondition of successful 
integration. From then on, the emphasis was on ‘negative’, rather than 
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‘positive’ integration, on deregulation and liberalisation, rather than 
harmonisation and convergence.
One member of the Mont Pèlerin Society, Fritz Machlup, an Austrian 
economist who had been forced to emigrate to the U.S. in the 1930s from 
his native Austria (like von Mises, Haberler and von Hayek), gave much 
time to studying the basic meaning of ‘integration’. Confronted with 
notions of political integration in Europe, he delved into the history of 
economic integration, pointing to the necessity for the removal of obstacles 
(negative integration), rather than harmonisation, coherent regulation, 
or structural funds etc. (positive integration) (Machlup, 1977). Not only 
was he able to counter the dominant notion of political integration on 
this basis, he also refined the neo-liberal counter-proposal: economic 
integration requires the commitment to the removal of obstacles of all 
kinds, including political obstacles like public enterprise, regulatory 
competencies, non-tariff barriers, etc. And Europe was only a regional 
part of a larger task: the neo-liberal perspective on integration was global. 
‘Cosmopolitan capitalism’, as Herbert Giersch wrote in 1989, on the eve 
of the post-Socialist expansion of the capitalist order (Giersch, 1989: 1-16).
Both Social Democratic and Conservative ideas of regulated capitalism 
eventually came under siege by neo-liberal ideas of deregulated or ‘free 
market’ capitalism across borders. Machlup’s preceding intellectual 
efforts to develop a competitive notion of integration on behalf of neo-
liberal strategies went unnoticed, by and large, until it attained relevance 
in the single market project of the 1980s and important court decisions 
like the Cassis de Dijon case of 1979. EU Commissioner Davignon proposed 
trade policy based on this ruling, which essentially required the removal 
of non-tariff trade barriers (like diverging consumer protections standards 
etc.). In economics, Mont Pèlerin member and president from 1986-
1988, Herbert Giersch’s analysis of ‘Eurosclerosis’ added momentum to 
the negative integration pathway chosen in the 1980s (Giersch, 1985). In 
political science, Fritz Scharpf’s work on the negative integration bias of 
Europe seemed to validate the inevitability of European neo-liberalism. 
With hindsight, Fritz Machlup’s historical investigation suddenly seemed 
to matter a lot.
But the collapse of the Soviet Union and German unification changed 
the terms of the debate again. The EU Commission president Jacque 
Delors jumped on the occasion to pursue a more ambitious agenda of 
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economic, monetary and political union, which turned out to be highly 
divisive. Progressives blamed the Maastricht Treaty as a major turn to 
neo-liberalism because it would for the first time institutionalise austerity 
criteria in an international treaty for the European members of monetary 
union. Overlooked by many, right wing neo-liberals (like Herbert Giersch, 
and a letter writing community of economists) also attacked the Maastricht 
Treaty because the criteria were considered soft, and difficult to enforce. 
In addition to such economic criticism of Maastricht, the ‘British’ Euro-
sceptics formed in even stronger opposition to political union.
1990s: Neo-liberals move on and to Brussels
All those who are interested in Europe remember the famous Bruges 
speech, delivered by Margaret Thatcher, the founding event of the Bruges 
Group against an ever-closer union. Neo-liberal civil society networks had 
not mobilised many resources in Brussels before the 1990s, but did now 
with a vengeance. The Bruges Group started a considerable publishing 
activity of policy papers against many aspects of integration. Its Manifesto 
for Europe, of Europeans against technocratic rule from Brussels, attracted 
600 signatures from Euro-sceptic academics. When the convention 
process was started to debate a political constitution, neo-liberals from 
across Europe pulled together the European constitutional group headed 
by Professor Christian Kirchner, a public choice economist from Berlin. 
In 1993 the network contributed a neo-liberal draft constitution to the 
process. The following members joined in the writing: Peter Bernholz 
(Switzerland); Francisco Cabrillo (Spain); Gert Dahlmanns (Germany); 
Jacques Garello (France); Henri Lepage (France); Angelo M. Petroni (Italy); 
Joachim Rückert (Germany); Frank Vibert (Great Britain); Peter Stein 
(Sweden); Pascal Salin (France).
The group included seven members of the Mont Pèlerin Society. It 
remained active after the collapse of the constitutional process. An open 
letter of the group (in modified composition), to the head of the European 
Council, Donald Tusk, in 2015 (dated December 1), opposed measures to 
increase solidarity across borders and presented yet another agenda for a 
limited Europe.
Around 2008-2010, an interruption in the neo-liberal networks occurred. 
For example, the Stockholm network, which had connected more than 100 
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think tanks, ceased activity in 2010. A major reason for this development 
– apart from the global financial crisis – was the formation of the Alliance 
of European Conservatives and Reformists, led by the British Tories and 
other right-wing parties from Poland and the Czech Republic (Vaclav 
Claus, a Mont Pèlerin member), among others. Its founding document, 
the Prague Declaration, states a clear neo-liberal programme for Europe, 
a blueprint for partial disintegration. The language is mostly Euro-sceptic. 
The only positive reference is the expressed desire for equality of Member 
States, big and small, as would be expressed by any good federalist.
The new party alliance opposed the collaboration of Conservatives and 
Socialists in the EP, and aimed at creating centre-right-wing majorities 
against deeper integration. Many activities of neo-liberal civil society 
networks now moved closer to established European party politics. AECR 
forged a new neo-liberal think tank network under the umbrella of the 
party foundation New Directions (Plehwe&Schlögl, 2014), which combines 
many former Stockholm network members. Brexit will certainly weaken 
the political party coalition of the AECR, but the Cameron wing of the 
Tories have already established their own ‘open Europe’ think tank, which 
operates with offices in London, Brussels and Berlin. Think tanks, in fact, 
are much less restricted with regard to their partners and affiliations than 
political parties, and can be considered extremely valuable in maintaining 
ties and promoting specific ideas and projects across parties and world-
views. It still remains to be seen if Brexit will weaken neo-liberal 
perspectives. Neo-liberal networks are deeply entrenched in the various 
nations across the EU.
Opposing deeper integration, defending the status quo  of 
corporate globalisation, losing Europe
Neo-liberal circles have been one of many competing social forces in the 
process of European integration. Their influence has always been relative. 
In the beginning of the European integration odyssey, the circles of Jean 
Monnet were arguably quite a bit stronger than the neo-liberal opposition. 
Neo-liberal perspectives gained influence in the 1980s, against a backdrop 
of the crisis of Fordism and a welfare state model plagued by rising 
unemployment, increasing expenses and public debt. The neo-liberal 
transformation of the welfare state has since become the mainstream in 
the age of “permanent austerity” (Paul Pierson).
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With regard to the EU, the picture of the 1990s is more complicated: 
neo-liberals advanced in terms of deregulation, cross border liberalisation 
and the supply-side oriented austerity. But European integration also 
expanded in areas of environmental, social and labour market policies, 
much to the dislike of the friends of negative integration. Fighting these 
developments, European neo-liberals have now become more political in 
the framework of the European Alliance of Conservatives and Reformists 
and their New Direction foundation. Their programme is best understood 
as a prospect of partial disintegration, a limited EU that is imagined to 
come closer again to neo-liberal ideals.
Readers may still doubt that neo-liberals actually exist, since few are 
willing to officially embrace the label. But thankfully, Sam Bowman of 
the Adam Smith Institute recently declared a ‘coming-out’ of neo-liberals, 
which included the following (incomplete) positive list of essentials, 
notably excluding any reference to democracy, just as in the statement of 
aims of Mont Pèlerin:
1. Pro-markets
2. Pro-property rights
3. Pro-growth
4. Individualistic
5. Empirical and open-minded
6. Globalist in outlook
7. Optimistic about the future
8. Focused on changing the world for the better
(Bowman, 2016)
Unlike in 1947, social minimum standards are also notably absent, let 
alone notions of social citizenship. The paradoxical effect of the permanent 
neo-liberal hammering on the EU and the welfare state has of course 
helped the rise of neo-nationalist tendencies, culminating in Brexit, and 
Le Pen and Frauke Petry ante portas. This is the choice neo-liberals, and all 
Europeans face: promote neo-liberalism and move Europe ever closer to 
the brink of disintegration, or reconsider the scope of integration. Victims 
of globalised ‘free market’ capitalism look for protection. If workers and 
employees do not, or cannot, organise trade unions, they will get a Donald. 
Social security may be framed as an exclusive right of legitimate members 
of the Nation State, protected from outsiders and others that do not belong. 
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Or social citizenship may be considered solidarity of inhabitants of a 
social space shared by all who live together and need solidarity in order 
to tackle the problems and issues that result from common economic, 
political, ecological and other challenges, not least from the now extremely 
burdensome heritage of neo-liberal orders.
Neo-liberals united on the basis of common norms and principled 
beliefs back in the inter-war and post-war periods, which provided them 
orientation in their effort to organise across borders, which they aim to 
maintain to control people, but not capital. Progressives have been lost 
in national varieties of capitalism, welfare states and so on, instead of 
developing a competitive base across borders. The Left, in fact, has much 
to learn from the right-wing efforts to organise and coordinate across 
borders. Paradoxically, the Right has become the international party. Can 
the Left overcome its parochial inclinations?
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Learning from Syriza
Andreas Karitzis 
The government experience of Syriza provides us with valuable insights 
regarding the implications for the Left’s diminished power and the 
neoliberal transformation of the State within national and international 
networks of power. Furthermore, we are able to identify and examine 
inadequacies of the approach of the traditional Left. It seems that the 
strategy of building social alliances in terms of representing beliefs and 
demands at the political level is not enough. It is not sufficient to engage 
effectively with the State and the government in order to effect a coherent 
transition strategy to a new political economy and a robust democratic 
social and institutional configuration. Less ambitiously, it is not sufficient 
to check the imposition of austerity policies and neoliberal transformation. 
It is not enough to pave the way for the restoration of democracy and 
popular sovereignty. 
If this is our current predicament, then I argue that we need to 
redesign the “Operating System” of the Left. The Left needs to initiate a 
process of adaptation in order to respond effectively to the new conditions 
shaped by the neoliberal national and international financial and political 
architecture. I argue that the urgent question is not whether we should do 
politics within the State, or not as it is traditionally conceived, but to set 
up a new conceptual and organisational framework of doing politics, both 
within the State, and outside of it, such as it is relevant today.
Time lag
The Left – but not only the Left – in Western societies of a robust democratic 
constitution, has been trained to do politics within the coordinates of a 
post-war institutional configuration. According to this, the elites are 
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committed to accepting the democratically shaped mandate of an elected 
government. If they do not like the policies that it promotes, they have to 
engage in a political fight; opposition parties must push the government, 
through their political activity, towards more moderate directions, they 
must convince the people that this policy is not desirable nor successful, 
and use democratic processes for a new government of their preference to 
be elected1.
According to this conception, the post-war global balance of forces 
inscribed in State institutions has a considerable amount of popular 
power, rendering them quasi-democratic. This amounts to tolerating the 
fact that people without considerable economic power have some level of 
access to crucial decisions. Of course, the quality and the range of the 
access has been a constant issue of class struggle. The elites have been 
obliged to fight according to the rules (or at least to appear to do so), and 
at the same time they have worked deliberately to diffuse any kind of 
institutional configuration contaminated by popular power. In the last 
decades (not accidentally, after the fall of the Soviet Union), they made 
decisive steps towards diffusing this kind of power and hence limiting 
the ability of the popular classes to influence crucial decisions. Today the 
elites feel confident to openly defy democracy. Democracy is not a taboo 
any more. 
The strategy of Syriza was implicitly based on the premise that the 
institutionalised popular power of the past is not exhausted; the elites will 
respect at least a shred of the democratic mandate of the new government, 
and provide it with some degrees of freedom required in order to, at least, 
heal social wounds and restore economic activity. We could say that the 
implicit idea was that by winning the elections, remaining institutional 
powers would somehow be enough, and it would be used to stop austerity. 
And then, in a relatively stable environment, we could enhance people’s 
power using the State institutions. We all know the results of such a 
1 | It could be argued that this was not truly the case even for the so-called 
Western societies after the Great War. This is surely a debatable issue. However, 
for the argument I present here, it is sufficient to assume that this was at least 
the dominant conception of the political functioning that shaped the methodology 
and strategy of the political agents, even if it does not correspond fully to reality. I 
would like to thank Leo Panitch for the clarification of this point. 
160 Andreas Karit zis 
strategy, now. The outcome was totally different. There was virtually 
no change of policy. The elites are no longer committed to the post-war 
democratic rules of the political and social fight2.
Avoid oscillation
It seems that the traditional strategy of building social alliances in terms of 
representing beliefs and demands at the political level is not enough. The 
traditional strategy may give us access to traditional institutional power. 
But, we know from the Greek experience of the last years that the popular 
power, once inscribed in the traditional institutional configuration, is 
seriously depleted, if not exhausted. We do not have enough power to 
make the elites accept and tolerate our participation in crucial decisions. 
The amount of power we can reach through traditional political practice is 
not enough to pave the way for the restoration of democracy and popular 
sovereignty in Europe.
But in order to overcome our impotence to challenge financial 
despotism in Europe, we must avoid an unproductive oscillation. Usually, 
in the Left, there is a hot debate regarding the nature and the place of 
the State within our strategy: should we intervene in State institutions, 
or not? However, in my opinion, the pressing question is not whether we 
should do politics within the State or not, as it is traditionally conceived. 
We usually articulate Left strategies that either include the State, or 
exclude it, and then we compare them and debate over their comparative 
pros and cons. Our strategies implicitly presuppose that doing politics in 
both cases is ‘a given’, and it remains only a matter of articulation: what 
is our priority, and in cases of non-exclusionary approaches, what are the 
best ways of connecting them. I argue that we must reformulate these 
kinds of debates, taking into consideration that there is a deeper issue that 
needs to be addressed: our know-how of doing politics is seriously outdated, 
undermining all our strategies, from the outset.
2 | We can see the same attitude in other areas of current politics as well. The 
elites have developed ways to avoid taxation that render any political decision 
of a government to increase their taxes extremely dif ficult to implement. Elites 
gradually detach themselves from societies, shif ting the ground and the nature of 
class struggle in ways that need to be specified and analysed.
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We must reformulate the point of view from which we are approaching 
our current situation, otherwise we may trap ourselves in an oscillation: 
every time a state-oriented Left strategy fails, a movement-oriented strategy 
will prevail, and vice-versa. There is the danger of constant oscillation 
between irrelevant and feeble strategies that are failing by design. It leaves 
us always blaming our impotence on the last decision to intervene with 
State institutions or the last decision to abstain from doing so. According to 
my experience and understanding, we must initiate a somewhat daunting 
process of setting up a new conceptual and organisational framework; of 
doing politics both within the State and outside of it, which indeed would be 
relevant to the current situation.
Redesign the ‘Operating System’ of the left
We know that the popular power once inscribed in various democratic 
institutions is exhausted. We do not have enough power to make the elites 
accept and tolerate our participation in crucial decisions. More of the 
same just will not do. If the ground of the battle has shifted, undermining 
our strategy, then it is not enough to simply be more competent on the 
shaky battleground; we need to reshape the ground. And to do that, we 
have to expand the solution space by shifting priorities: from political 
representation, to setting up an autonomous network of production of 
economic and social power (NESP). 
We must modify the balance between representing people’s beliefs 
and demands, and coordinating, facilitating, connecting, supporting and 
nurturing people’s actions. Instead of being political representatives of the 
popular classes in a toxic, anti-democratic European political environment, 
designed to be intolerant to people’s needs, we must contribute in a 
meaningful way to the formation of a strong ‘backbone’ for: resilient and 
dynamic networks of social economy and co-operative productive activities, 
alternative financial tools, local cells of self-governance, democratically 
functioning digital communities, community control over functions such 
as infrastructure facilities, energy systems and distribution networks. 
These are ways of gaining the degree of autonomy necessary to defy the 
control of elites over the basic functions of our society. 
It is not only in Greece that there is a growing exclusion of people 
from employment or from opening a bank account, from having a ‘normal 
life’. Modern society in general is in decline. From history we know that 
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societies in decline tend to react in certain ways in order to survive. It is 
up to us to grasp this and start building networks that can perform basic 
social functions in a different way – one that is democratic, decentralised 
and based on the liberation of people’s capacities.
For example, exploring ways, models and methods of building the 
NESP requires evaluation and the use of concepts such as the ‘commons’. 
Expanding this notion even further and putting forward a project of 
shaping political representation as ‘commons’ could give us valuable 
insights into new ways of performing vital functions like political 
representation, transcending the traditional, institutional framework of 
representative democracy.
Redesigning the “operating system” of the Left also means the 
elaboration of a multi-level democratic transformation strategy of the 
State, and its effective interconnection with the NESP. The Left talks too 
much about the democratic transformation of the State. In practice, the 
driving concept is the restoration of State functions, as they were before 
the neoliberal transformation. The expansion of a network of economic 
and social power under the people’s control would further unlock our 
imagination, facilitating the targeted reforms of State institutions that are 
needed in order to connect them with the NESP. In theory, this is an old 
idea: the transformation of the State is a complementary move to the self-
organised collectivities of the people outside of it, driven by these forms 
of self-governance.
First, this would allow people, who are being excluded today, to 
survive. Second, this could begin a transition towards a better and more 
mature society. And last but not least, there are no empty spaces in history, 
so if we do not do this, the nationalists and the fascists – with their own 
militarised ways of performing these basic functions – may well step in to 
conclude the decline.
Shifting the battlefield
The elites have already spotted the shifting nature of the battlefield and 
have moved to new unclassified ways of organising and acting. They 
have developed new kinds of institutions (a Greek example of successful 
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clustering3) compatible with the emerging environment of fast flows of 
information, digital frameworks of action and production etc. They are 
also exploring new methods and models; for example, “open innovation” 
models have emerged in the last few years to enable the R&D departments 
of big multinational companies to cope with today’s distributed nature 
of knowledge and expertise, which exceeds past means of control and 
usurpation of human intellectual creativity and innovation. These new 
ways of organising, and acting, infuse values like collaboration, sharing, 
exchange of knowledge and expertise, decentralisation and distribution, 
diversity and inclusion, and common goals, into the private sector in 
order to boost the production of value, which we know to be seriously 
undermined by the corrosive effects of competition. This strategy shows 
that our values are not only desirable but also effective, as long as we find 
ways to make them the operational core of our collective mobilisation, 
instead of being just part of our rhetoric.
We have to create new popular power if we want to bring about 
substantial change, or make ourselves resilient instead of just handling 
the remaining, seriously depleted, if not already exhausted, popular power 
inscribed in traditional institutions. The question is what does it look like, 
to do politics in order to produce popular power, without presupposing 
traditional democratic functioning – to restore it by transforming it anew? 
In other words, what are the modifications needed in our political practice 
for the constitution and expansion of NESPs?
These modifications may be classified in three categories: political 
imagination, methodology and organising principles. From my experience, 
the very same people who energetically claim that we need to be more 
innovative, better adapted and more efficient, when they actually do 
politics, reproduce priorities, mental pictures, methods and organisational 
habits that they already know are insufficient or inadequate. There are 
ingrained norms, in terms of methodological guidelines that decisively 
shape the range of our collective actions, rhetoric, decisions and ultimately 
strategy. In the same vein, we believe in and fight for the promotion of the 
logic of cooperation and democracy, against the logic of competition, but 
in practice our organisations suffer severely in terms of cooperation and 
3 | Corallia. “Corallia’s vision is “A Greek environment with the right framework 
conditions to allow sciences, innovation and entrepreneurship to flourish (again)”. 
(http://www.corallia.org/en/).
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democracy on the operational/organisational level. We need to recognise 
these blind spots and set up a process of identifying best practices, 
methods and regulations – both from the experience of our collectivities 
and from expertise in management, leadership, organisational complexity 
and network systems theory etc. – in order to operationally upgrade our 
forces.  
Furthermore, our actions and initiatives are not connected up properly, 
but are fragmented and isolated, destined to face the same difficulties 
again and again. We need to upgrade our operational capacities through 
appropriate nodes of connection, facilitating smooth flows of know-how 
and information, transferring best practices, building databases and 
accumulating knowledge and expertise in an easily retrievable and useful 
way. Actually, this is the advantage of multinational and large corporations 
in general, in comparison to others: they have a vast social network, and 
powerful databases, that give them the necessary tools to plan and pursue 
their goals, while their smaller competitors seem in disarray in a global 
environment of rapid changes. We need these qualities if we want to be 
really useful today.
It’s the implementation stupid4!
Having been in the Syriza leadership during the period of preparation for 
assuming governmental power, I came to the conclusion that Foucault 
was right when he argued that one major lacking of the Left is that it 
misses a mode of governmentality stemming from its own logic and 
values. We miss a modality of administrating populations and running 
basic social functions in a democratic, participatory and cooperative way. 
One aspect of this lacking today – based on the Syriza experience – is 
the total ignorance and indifference towards issues that are related to the 
implementation process. The prevailing rhetoric within Syriza was that the 
4 | German Finance Minister Schäuble used this phrase in a public discussion 
with the Greek Prime Minister Tsipras in order to point out that the implementation 
of the agreement must move on, giving real results in terms of measurable fiscal 
aims and structural reforms. Seen dif ferently, this phrase indicates why we 
ended up in a situation in which the neoliberals are the true ‘revolutionaries’, 
dramatically changing the basic coordinates of modern societies whilst the Left 
seems unstable and feeble.
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issues are political and not technical.5 So, all we had to do was to decide 
what we wanted to do, not to explore the ways in which we were going to 
implement them. The implicit premise was that the crucial point was to 
be in the government and the ministries, making political decisions, and 
subsequently, somehow, these decisions would be implemented by the 
‘technical’ nature of State mechanisms.
Apart from the fact that this attitude contradicted what we wanted 
to say regarding the corrosive effect of the neoliberal transformation of 
the State and the complexity of being in the EU and the Eurozone, it also 
revealed a greatly superficial understanding by the traditional political 
Left of the notion of the “transformation of the State”. The fact that we are 
talking about a current in the Left, which includes governmental power 
within its strategy, the low level of awareness regarding the importance 
of implementation processes reflects the degree of obsolescence of Leftist 
organisations. To me this justifies exactly why there is the need for a 
radical redesign of the “Operating System” of the Left. 
The major problem is that a mentality like this ignores the obvious 
fact that the range of one’s political potential in being in the government 
is determined by what one knows one can do with the State. The 
implementation process is not a ‘technicality’, but the material basis 
of political strategy. What the traditional Left takes to be the political 
essence, namely the general, strategic discussion and decision (what 
to do with the debt, privatisations etc.) is just the ‘tip of the iceberg’ of 
State-politics. The implementation process is the ‘iceberg’ of State-politics 
beneath the surface. Instead of just being a ‘technicality’, it is the biggest 
portion of State-politics. Actually, it is where the political struggle within 
the State becomes hard, and where class opponents battle to prevail over 
implementation, which is, after all, a battle over shaping reality. The tip 
is not going to move the iceberg by itself, as long as it is not supported 
by a multi-level and multi-personal implementation process with clear 
orientation, functional methods and high-level coordination. This is the 
integrated concept of State-politics that we have forgotten in practice and 
by doing so we tend to fail miserably whenever we approach the tip of the 
iceberg. So, the question is not whether we should fight for the tip or not, 
5 | A similar rhetoric appeared publicly during the negotiation process with the 
lenders.  
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but whether we have any clue what to do with the iceberg beneath it, or 
not.       
One of the results, in the case of Syriza, was that the Programme 
Committee, the highest political organs, and the departments of the 
Central Committee, did not work deliberately on managerial issues 
regarding steps, methods and difficulties of implementing our own 
policies and organisational issues, like restructuring processes in the 
various State institutions we would have access to, but rather, they were 
sites of political argumentation in the most general and abstract terms. 
The quality of governmentality, and the capacity of transforming the 
State-politics of the Syriza government, is just the natural outcome of this 
kind of preparation.  
It is a matter of debate whether the Syriza experience in this respect is 
generalisable or not for the Left today, on a global scale. But it seems to me 
that there is also a lack of literature on these issues as well. There is Left-
oriented literature, regarding geopolitics, economics, social movements, 
political science (political representation, alliances etc.). There are 
also Left-oriented debates regarding strategic questions, the nature of 
rupture, modern subjectivities. But, what about management, leadership, 
organisational theories, complexity, system and network theories? I hope I 
am wrong and it is just me, the Greek Left, or the traditional political Left, 
that is not familiar with the debates regarding these issues, triggered by 
current scientific production or practical experiences of our collectivities. 
In any case, I am sure that there are plenty of useful materials in these 
domains that the Left should recognise as being extremely crucial for 
our cause. And for as long as we have not explored such important areas 
of human activity and creativity, we can be optimistic that we may well 
discover some truly powerful ‘weapons’ in giving us stronger operational 
capacities in the future.
The commons as unifying political vision
Sophie Bloemen1
The crisis of the European Union begs for new, unifying and constructive 
narratives – alternatives to the right-wing populist and nationalist wave 
that is getting fiercer every day. A ‘commons’ approach holds the potential 
for a unified vision towards an alternative economy, a Europe from the 
bottom-up, and an ecological economy and way of life. The idea of jointly 
stewarding shared resources, community, and a generative economy can 
find resonance with a diverse range of citizens. 
Major fault lines are starting to appear in the dominant world-view 
based on individualism, private ownership and an extractive relationship 
with nature. Although this view is still pervasive in economics, politics 
and law, a novel outlook based on networks, access and sustainability 
is emerging (Capra&Mattei, 2015). The online environment, where 
knowledge is shared and co-produced on a large scale, has made a huge 
contribution to this shift in perspective (Benkler, 2006).
The predominant discourses that permeate political discussions 
at the European Union level are, however, those of economic growth, 
competitiveness and efficiency – considerations that tend to trump 
everything else. The lion’s share of the European Union’s policy focuses 
on macro-economic indicators and the promotion of large commercial 
interests. Citizens are often viewed simply as entrepreneurs or consumers.
This dominant outlook follows the logic of the ‘homo economicus’, 
the fictional abstract individual of standard economics, who maximises 
his personal material gain through rational calculation. The underlying 
Cartesian subject-object dualism, in which mind is divorced from nature, 
leads to the perception that the world is there for humans to dominate 
1 | An earlier version of this ar ticle has been co-written with David Hammerstein.
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and use. In addition, these models do not take into account the limits of 
our cognitive capacities or the limits of natural resources. As a result, it 
rationalises a view in which agents, when presented with the possibility to 
extract value from nature for their personal benefit, should always do so. 
An ensuing focus on markets and growth has blinded us from the 
loss of social cohesion, rampant inequality, and the destruction of the 
environment. In the perceived need to quantify everything, gross domestic 
product is used as a measure of social wealth. Modern property rights and 
the dominant concept of ownership as an individual right protected by the 
State, to allow short-term accumulation, are central to the materialistic 
orientation and extractive mentality that lie at the root of today’s global 
ecological crisis. The commodification of our common resources, and 
even our online behaviour, seem limitless.
The commons
The commons perspective stands in stark contrast to the policy 
priorities that currently dominate in Europe. The commons refers to 
shared resources and frameworks for social relationships, managed 
by community. Commons also stands for a world-view and ethical 
perspective favouring stewardship, reciprocity and social and ecological 
sustainability. This outlook defines well-being and social wealth not just 
by narrow economic criteria like gross domestic product or a company’s 
success. Instead, it looks to a richer, more qualitative set of criteria that 
are not easily measured – including moral legitimacy, social consensus 
and participation, equity, resilience, social cohesion and social justice 
(Ostrom&Hess, 2007).
The commons discourse considers people as actors who are deeply 
embedded in social relationships, communities and local ecosystems, 
instead of regarding society as a collection of atomised individuals, 
principally living as consumers or entrepreneurs. Human motivation 
is more diverse than maximising material self-interest alone: we are 
social beings and human cooperation and reciprocity are at least as 
important in driving our actions (Bollier, 2014: 112). This more holistic 
perspective considers human activity as part of the larger, living bio-
physical world. Recognising the multiple domains of people’s lives, 
bottom-up, decentralised and participatory approaches to our major social 
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and environmental dilemmas provide functional solutions to the current 
environmental and social crises facing our continent. 
The idea of the commons does not fit within the traditional ideological 
frameworks of Left and Right. However, it does provide a clear ethical 
perspective and helps us appreciate and understand the value of people 
collectively stewarding resources, without the dominant, centralised roles 
of the market or the State. The commons are not primarily a political theory, 
but first and foremost a practice emerging from the bottom-up. Everywhere, 
people are engaged in alternative practices as part of the struggle for 
ecological, social and cultural transition within their communities. 
All over Europe, local initiatives are seeking to take care of their direct 
environment, are sharing and stewarding knowledge online and claiming 
natural resources as our commons. Examples include community wi-fi 
structures, providing access to the internet in remote areas, co-housing 
initiatives ensuring affordable housing, community land trusts that explore 
collective forms of property and urban commons initiatives working to 
regenerate the city for its citizens. The digital knowledge commons are 
a key element of an alternative economy and online commons projects 
have attained an impressive scale. Creative commons licenses for cultural 
works, for example, are now over one billion. There is Wikipedia, by 
far the world’s largest and most used encyclopaedia, and Firefox, which 
offers a free and open source alternative to Apple’s Safari and Microsoft’s 
Internet Explorer. About half of all administrative bodies in the EU are 
as of now using open source-software. In all these areas, the commons 
approach offers a new vocabulary for collective action and social justice. It 
opens up ways of reshaping processes for the governance of resources by 
communities themselves. 
Cultural change and political struggle
All this while European civil society, NGOs and social justice networks, 
up to now have not been able to unite around a broadly shared agenda. 
Hundreds of organisations united in the fight against the TTIP, a trade 
agreement driven by the interests of large corporations and negotiated 
in a highly un-transparent manner. However, in order to make progress 
towards another, fairer and ecological economy and society, a movement 
cannot be solely reactionary; it has to set the agenda. The emerging 
radical initiatives that have been proposing alternatives have mostly been 
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engaged at a national or local level, rather than on the European level. 
Examples are ‘15M’ in Spain, ‘Nuit de Bout’ in France and the University 
occupation in Amsterdam. Occupy was translocal, but did not succeed in 
really opening up the conversation in Europe. Local struggles, forward-
looking and emancipatory projects, will have to be connected in order to 
really be strong. The national and local levels are essential, but not enough. 
The fact is that a great deal of the laws and developments that shape our 
societies come from the European level and global markets. Civil society 
has to have translocal and transnational solidarity around a shared vision 
of an alternative society. 
We see this vision of an alternative society emerging, both in theory 
and political beliefs, but even more so in practice. It is emerging in the way 
people choose to live their lives. Whilst societal changes we experience 
are often cast in terms of economy or technologies and are dependent on 
a favourable institutional environment, they are often rooted in cultural 
change. Our culture reflects and shapes our values and how we attribute 
meaning to our lives. Cultural change is therefore a key driver for social 
transformation. Many current community-led and social innovation 
initiatives and practices are enabling communities to be generative, 
instead of extractive, outside of the market and State. This is creating 
a new civic and cultural ethic that breaks with conventional notions of 
citizenship and participation. The regenerative activities of commoners 
showcase, above all, cultural manifestations of new ways of daily life. 
At the same time, the perspective of the commons unites many 
different struggles; the struggle for managing water as a common good, 
of managing our energy locally and sustainably, of being able to share 
knowledge, from affordable medicines and limiting patents, to struggles 
around the urban environment and citizen participation and new forms 
of democracy. All of these concern the participatory and equitable 
management of common goods in a sustainable matter: goods that are 
fundamental to everyone’s well-being and flourishing. 
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European commons assembly
The European Commons Assembly2 that took place in Brussels in 
November has been a case in point for the unifying potential of the 
commons. The movement of commoners has been growing across Europe 
over the last decade, but with the Assembly it came together for the first 
time in a political transnational European constellation. The objectives 
of the meetings were multiple, but the foremost goal was to connect 
and form a stable but informal transnational commons movement in 
Europe. Over 150 Europeans came to Brussels, and in a symbolic move 
of reclaiming Europe, met for half a day in the European Parliament. 
They came to develop new synergies, express solidarity and to discuss 
European politics, as well as policy proposals. Europe’s democratically 
elected Members of the European Parliament exchanged views with the 
‘Commons Assembly’, made up of a myriad of commoners, activists and 
social innovators from many different corners of Europe. 
The political energy generated by bringing all these people together 
in this context was exceptional. The Assembly included important 
discussions, about the relationship between ‘the Left’ and local commons 
movements, between practical examples of building alternatives on 
the ground and macro political and economic visions of Europe. These 
conversations have to be about philosophy and vision, yet also about whom 
we are addressing and what is to be included or excluded in our narrative. 
How to build broader coalitions on the ground, not bound to the Left or 
Right, how to prevent erecting walls with academic language and theory, 
and indeed, how to attract conservative commoners. The Assembly will 
continue as a political process and diverse platform that still needs to find 
its way, yet holds a great deal of potential. 
How to move for ward
People left behind by globalisation find themselves in a world where 
economic insecurity is the default and everything is for sale. Moreover, 
globalisation and the focus on the individual has led to the loss of familiar 
culture and community and the loss of a clear national identity. Instead 
of rejecting these sentiments, we need to acknowledge them, for they 
2 | https://europeancommonsassembly.eu/
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are real. The commons embrace predominantly progressive values, but 
they are not about de-localised cosmopolitanism. Instead, the commons 
depend on the local environment and resources, on community, traditions, 
care and trust. Rather than letting the political backlash lead to Europe’s 
disintegration, we should turn our gaze to what is below, to what people 
are creating locally, what is happening on the ground. That is where there 
is hope and energy, that is where people are jointly stewarding their own 
resources, be it local energy cooperatives or online initiatives such as 
Wikipedia.
As we build this movement, we can do our best to improve networking, 
campaign tactics and alliances3. We have to ask ourselves however, how 
does a commons movement as a political force relate to conventional 
political power? There is a tension between conventional political 
advocacy and ‘commoning’. If the building of an alternative economy is 
the primary task, is it then the main role of advocacy and politics in favour 
of the commons which will be able to facilitate the building of such an 
economy? And should we not focus first and foremost on the deepening 
of democracy, as the role of representative democratic structures are part 
of the problem? These are questions the commons movement, and the 
political advocates involved, have to keep asking themselves. The role of 
local initiatives in the political platform has to be addressed and developed 
in such a way that we find a functioning and satisfying configuration. 
Otherwise, the movement risks being neutralised and domesticated in 
the policy venues that are so crucial in protecting and facilitating the 
flourishing of the commons.
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Instructions for building      
a pan-European movement
Interview with Pia Eberhardt, Corporate Europe Observatory1
The negotiations on the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) between the European Commission and the US 
government led to massive protests both in the US and in Europe over 
the last few years. While supporters argue that an increase in free trade 
would result in economic growth and more jobs, critics claim that TTIP 
endangers environmental and consumer standards and that it is an 
assault on democracy itself. Pia Eberhardt, works for the Corporate Europe 
Observatory and is one of the spokespersons of the anti-TTIP movement.
***
Would you say the anti-TTIP movement has been successful? And if so, in what 
way exactly? 
Yes, absolutely. It has been successful in many ways: First, we have 
managed to put a highly complex issue on the public agenda in many 
EU countries. In countries where TTIP has been publicly debated for a 
while now – like Germany or Austria – the majority of the population is 
now opposed to TTIP according to polls. Second, this has put enormous 
pressure on policymakers and made the TTIP negotiations much more 
complicated, to the extent that they may never be concluded. Third, we 
have managed to build a relatively stable – and broad – pan-European 
network. That did not exist in Europe before.
1 | This interview took place in October 2016. The last two questions were added 
in January 2017.
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The street protests were among the most successful in a long time (at least in 
some countries, such as Germany). Why do you think people were mobilised 
over what is actually a very complicated and technical international trade 
treaty?  
I think the most important reason is TTIP itself, and the fact that it will 
have an impact on so many issues that people care about – from the 
environment to labour rights and democracy as a whole. Because of its 
scope, nearly every component of Europe’s organised civil society – trade 
unions, environmental and consumer groups, digital rights activists and 
so on – has a reason to worry about TTIP. And they all campaigned on it. I 
cannot think of any other issue where this has been the case.
Was it different to other protests, like for example Heiligendamm 2007? If so, 
what was the difference?
First, I would say that the threats that TTIP poses are much more 
concrete: this will be a treaty that binds our societies indefinitely and 
has a very concrete impact for example on how much competition small 
farmers face and which standards prevail in the food sector. The threats 
of a G8 summit are far more diffuse. It may be clear to us activists what 
the problem is with the G8 and why it is an important link in the network 
of institutions that has driven neoliberal globalisation, but for ordinary 
people the implications are very abstract. Second, I think that the anti-
TTIP movement is much broader – and allows for many more different 
ways of people getting involved than, for example, the anti-G8 protests. 
During the “TTIP Game Over” action days in Brussels, for example, we 
saw the kind of direct actions and civil disobedience that played a key role 
in Heiligendamm. But at the same time people have also spent a lot of 
time discussing the issue with local politicians and working on anti-TTIP 
and CETA resolutions, which have now been passed by over 2000 cities 
and regions in Europe. And you also have the small and medium-sized 
businesses against TTIP. This context allows a topic to become an issue 
for groups far beyond the usual suspects and small left-wing circles.
What were the difficulties in building up a transnational protest?
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I would say it wasn’t very difficult, but obviously you face the usual 
challenges: language barriers and resources are always an issue. It simply 
takes a lot of resources to translate studies and other information sources 
so that people can work with them on the ground in their countries. And 
obviously we do not have the means to translate our EU-wide meetings 
into lots of different languages, so effectively only people who speak 
English can attend. Another challenge is that you need some form of 
coordination of such a movement – but at the same time you need a lot of 
space and flexibility so that all the national campaigns can work in a way 
that makes most sense for their own countries. So, for example, deciding 
on European-wide action days is never easy because a day or week that 
might make perfect sense in the Spanish context might be completely out 
of context in Austria.
What role did social media play? Do you see a conflict between “clicktivism” 
and protest on the streets or long- term engagement?
Social media plays a very big role. If you have a new analysis on TTIP, it can 
reach people everywhere in no time. You can use it to build up pressure 
on policymakers, for example during twitter storms. But online campaign 
groups like Campact in Germany do much more than clicktivism. Thanks 
to Campact, for example, thousands of people have visited the offices of 
their MPs. They have put “door hangers” informing about the different 
party positions on TTIP on people’s doors ahead of important elections. 
And research has shown that around a third of the people who attended 
the big demos against TTIP in Germany did so because they had learned 
about TTIP from Campact. So no, I do not see a conflict between these 
different forms of engagement – as long as we do not put out different 
messages.
Have you cooperated with organisations from the US? Do you see potential for 
transatlantic solidarity rather than the transatlantic spectatorship we see, for 
example, with the US presidential election?
Yes, of course. US (and Canadian) groups were involved in the struggle 
against TTIP and CETA right from the start. All the working groups 
we have on the different TTIP issues – for example on agriculture or 
regulatory cooperation – are transatlantic, so there are regular calls on 
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these issues between people on both sides of the Atlantic. Email lists, too, 
are transatlantic. Anything else would not make sense because with TTIP 
the key line of conflict is not the US vs. the EU or the other way round – it 
is corporations and their profit interests vs. other societal interests.
What are the most important things other movements can learn from all this?
I would say two things: First, confront any differences between the different 
actors in the movement head on – but do not get lost in them; focus on 
your commonalities. For example, at the very first European meeting we 
had on TTIP it was clear that there were people who opposed free trade 
while others were in favour of free trade but were still critical of many 
parts of the TTIP, for example regulatory cooperation and investment 
protection. So we made these positions very clear from the outset, but then 
said: let us not lecture each other on our respective positions but rather 
focus on what we have in common, for example that we see TTIP as a 
threat to democracy and to regulation in the public interest. The same goes 
for different forms of activities – we have a coalition that brings together 
people who regularly lobby policymakers and people who consider this a 
waste of time and prefer to do direct actions. But both are respected; it is 
clear to everyone that our broad base is our strength.
The second lesson is related to this: you have to be able to get out of your 
comfort zone. To stop TTIP it is not enough to get grassroots groups, trade 
unions and left and Green parties on your side. You also need to convince 
significant sections of the conservative middle class and more centre-right 
parties and conservative media. So you need people and organisations that 
know how to speak to, say, conservative farmers in Bavaria, to judges, to 
medium-sized enterprises, and to regulators. That has an impact on your 
messaging and the way you act.
How do you deal with the increasing appropriation of traditional left-wing 
causes by nationalist groups?
It is a challenge, and I do not think we have a satisfying answer to that yet. 
In the German context, for example, nearly every speech at the big demos 
we staged made it clear that there was no space for racist, anti-Semitic or 
anti-American positions in these marches. People bearing big banners 
with messages to this effect marched in front of the rest. And we had 
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anti-fascist monitoring groups at the demos to kick out people with racist 
messages. These initiatives are very important and must continue. But I 
am not sure that that will be enough.
For example, we face the concrete problem that the Social Democrats 
in the European Parliament do not want to vote with the far right. I can 
totally understand that. And for the Greens in the European Parliament 
it must be horrible to be constantly lumped together with UKIP, for 
example, which is also voting against TTIP in the Parliament. But the 
response of the democratic parties cannot be to start approving all kinds 
of neoliberal projects simply because nationalists are opposing them. 
However, I honestly have no idea how to deal with that situation. It is 
pretty disastrous.
Wallonia, a French-speaking region of Belgium with a population of about 3.5 
million people, grabbed the world’s attention when it vetoed CETA. How do you 
evaluate what happened in Wallonia?
What happened in Belgium was on the one hand very encouraging. 
The Walloon Parliament organised 70 hours of public consultation on 
CETA. So, it scrutinised the agreement vigorously. And it identified 
serious concerns – and did have the backbone to at least temporarily block 
the CETA ratification when it was clear that its concerns had not been 
addressed. So, what we saw was a rare glorious democratic moment, where 
a Parliament actually did its job, scrutinised a complicated agreement with 
serious consequences and stood up to defend the interests of the people 
who elected it.
But the episode was also disillusioning. In the end, the pressure on 
Wallonia was too strong and it had to clear the path for the Belgian federal 
government to sign CETA – even though none of CETA’s flaws were 
fixed. Nonetheless, Wallonia achieved two important things: it forced the 
Belgian government to send CETA’s investment chapter to the European 
Court of Justice so that the court can check if the chapter is in line with 
EU law. And Wallonia – and the three other sub-federal entities which 
shared its opposition to CETA – put down in writing that they will not 
ratify CETA in its current form when CETA reaches the third stage of 
ratification, in which all regional Belgian Parliaments will have to vote on 
CETA again. So, it is clear that CETA will have to be changed – or Belgium 
will not be able to fully ratify CETA.
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As TTIP has been put off the political agenda, CETA is still in negotiations. Do 
you foresee the future of the movement working against CETA? 
CETA will face a long and difficult battle to get ratified in all EU member 
states. Because in the third phase of the ratification, around 40 Parliaments 
in all 28 EU member states will have to ratify the agreement. This is likely 
to happen quickly in some countries like the Nordic states where CETA 
is not really an issue. But in others like Belgium, France, Austria and 
Germany, it might take years until CETA will be put to an actual vote. 
And that will mean that the agreement will only partially enter into force – 
and the controversial investment protection chapter, for example, will not. 
That in itself is already a major civil society victory – even if we might not 
manage to kill CETA for good in these votes.
For TTIP, we will have to see what the Trump administration will 
really do. At the moment, we do not know its position on TTIP. It could 
be that the US government buries the agreement. But I think it is likely 
that the TTIP negotiations will be picked up again in the second half of 
2017. Many of the TTIP chapters – for example, on regulatory cooperation 
or financial deregulation – fit quite well with Trump’s deregulatory big 
business agenda. So, we will definitely remain vigilant.
Together means Razem
Interview with Marcelina Zawisza and Maciej Konieczny, Razem1
Something is moving in ultra-conservative Poland. Marcelina Zawisza 
and Maciej Konieczny are members of Razem (“Together”), a new 
political party emerging from social movements and strongly inspired by 
the experience of Podemos in Spain. They explain their project and the 
Polish political scenario: from the surprising social policies of the current 
authoritarian government to the liberal opposition defending freedom of 
information but forgetting about inequality. In this context, what does it 
mean to launch a new party from the bottom-up in Poland today?
***
Why a new party in Poland? Why did you make the shift from social movements 
to party politics?
There was no real left party in Poland. There is the so-called Socialist or 
post-Communist party, which is just bureaucrats of the late Communist 
government that became the new establishment after the transition – 
basically neoliberal, socially conservative, not leftist at all, but they took 
the place of the left in the country and our objective was to re-open that 
space. Nobody trusts parties anymore here, and this is why we were very 
sceptical regarding the success of this operation. But if parties are in 
distress, social movements are not in a better situation: small, fragmented 
groups, incapable of having a strong impact, chronically divided.
1 | This interview took place in July 2016.
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And so you thought a solution would be to have all these forces come together to 
form a single political group?
We wrote an open letter to all movements. We received two thousand 
signatures in a few days, almost all of them – and this was the real surprise 
– from people we did not know and who never took part in organised 
mobilisations. We really wanted to know who they were! We met them, 
and to our surprise we learnt they were not interested in traditional left-
wing organisations or movements. They reputed those political forms to 
be old and useless.
This is a story we have heard before. When talking with Podemos’ founders 
they say that to launch a new political project they had to leave the world of 
organised movements, who at the beginning were even against them, in order 
to intercept the energy coming from the 15M and only after that, they could go 
back and include organised movements. Is it something like that?
Exactly. The organised left has been in conflict with us since the beginning. 
But now many have left the traditional movements or organisations and 
joined Razem instead, to come out of their small bubble. We decided to be 
part of the trail of the new European left, moving from the base. In this 
sense, Podemos is a big inspiration; they have proved that it is possible to 
bring a change. 
At the elections last year there was a coalition of the United Left, post-
communists, Greens, left-liberal … Why didn’t you join this list, rather than 
running by yourself?
We have our own agenda and a new way of conceiving politics itself, 
together with its organisation. The old way of doing politics is dead and 
is represented by the same names and the same politicians and power 
groups that, election after election, try to found new coalitions, new 
alliances, just to win their seat in Parliament again. We are talking about 
the political class as a whole. It simply does not work anymore and it is 
not what we want to do. Moreover, these parties, when elected, passed 
laws permitting evictions, perfectly fitting the mainstream “there is no 
alternative” narrative.
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And they have been eclipsed. The post-communist party was at 40 per cent and 
now is not even in Parliament. But what makes your model work? What are 
your flagship methods or policies?
Our program is somehow not so radical, we could define it as social 
democratic. But this, in Poland, is something new. Nobody ever talked 
about progressive taxation, redistribution … And now, when statements 
concerning workers or poverty are needed by the media, they come to 
us. The same happens with social issues: we are the ones asking for the 
decriminalisation of abortion, still an illegal practice in Poland. And when 
the government tried to pass an even more restrictive law, making abortion 
illegal even in the case of rape, we organised a rally in Warsaw, which over 
than ten thousand people attended. The biggest demonstration ever on 
this issue in Poland.
Talking about social policies, the current government – led by Kaczyński’s party 
Law and Justice – is quite an interesting case. It is for sure an authoritarian, 
xenophobic, illiberal government, on a collision course with the EU. But it is, 
nevertheless, passing some measures that could be seen as traditionally leftist: 
reduction of the retirement age, maternity allowance, social housing. What do 
you think about it? Is this a new kind of national socialism?
We must say we are surprised as well. We thought the social agenda 
mentioned during the political campaign would be forgotten once elected, 
as had happened when the same party had the chance to govern previously. 
But now they are really doing it! They are way more nationalistic and 
authoritarian than the first time, but they are also way more social. For the 
first time we have assisted a growth, rather than to a reduction in welfare 
provisions. The new maternity law will drastically reduce child poverty 
from 28 per cent to 10 per cent, an issue closely linked to large families 
here in Poland. And for the first time, most public spending will go to the 
poorest: 6 billion złoty to the poorest 10 per cent of the country, only 300 
million to the richest 10 per cent.
So, for the first time there are redistributive policies.
And we will not be the ones criticising them. A social housing program 
was launched, not giving resources to banks or big building companies, 
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but giving resources for controlled rents. And there is more: the taxation 
system is undergoing a modification that will make it more progressive, 
the flat tax is being abandoned, along with regressive taxes for the richest. 
But at the same time, the government is extremely authoritarian. A militia 
with semi-automatic weapons is about to be created, mostly made up of 
components of far-right groups. A bill against terrorism is about to pass, 
creating a permanent state of emergency. Not to mention the gag that 
has been put on the press and attacks against the independence of the 
Constitutional Court. It is quite frightening.
And it is against this authoritarianism that we have seen so many demonstrations 
in Poland. But you have chosen not to join KOD, the organising platform. Why 
is that?
Well, the governing party is in fact terrible, but these demonstrations have 
been predominantly organised elites of the previous government [Civic 
Platform, the party of the current President of the European Council, 
Donald Tusk – Ed].
They demonstrate for freedom of speech, but then attack the govern-
ment’s social policies – refuting them as a way to “buy” votes. They do not 
understand that this money is incredibly important for many people. They 
tell the poor they should go out in the streets, fighting to save our consti-
tutional system, while at the same time, by accepting 500 złoty per month 
for maternity benefit, they are selling themselves. And all this while a ma-
jority of the low-middle class only earns 2000 złoty per month. They are 
completely out of touch with reality. And this is how in Hungary Viktor 
Orbán obtained an absolute majority in Parliament, by having only one 
opposition party that represented only the elite.
We want to kick out this government, but to do it we believe that just 
to gather liberals in big cities is not enough. You have to reach out to those 
people who now vote for Law and Justice [the governing party – Ed]. If no 
one has the courage to create a social agenda, then the space is open for 
authoritarian forces
What is the social base of the governing party?
They have a cross-cutting base. Many vote for them as they are thought 
to be against the establishment and as the people have had enough of the 
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previous government; a government that chose to ignore completely all 
social issues. Civic Platform talks about those Poles who had to emigrate 
as “lucky” people who had the opportunity to have work experience 
abroad. They did not realise how much suffering was brought by family 
separations or that two million people could not find a job in their own 
country. These opposition groups – KOD, Civic Platform – are part of the 
post-transition elites that now would love to just go back to business as 
usual. All without realising inequality levels are much higher in Poland 
than the European average.
You received considerable public funding because of your result in the last 
elections. You have two more years until the next one: what now? What will be 
your next steps?
We are trying to open 25 social spaces across Poland. They will not be 
just normal party offices, but community places where everyone can come 
and utilise the space, organise a dance lesson, classes for children, legal 
assistance and so on. This is something the socialist party of Poland used 
to do before WWII. We do have a strong tradition of political parties as 
social entities, working with cooperatives, unions, even sport clubs, much 
more than just an election to election machine. We did not call ourselves 
“something-left”, as nobody here knows what left is anymore. We called 
ourselves Razem, “Together”. But our origins are clear, and we want to 
start anew from there.
The birth of a new civic platform in Romania
Interview with Oana Băluță and Camil Pârvu, Demos1
Romania’s political landscape has become increasingly problematic as 
a result of growing social inequality and economic instability. In this 
context, Demos has emerged as a growing citizens platform that aims 
to secure more political influence for the people. It offers open forums 
for the citizens to come together and reflect on common demands and 
the problems that the government is not solving. Oana Băluță and Camil 
Pârvu are members of the new initiative Demos. They reflect about the 
political situation, the social struggles and about how the new citizens’ 
platform can influence the political agenda in the country. Oana Băluță 
is an associate professor at the University of Bucharest’s Faculty of 
Journalism and Communication Studies and Camil Pârvu is an associate 
professor at the university’s Faculty of Political Science.
***
Over the last few years, in certain European countries like Greece, Spain and 
Poland we have seen the formation of political parties that began as social 
movements or citizens’ platforms. How was Demos formed, what does it mean 
to be a civic platform and how do you see the transition to a political party?
Many of the members of Demos as a civic platform have been directly 
involved in the waves of protest that Romania has seen since 2011. A 
particularity of these protests is that they have been rather effective 
in these last five years – forcing two resignations by prime ministers 
1 | This interview took place in November 2016, before the parliamentary elec-
tions in Romania, where the Social Democrats won 46 per cent of the vote.
186 Inter view with Oana Băluță and Camil Pâr vu
and, in the 2013 protests over the Rosia Montana gold mining project, 
a policy change from what was a very broad parliamentary coalition on 
other issues. Part of the strength of the street protests derived from the 
de facto impossibility of forming new political parties and the increasing 
cartelisation of the existing ones. In the course of the last year the electoral 
legislation has changed, making it much easier to establish new political 
parties. Some of the newly formed political parties are, however, very 
neoliberal in their social and political outlook – as they insist on post-
political expertise delivering a social conflict-free society. We, by contrast, 
are, focussing on the key issues of rising inequality (Romania has the 
highest level of income inequality in the EU), social and environmental 
policy, poverty, housing, and rebuilding the social state, which is in the 
process of being dismantled. Our political and social vision is driven by 
the lessons and vocabulary of the social protests.
How would you describe the political context in Romania today? And within 
this context, what are the main policies advocated by Demos? 
Given that 2016 is an election year in Romania – local elections have 
already been held and parliamentary ones will take place in December 
– it makes sense to reflect on the political context in terms of both the 
political parties running for election and the public policies. The competition 
is fiercer in this year’s elections because new political parties have been 
established that have the potential to displace the parties that traditionally 
win. There is also a mixture of ideologies, a reluctance to adopt any single 
ideology, confusion regarding the official ideology, the public policies 
and the rhetoric of the politicians, as well as opportunistic strategies that 
embrace nationalism, populism and moral conservatism. 
Demos is not running in the elections because for now it still functions 
as a civic platform. It brings people together to debate and discuss 
solidarity, democracy and giving politics back to the people. Despite 
the growing competition among political parties, socio-economic and 
environmental issues are still being left aside despite the fact that they are 
creating inequality and a lack of opportunities for individuals and groups. 
Demos wants to play an active role in combating inequality in education, 
in the labour market, in healthcare, in the environment and in the social 
welfare system by promoting opportunities for individuals in a precarious 
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situation/the disadvantaged. Demos also advocates gender-sensitive, anti-
racist and environmentally-friendly policies. 
What are the main social issues in Romania today and how is the government 
dealing with them? 
The main social issues are unemployment, workers’ rights, access to 
decent healthcare and education, work-life balance policies, housing, and 
the protection of vulnerable individuals – for instance women who are 
victims of gender-based violence. Some social issues are being addressed 
by the government, while others are being ignored or “postponed”. 
Take public kindergartens, for instance. Their number has decreased 
steadily since 1989, and the statistics show that the shortage of public 
kindergarten places is having a negative impact on women’s employment 
rates and children’s access to public school education, particularly in rural 
areas. Developing and investing in public kindergartens yields positive 
results in terms of gender equality and children’s access to primary school 
education, especially in the case of one-parent families and families that 
are struggling financially and desperately need a second income to stay 
above the poverty line. You cannot increase employment rates among 
women without investing in public kindergartens. We have to understand 
the cumulative impact the lack of kindergarten places has for instance on 
pensions and on poverty rates among elderly women. 
 
Where is Demos operating at the moment? Do you have different groups at the 
national and regional levels? If so, how do the policies and methods differ from 
one level to the other?
We are starting to set up central and local party structures (the party will 
become an official entity in a couple of months) to prepare for the next 
elections in three years’ time. Parallel to this process the civic platform 
is now present in many of the big cities and has national reach. We 
selected particular themes for the debates at each local event – labour 
laws, the reconstruction of the social welfare state, the creation of new 
anti-corruption policies etc. We are very pleased with the attention and 
feedback that these local debates have generated and we continue to 
develop this network.
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When we talk to the founders and members of new political parties in Europe, 
they point to the challenges of maintaining a productive, enduring and 
healthy relationship between the social movement that produced them and the 
institutions. What are the expectations of Demos in this respect?
Because Demos is still a civic platform at present we have not yet actively 
confronted that challenge, although there is an internal process of 
negotiating our own identity as we make the transition from civic activists 
to members of a political party. For the moment our organisational 
structure remains rather horizontal and we are setting up working groups 
and subgroups in which we can harmonise our expertise for several key 
policy areas, such as social policy, environmental policy, administrative 
reform etc. This means that when the political party is finally established 
it will inherit the style and political culture of the civic platform. It will, 
however, be a political party with specific decision-making procedures. 
We have included several groups in a process of consultation in order to 
ensure a better integration and coverage of various policy areas. We have 
already consulted green NGOs, LGBT groups and newly formed trade 
unions, and we plan to have consultations with women’s rights groups and 
other such organisations. Many members of the Demos Initiative Group 
come from social movements and NGOs themselves, and we can build up 
a healthy relationship with these groups if there is mutual trust and if we 
understand and accept each other’s limitations, as well as the importance 
of working together in order to respond more effectively to the needs of 
special groups and better represent their interests. It will be a learning 
process for both the agents of social movements and Demos. We need 
to create trust, advocate specific policies and dialogue, and embrace an 
approach based on common sense.  
The Rojava Revolution and the model of 
democracy without a state
Sheruan Hassan and Jonas Staal1
At the start of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, Kurdish revolutionaries 
reclaimed the northern part of Syria, known as Rojava, which means 
“West” in Kurdish and refers to the western part of Kurdistan. In 2012, the 
peoples of the region declared a Democratic Self-Administration of Rojava, 
aimed at bringing about a new political model known as democratic 
confederalism. This model was described by Kurdish revolutionary 
Abdullah Öcalan as “democracy without the state,” an ideal based on local 
self-governance, gender equality, communal economy, secularism, and 
cultural and religious diversity.
The Rojava Revolution is widely known for its effective resistance against 
the brutal violence of the Islamic State. The Women’s Protection Units 
(YPJ) and People’s Protection Units (YPG) – the self-organised people’s 
armies of Rojava – have proved most successful in liberating land that 
was under the control of the Islamic State, and subsequently securing the 
rights and protection of religious and ethnic minorities in the region. 
However, the revolution of Rojava is not just a military struggle. It is 
also a cultural struggle, a struggle to “change mentalities,” as Amina Osse, 
Deputy Chair of the Committee of Foreign Affairs of Canton Cizîrê in 
Rojava, puts it. With this change of mentality, Osse refers to the ideological 
awakening of Rojava through the practice of stateless democracy. The old 
model of the nation-state, Osse explains, is not capable of representing a 
diversity of peoples, due to its centralised and homogeneous identitarian 
1 | This text was first published in New Worlds, The Democratic Self-Administra-
tion of Rojava & New World Summit (Studio Jonas Staal), KORO / URO, 2016.
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politics. The nation-state further operates as a vehicle for global capital, 
privileges, and patriarchal relationships, and stands in conflict with ideals 
of a sustainable ecological society. In that light, the ultrafundamentalist 
and hyperpatriarchal Islamic State, which emerged from a history of 
violent imperialist politics in the region, stands in epic contrast to Rojava’s 
ideal of a non-state democracy, championing women’s rights and cultural 
diversity. 
The Rojava Revolution is thus important for reasons that go beyond 
the enormous sacrifices at the frontlines against the Islamic State. It is 
also a struggle for a new society and a new democratic ideal. The Rojava 
Revolution brought about local parliaments, councils, and communes, 
which form the heart of the project of political self-governance – the heart 
of the Democratic Self-Administration. The revolution brought about 
new academies, such as the Women’s Star Academy in Rimelan, which 
developed a new scientific paradigm based on women’s perspectives, 
known as “Jineology.” The Movement for Culture and Arts, Tev-Çand, 
established cultural centres in all of Rojava’s villages and cities and 
organises exhibitions, music events, theatre, film screenings, and the 
cultural education of children and young adults. Moreover, it brought 
about the Rojava Film Commune, which is producing the first films by 
and for Rojavans on their history and revolution.
The democratic self-administration of Rojava  
and the new world summit
It is the intersection between culture and politics in the Rojava Revolution 
that brought about the collaboration between the Democratic Self-
Administration and the New World Summit, an artistic and political 
organisation founded in 2012. The New World Summit aims to create 
temporary parliaments in theatres and art spaces all over the world, 
where it invites representatives of stateless and blacklisted organisations 
to speak. The organisation aims to explore the space of art and culture 
to create new models of democracy that aim for equality between state 
and non-state actors. Six summits have been organised so far, including 
in Berlin (2012) and Brussels (2014), and have involved more than forty 
stateless and blacklisted organisations from around the world. 
In 2014, the Democratic Self-Administration invited the New World 
Summit team to travel to Rojava and witness the development of their 
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new civil society. It was during this visit that Amina Osse proposed to the 
New World Summit to contribute to the Rojava Revolution with a project: 
the creation of a new public parliament in the city of Dêrik in Canton 
Cezîrê, Rojava. A parliament as a public artwork, a sculpture, and symbol 
inspired by the Rojava Revolution, which at the same time would operate 
as a political space for the communes of Rojava to gather. This invitation 
resulted in a series of different collaborations. The construction of the 
public parliament began in August 2015, and an international delegation of 
representatives of stateless political organisations, politicians, academics, 
journalists, artists, and students travelled to Rojava in October 2015 to 
witness the achievements of the Rojava Revolution and celebrate the start 
of construction on the new parliament, which is aimed to be inaugurated 
early 2017. In January 2016, the Democratic Self-Administration of 
Rojava and New World Summit collaborated on a temporary parliament 
in Utrecht, inspired by the ideal of stateless democracy. Currently, a new 
project is underway in the form of a temporary embassy of Rojava in the 
City Hall of Oslo – the New World Embassy: Rojava.
To us, this collaboration between the realms of revolutionary politics 
and art emphasises the importance of cultural struggle within political 
struggle. Rojava inspires new political movements and artists all over the 
world to re-imagine the world differently, to confront the major crises in 
our politics, economy and ecology, to change mentality, and embrace a 
democratic paradigm that allows for power and resources to be shared by 
a diversity of peoples. It is not just one new world that Rojava is making 
possible; Rojava inspires many new worlds in the making, and invites 
artists and thinkers to contribute their imagination to make these many 
new worlds a reality, in the same way that the Rojava Revolution has made 
their new world of stateless democracy a reality for its peoples.
New world summit–Rojava
In 2014, the New World Summit was commissioned by Amina Osse, 
Deputy Chair of the Committee of Foreign Affairs of Canton Cizîrê, 
to develop a new parliament for the autonomous region of Rojava. 
Amina Osse, Democratic Union Party (PYD) representative Sheruan 
Hassan, and artist Jonas Staal conceptualised the design as a public 
parliament – a parliament as a public space surrounded by a newly 
developed park, symbolising the Rojavan ideal of politics as common 
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property. The location of the parliament was decided to be the city of 
Dêrik. The circular space of the parliament can accommodate about two 
hundred and fifty people, the average size of a local commune in Rojava. 
The centre of power remains purposely unoccupied, emphasising the 
egalitarian ideal of stateless democracy as collective self-governance. 
Around the circular space, arches are constructed on which key concepts 
of Rojava’s Social Contract are written. The roof consists of hand painted 
fragments of flags representing local political organisations. On October 
16–17, 2015, a two-day summit was organised in the local cultural center 
of Tev-Çand in Dêrik to celebrate the start of construction, where Rojavan 
representatives spoke side by side with representatives of other state-less 
movements and progressive political parties from all over the world.
Works by Democratic Self-Administration 
of Rojava and Studio Jonas Staal 
New World Summit Rojava (2015-2017)
Figure 1: New World Summit – Rojava.
Description: Design of the new public parliament and surrounding park in 
the city of Derik, commissioned by the Democratic Self-Administration of 
Rojava (northern-Syria). Artist: Democratic Self-Administration of Rojava 
and Studio Jonas Staal, 2015-16.
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Figure 2: New World Summit – Rojava.
Description: Interior design of the new public parliament in the city of Derik, 
commissioned by the Democratic Self-Administration of Rojava (northern-
Syria). Artist: Democratic Self-Administration of Rojava and Studio Jonas 
Staal, 2015-16.
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Figure 3: New World Summit – Rojava.  
Description: Design of the inside of the roof of the 
new public parliament in the autonomous Rojava 
region: clockwise from top-center these depict the 
flags of the autonomous Rojava region, the Syriac 
Union Party (SUP), the Movement for a Democratic 
Society (Tev-Dem), the Democratic Union Party 
(PYD), the Rojava Democratic Youth Union (YCR) 
and the Star Union of Women (Yekitiya Star). 
Artist: Democratic Self-Administration of Rojava 
and Studio Jonas Staal, 2015-16.
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Figure 4: New World Summit – Rojava.
Description: Public arriving for the celebration of the construction of the new 
public parliament and surrounding park in the city of Derik, commissioned 
by the Democratic Self-Administration of Rojava (northern-Syria). Artist: 
Democratic Self-Administration of Rojava and Studio Jonas Staal, 2015-16. 
Photo: Ernie Buts.
Figure 5: New World Summit – Rojava.
Description: Public celebration of the construction of the new public 
parliament and surrounding park in the city of Derik, commissioned by 
the Democratic Self-Administration of Rojava (northern-Syria). Artist: 
Democratic Self-Administration of Rojava and Studio Jonas Staal, 2015-16. 
Photo: Ruben Hamelink.
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Figure 6: New World Embassy: Rojava.
Description: Overview of the New World Embassy: Rojava in the Oslo City 
Hall. Artist: Democratic Self-Administration of Rojava and Studio Jonas 
Staal, 2016. Commissioned by: Oslo Architecture Triennial: After Belonging, 
After Belonging Agency and KORO Public Art Agency Norway / URO. 
Photo: Istvan Virag.
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Figure 7: New World Embassy: Rojava.
Description: Ambassador Salih Muslim (Co-chair Democratic Union Party, 
PYD) debates with Katerin Mendez (Feminist Initiative!), Lorenzo Marsili 
(European Alternatives), Despina Koutsoumba (Antarsya) and Kate Shea 
Baird (Barcelona en Comú), chaired by Radha d’Souza (University of 
Westminster). Artist: Democratic Self-Administration of Rojava and Studio 
Jonas Staal, 2016. Commissioned by: Oslo Architecture Triennial: After 
Belonging, After Belonging Agency and KORO Public Art Agency Norway / 
URO. Photo: Ernie Buts.
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Figure 8: New World Embassy: Rojava.
Description: Ambassador Sînam Mohammed (Democratic Self-
Administration of Rojava) debates with Laura Raicovich (Queens 
Museum, New York), Moussa Ag Assarid (Free Azawad) and Shela Sheikh 
(Goldsmiths University, London), chaired by Maria Hlavajova (BAK, basis 
voor actuele kunst, Utrecht) in the New World Embassy: Rojava. Artist: 
Democratic Self-Administration of Rojava and Studio Jonas Staal, 2016. 
Commissioned by: Oslo Architecture Triennial: After Belonging, After 
Belonging Agency and KORO Public Art Agency Norway / URO. Photo: 
Ernie Buts.
A revolution of life
Jonas Staal in conversation with Salih Muslim1
In your lecture today you made clear that the battle in Rojava is not just about 
fighting against the Islamic State; it is also a fight for a specific political idea: 
the model of democratic autonomy. What exactly is this model of democratic 
autonomy that lies at the heart of the Rojava Revolution?
The reason we are under attack is because of the democratic model we are 
establishing in our region. Many local forces and governments do not like 
to see these alternative democratic models being developed in Rojava. They 
are afraid of our system. We have created, in the middle of the civil war 
in Syria, three autonomous cantons in the Rojava region that function by 
democratic rule. Together with the ethnic and religious minorities of the 
region – Arabs, Turkmen, Assyrians, Armenians, Christians and Kurds 
– we have written a collective political structure for these autonomous
cantons: our Social Contract2. We have established a people’s council with 
101 representatives from all cooperatives, committees, and assemblies 
running each of our cantons. And we have established a model of co-
presidency – each political entity always has both a female and a male 
chair – and a quota of a minimum of forty percent gender representation 
of each gender, in order to enforce gender equality throughout all forms 
of public life and political representation. We have, in essence, developed 
1 | This interview took place after a lecture by Muslim in Amsterdam, on Novem-
ber 10, 2014. It was first published on Tenk.cc.
2 | The Social Contract was republished in Dilar Dirik, Renée In der Maur 
and Jonas Staal (eds.). Stateless Democracy. Utrecht: BAK, basis voor actu-
ele kunst, 2015. The Social Contract can be found at: https://civiroglu.net/
the-constitution-of-the-rojava-cantons/
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a democracy without the state. That is a unique alternative in a region 
plagued by the internally conflicted Free Syrian Army, the Assad regime 
and the self-proclaimed Islamic State.
Another way of referring to this concept of democratic confederalism, 
or democratic autonomy, is radical democracy, where people are mobilised 
to organise themselves and to defend themselves by means of people’s 
armies like the People’s Protection Units (YPG) and Women’s Protection 
Units (YPJ).3 We are practicing this model of self-rule and self-organisation 
without the state as we speak. Other people will speak of self-rule in 
theory, but for us, this search for self-rule is our daily revolution. Women, 
men, all strands of our society are now organised. The reason why Kobanî 
still stands is because we have built these structures4.
In your lecture, the words “democracy,” “freedom,” and “humanity” came up 
very often. Could you explain what you regard as the fundamental difference 
between capitalist democracy and what you have just described as democratic 
autonomy?
Everyone knows how capitalist democracy plays for the votes; it is a 
play of elections. In many places, parliamentary elections are just about 
propaganda; they only address the direct self-interest of a voter. Democratic 
autonomy is about the long term. It is about people understanding and 
exercising their rights. To get society to become politicised is the core of 
building democratic autonomy. In Europe, you will find a society that is 
not politicised. Political parties are only about persuasion and individual 
benefits, not about actual emancipation and politicisation. Real democracy 
is based on a politicised society. If you go now to Kobanî, and you meet 
the fighters of the YPG and the YPJ, you will find that they know exactly 
why they are fighting and what they are fighting for. They are not there 
3 | The model of democratic confederalism is explained by Abdullah Öcalan in, 
among others, Abdullah Öcalan. Democratic Confederalism. London: Internation-
al Initiative “Freedom for Abdullah Ocalan-Peace in Kurdistan,” 2011.
4 | At the time of this interview, the Women’s and People’s Protection Units (YPJ 
and YPG) were defending Kobanî against the invasion by IS that star ted in Septem-
ber 2014. At the end of October, only 20 percent of the city was under the control 
of the YPJ and YPG, yet in November, they slowly star ted to gain more terrain. Ko-
banî was liberated by the YPJ and YPG on January 27, 2015.
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for money or interests. They are there for elementary values, which they 
practice at the same time. There is no difference between what they do and 
what they represent.
So how does one politicise a society to that level of political consciousness?
You have to educate – twenty-four hours a day – to learn how to discuss, to 
learn how to decide collectively. You have to reject the idea that you have 
to wait for some leader to come and tell the people what to do and instead 
learn to exercise self-rule as a collective practice. When dealing with daily 
matters that concern us all, they have to be explained, criticised and shared 
collectively. From the geopolitics of the region to basic humanitarian 
values, these matters are discussed communally. There has to be collective 
education so we know who we are, why we are facing certain enemies and 
what it is we are fighting for.
In a community that is at war and facing humanitarian crisis, who is the 
educator?
The peoples themselves educate each other. When you put ten people 
together and ask them for a solution to a problem or propose to them 
a question, they collectively look for an answer. I believe, in this way, 
they will find the right one. This collective discussion will make them 
politicised.
What you are describing as the heart of democratic autonomy is in essence the 
model of the assembly.
Yes, we have assemblies, committees; we have every possible structure to 
exercise self-rule throughout all strands of our society.
What do you consider the conditions for such a democratic experiment to be 
able to take place?
It is a long-term process. I myself have been involved in this movement 
for decades, in this fight – I have been in jail; I have been tortured. So 
the people of my community also know why I do what I do. I am not 
there to collect money or to benefit personally. At the time, the reason the 
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Syrian government captured and tortured me was that I was educating the 
people. And I am just one person; so many friends have gone through the 
same. Many have become martyrs as they died as a result of the torture 
of the regime. Democratic autonomy is not an idea to be realised in one 
day; it is an approach, a process that takes explaining, education – it is a 
revolution that takes a lifelong commitment.
There are many students, intellectuals and artists who are looking to Rojava, 
who are looking to Kobanî, and who recognise that, in a way, the promise of 
stateless internationalism has found its way back in our time. What do you say 
to these people who are not in Rojava but who see its revolution as a horizon. 
What can they do?
Well, go to Kobanî. Meet the people and listen to them, understand how 
they have brought their political model about. Speak to the YPG, the YPJ, 
and learn what they are doing – ask them questions, meet their society. 
In the near future, the conditions will allow you to go, and you can learn 
about the model of democratic autonomy that was defended in the worst 
imaginable conditions, with threats to life, with a lack of food and water. 
Go and speak to the people and you will understand how and why they did 
it. And what our society looks like as a result of it.
Do you believe that democratic autonomy could be a model enacted on a global 
level?
I believe that the democratic administration that we have established is 
one that everyone feels they are sharing in, so yes, that is a model for the 
world. There were many prejudices about our revolution, but when people 
from outside visited and sat down with our communities, they started 
to believe that democratic autonomy was the right thing. We had people 
joining our revolution even from Damascus. Everyone can come and see 
for themselves that our revolution is being fought and realised every day. It 
is a revolution of life, and as such, our struggle is a struggle for humanity.
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List of organisations in order of appearance
European Alternatives is a non-profit organisation that works to promote 
democracy, equality and culture beyond the nation-state. https://euroalter.
com 
European Democracy Lab is a Berlin based think-tank working towards 
a more social, politically equal and democratic European future. http://
www.european-republic.eu/de/ 
Barcelona en Comú is a citizens platform and political coalition in the city 
of Barcelona. https://barcelonaencomu.cat 
Marea Atlántica is a citizens platform and political coalition in the city of 
A Coruña. http://mareatlantica.org 
P2P Foundation is an organisation with the aim of studying the impact of 
peer to peer technology and thought on society. https://p2pfoundation.net 
Ahora Madrid is a citizens platform and political coalition in the city of 
Madrid. https://conoce.ahoramadrid.org 
Cambiamo Messina dal Basso is a grass roots movements and citizens 
platform in the city of Messina. http://www.cambiamomessinadalbasso.it 
Ne davimo Beograd (Don’t let Belgrade d(r)own) is a right-to-the-city in-
itiative in Serbia resisting massive redevelopment plans in the centre of 
Belgrade as well as government corruption https://www.facebook.com/
nedavimobeograd/ 
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Human Rights Institute Bratislava, Slovakia is a NGO fighting for civil 
liberties and rights in Slovakia and the region http://www.ludskeprava.sk/ 
openDemocracy is an independent global media platform covering world 
affairs, ideas and culture which seeks to challenge power and encourage 
democratic debate across the world. https://www.opendemocracy.net 
Krytyka Polityczna is a network of Polish left-wing institutions and intel-
lectuals that works on the fields of social sciences, culture and politics to 
have an impact against economic and social exclusion. http://krytykapo-
lityczna.pl 
Eldiario.es is a member financed Spanish online newspaper founded in 
2012. http://www.eldiario.es 
Abwab is the first Arabic newspaper in Germany launched in 2015. http://
www.abwab.eu 
DiEM25  is a pan-European, cross-border movement of democrats that 
works as an infrastructure to democratise Europe before 2025. https://
diem25.org/home-de/ 
Syriza is left-wing political party in Greece, founded in 2004 
The Commons Network is a civil society initiative and think-tank working 
on a local, national and European level promoting access to knowledge 
and other social and ecological causes from the perspective of the com-
mons. http://commonsnetwork.eu 
European Commons Assembly is a process that started in in May 2016 
gathering diverse commons activists from 21 countries across Europe par-
ticipating to develop a shared agenda for the commons. https://european-
commonsassembly.eu 
Stop TTIP is an alliance of more than 500 European organisations run-
ning campaigns and actions against TTIP and CETA. https://stop-ttip.org 
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Razem is a left-wing political party in Poland formed in May 2015. http://
partiarazem.pl 
Demos is a civic platform formed in Romania that works bringing people 
together to debate and organise around the values of democracy and soli-
darity. https://www.facebook.com/Platforma.Demos/ 
New World Summit is an artistic and political organisation dedicated to 
providing alternative parliaments to host organisations that currently find 
themselves excluded from democracy. http://newworldsummit.org 
Democratic Union Party Syria (PYD) is a left-wing Kurdish political party 
established in 2003 by Kurdish activists in northern Syria. It is the leading 
political party in the Federation of Northern Syria - Rojava and its cantons. 
http://pydrojava.com 
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